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Abstract 
 
 
The main purpose of this study is to suggest reforms to Saudi limited liability company 
(LLC) law that would better protect minority shareholders. The analysis emphasizes the 
present difficulties a dissatisfied minority LLC shareholder faces when seeking to sell his 
or her stake in a company. A lack of liquidity in the KSA’s market for LLC shares is a 
major impediment to minority shareholders attempting to exit a business. The paper’s 
research demonstrates that the Saudi Companies Regulation (SCR) inadequately protects 
LLC minority shareholder rights, leaving them vulnerable to majority oppression. The 
paper argues that the SCR should be reformed to incorporate more of the minority 
shareholder protections provided by United States’ LLC laws. Specifically, the SCR should 
adopt two reforms that would be triggered by certain majority shareholder misconduct: (1) 
a statutory dissolution remedy and (2) mandatory buy-out rights for minority shareholders. 
The paper argues that these two protections are necessary to address the KSA’s illiquid 
market for LLC shares, as well as the present uncertainty regarding the duties of loyalty 
and care owed by LLC shareholders and managers.   
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Overview of the Study 
1.1. Background  
 
Terminating the relationship between an individual shareholder1, the other 
shareholders, and an entire company often proves difficult for small and medium-sized, 
closely-held businesses like an LLC. In large publicly-traded corporations, individual 
shareholders can easily liquidate their interest and terminate the relationship with the 
business whenever they wish, unless specifically restricted from doing so by a 
shareholders’ agreement.2 Owning shares in public companies generally does not directly 
affect the business’s activities or direction because such companies are typically managed 
by a board of directors and a board-selected group of officers. Additionally, public 
company shareholders are rarely involved in daily operations,3 whereas LLC shareholders 
often hold the right to vote on major company decisions. In an LLC, controlling 
shareholders therefore possess the power to direct company decisions through their voting 
power. Resolutions passed with the required voting percentage of shareholders can have a 
great effect on company operations and potentially endanger minority shareholders in the 
process.  A minority shareholder affected in this fashion may naturally wish to leave the 
venture and invest in a different company.4   
                                                 
1 The term “shareholder” as used in this research includes an individual LLC owner in Saudi Arabia, 
consistent with Western literature’s use of the term when referring to KSA LLC owners. Similarly, 
“shareholder” as used in the UK, France, Germany and many other European countries refers to an 
individual LLC owner. This differs with the term’s use in the United States, where “shareholder” refers to 
individual corporation owners, and individual LLC owners are referred to as “members.”   
2 Robert J. McGaughey, Business Breakups: Terminating Ownership 
Interests in Closely Held Businesses, Insights Journal (2011), Available at 
http://www.willamette.com/insights_journal/11/summer_2011_7.pdf.   
3 Julian Velasco, The Fundamental Rights of the Shareholder, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 407, 468 (2006). 
Available at https://lawreview.law.ucdavis.edu/issues/40/2/articles/davisvol40no2_velasco.pdf. 
4 Id. at 309. 
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A delicate balancing of the interests of majority and minority owners 
is necessary, for the majority owners should not be chained to what 
they believe to be unsound business judgment; yet, neither should 
the minority owners be bound to remain shareholders when they 
have similar misgivings.5 
 
Any difficulty in exiting an LLC can lead to an unfavorable outcome for minority 
shareholders who become locked into the company. To the extent that the majority owners 
are making company decisions based on their own personal interests,6 regardless of the 
company’s interest as a whole, a locked-in minority shareholder’s interest may not be 
adequately protected.7 Exit rights are therefore critical to protecting minority shareholders 
from majority misconduct, which can be a common occurrence.8 Transfer of share rights 
(the right to sell to a third party) and withdrawal rights that entitle the exiting shareholder 
to a return of capital are therefore critical mechanisms from the standpoint of minority 
owners. This research examines the ability of Saudi LLC owners to exit a venture while 
retaining the value of their investment prior to the natural termination and dissolution of 
the business.  The extent to which they can do this while avoiding litigation is also 
considered. The research additionally analyzes the corresponding withdrawal rights and 
interests under U.S. LLC statutes, as well as the remedies available to owners in both 
jurisdictions in the event of management deadlock or majority oppression.   
 
 
 
                                                 
5 Id. at 310. 
6 Sandra K. Miller, Minority Shareholder Oppression in the Private Company in the European Community: 
A Comparative Analysis of the German, United Kingdom, and French Close Corporation Problem, 30 
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 382 (1997). Available at 
https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1402&context=cilj. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. at 391. 
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1.2. Reasons for Choosing this Study 
 
 
This subject was chosen in light of the following: 
1-  Presently existing studies and legal literature on KSA business organizations only 
discuss LLCs in general terms, and typically do not deal at all with LLC shareholder 
rights. The existing studies focus primarily on establishing and running joint-stock 
companies. None of the literature has investigated or explored in-depth the legal 
relationships among LLC shareholders. A comprehensive study regarding LLC 
minority investor protections has yet to be completed.  
2- The Saudi government’s recent moves to encourage foreign and international 
investment make LLC shareholder rights in the KSA a particularly relevant topic. 
The government’s efforts have increased both the overall number of companies 
operating in the Saudi market and, in particular, the number of LLCs. As investors 
require a favorable legal and economic climate in order to commit their funds, 
defining an LLC shareholder’s rights is a matter of ongoing and growing 
importance. 
  
1.3. Significance of the Study 
 
The LLC is one of the most popular company structures in Saudi Arabia. The 
Kingdom’s private sector, in particular, contains large numbers of LLCs (sharikat that 
massouliyyah mahdoodah). According to the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA), 
over 54,000 LLCs existed as of 2011, in comparison with fewer than 6,000 joint-stock 
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companies (corporations) (sharikat musahamah).9 Of companies established in 2013, 
LLCs accounted for the highest share (63.2%) of total capital, followed by joint-stock 
companies, which accounted for 21.1% of capital.10  
LLCs are broadly accepted in the business sector for a number of reasons. First, 
LLCs are subject to less internal supervision by official authorities than are JSCs.11 Second, 
LLCs require a smaller initial capital contribution at formation.12 While JSCs are required 
to have a minimum of SR 500,00013 in start-up capital, in addition to submitting a 
feasibility study to the government, no minimum formation capital is required to establish 
an LLC.14 Each of these features, along with the limited liability protection that shields 
LLC owners from personal liability for business debts and other obligations, plays a role 
in LLCs’ popularity. Additionally, the quick and convenient formation of LLCs, combined 
with the broad sectors of the Saudi economy in which they can operate—despite some 
difficulties with insurance, savings, and banking operations—also contribute to their rapid 
proliferation in the Kingdom. Finally, LLCs are particularly suitable for family businesses, 
which form a significant part of the Saudi economy, and are primarily LLCs. SAMA notes 
that family businesses account for 95% of Saudi companies.15  
Saudi family businesses represent 62% of the total wealth of family businesses in 
                                                 
9 Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA), Forty-Eighth Annual Report 1433H, (2012). Available at 
http://www.sama.gov.sa/en-
US/EconomicReports/AnnualReport/5600_R_Annual_En_48_2013_02_19.pdf. 
10 Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA), Fiftieth Annual Report 1435H, (2014). Available at 
http://www.sama.gov.sa/en-US/EconomicReports/AnnualReport/5600_R_Annual_En_50_Apx.pdf. 
11 See Saudi Companies Regulation, Articles 56, 57, 58, and 59. Issued by Royal Decree No. (M/3) dated 
28/1/1437 H. Corresponding to November 12, 2015. 
12 While the previous SCR required a minimum formation capital of SR 500,000, the amended SCR 
abolished the minimum capital requirement; Id. Art. 160. 
13 1 US Dollar equals 3.75 Saudi Riyal. 500,000 SR equals 133347.56 USD. 
14 Id. at 54. 
15 Shehabaddin Al-Dubai, Ku Nor Izah Ku Ismail, & Noor Afza Amran, Overview of family business in 
Saudi Arabia (2012). Available at https://www.researchgate.net/publication/281050775. 
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the Middle East.16 Such companies are also responsible for approximately 12% of Saudi 
Arabia's GDP, and 40% of its non-oil revenue. Moreover, foreign investment in Saudi 
Arabia most often flows to LLCs; 87% of foreign businesses in Saudi Arabia assume an 
LLC form.17 KSA seeks to attract more foreign investment as a part of its Vision 2030 plan, 
seeking to diversify its economy and reduce its reliance on oil. In 2016 alone, the Saudi 
General Investment Authority (SAGIA) issued 1,999 business licenses to foreign 
establishments (industrial, service, and other), representing approximately SAR 500 billion 
in capital.18 The vast majority of these newly-established companies take the form of 
LLCs.19 The Kingdom has also announced the goal of doubling the number of LLCs, to 
104,000, by 2020.20 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
16 Id. 
17 Supra note 10. 
18 Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA), 53rd. Annual Report 
1438H (2017). Available at http://www.sama.gov.sa/en-
US/EconomicReports/AnnualReport/Fifty%20Third%20Annual%20Report.pdf. 
19 Id. 
20 U.S. Commercial Service, Doing Business in Saudi Arabia, 2017 Country Commercial Guide for U.S. 
Companies (2017). Available at https://sa.usembassy.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/60/CCG-2017-Saudi-
Arabia.pdf. 
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 2010 2011 Cumulative Total up to 2011 
Type of 
Company 
Number Capital Number Capital 
% 
Share 
in 
Capital 
Number Capital 
% 
Share 
in 
Capital 
Joint-stock 
companies 
361 66,229.2 403 4, 349.7 16. 7 5,076 1,707,555.6 85.3 
     Saudi 
320 66,017.2 360 4,334.6 16.7 4,565 1,692,848.7 84.6 
     Gulf 
7 0.5 3 0.0 0.0 45 3,035.0 0.2 
     Arab 
0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 6 1,754.1 0.1 
     Joint-venture 
7 50.0 4 0.0 0.0 40 6,867.7 0.3 
     Foreign 
1 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 6 613.3 0.0 
 Foreign branches 
26 161.6 36 15.1 0.1 414 2,436.8 0.1 
LLCs 
5,713 15,565.4 6,412 21,624.4 83.1 54,294 280,534.6 14.0 
     Saudi 
4,588 5,822.5 5,275 14,858.3 57.1 44,625 168,424.8 8.4 
     Gulf 
258 512.8 248 189.2 0.7 2,238 13,992.5 0.7 
     Joint-venture 
457 8,668.6 458 2,229.2 8.6 4,542 77,923.9 3.9 
     Foreign 
233 304.3 205 4,168.8 16.0 1,684 18,533.4 0.9 
 Foreign branches 
177 257.2 226 179.0 0.7 1,205 1,660.0 0.1 
General 
Partnerships 
199 34.0 393 45.2 0.2 5,854 3,927.2 0.2 
     Saudi 
194 33.9 387 37.9 0.1 5,731 3,844.7 0.2 
     Gulf 
0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 19 11.2 0.0 
   Joint-venture 
0 0.0 1 0.5 0.0 23 15.4 0.0 
   Foreign 
1 0.1 0 0.0 0.0 4 0.1 0.0 
 Foreign branches 
4 0.0 5 6.8 0.0 77 55.8 0.0 
Limited 
Partnerships 
94 72.3 152 6.1 0.0 2,767 9,939.2 0.5 
     Saudi 
92 71.7 147 4.6 0.0 2,696 9,857.9 0.5 
     Gulf 
1 0.1 1 0.0 0.0 13 2.5 0.0 
     Joint-venture 
0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 8 21.9 0.0 
     Foreign 
0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 12 26.9 0.0 
Foreign branches     
1 0.5 4 1.5 0.0 38 30.0 0.0 
Total 6,367 81,900.9 7,360 26,025.4 100.0 67,991 2,001,956.6 100.0 
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1.4. Research Methodology  
 
This study uses both critical analytical21 and comparative research methods. The 
study applies critical analysis methods in evaluating the SCR provisions governing LLCs. 
Critical analysis is also employed with regard to the published cases, legal documents, and 
academic articles which help to interpret and apply the relevant SCR statutes. For 
comparative research purposes, reference is made to U.S. LLC laws—mainly the Uniform 
Limited Liability Company Act, the Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, the 
Delaware Limited Liability Company Act, and their accompanying case law from different 
U.S. jurisdictions. The comparative approach is used to provide the Saudi legislature with 
specific, substantive examples for future domestic legal reforms.22 To generate a 
comprehensive understanding of LLC shareholder rights in practice, the study also 
examines more than 30 KSA Articles of Association, as well as a number of U.S. LLC 
operating agreements.  
 
1.5. Research Questions and Objectives 
 
 It is generally believed that SCR does not offer adequate statutory protection for 
minority shareholders in closely held businesses, including LLCs.23 This study aims to 
understand the different ways in which the U.S. and Saudi Arabia address protection of 
                                                 
21 Critical Analysis of Law is a doctrinal method for studying the application, and interaction, of particular 
legal rules seen in actual statutes and court opinions. For more information about the Critical Analysis 
method see Markus D. Dubber, Critical Analysis of Law: Interdisciplinarity, Contextuality, and the Future 
of Legal Studies (June 2012). Available at http://individual.utoronto.ca/dubber/CAL.pdf 
22 Kai Schadbach, The Benefits of Comparative Law: A Continental European View, 16 B.U. INT'L L. J. 
331, 422 (1998). 
23 FAHAD AL-MAJED, A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR REFORMING THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF 
SAUDI PUBLICLY HELD COMPANIES: A COMPARATIVE AND ANALYTICAL STUDY FROM A LEGAL 
PERSPECTIVE, 338, 339 (1st ed. 2012). 
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minority LLC shareholders. This comparative methodology will identify potential reforms 
to Saudi Arabian LLC law. More specifically, this research aims to identify the main 
obstacles facing LLC minority shareholders seeking to exit a company by transferring or 
liquidating their investments, which is the primary way minority LLC investors protect 
their interests. In sum, the paper aims to answer the following questions: (1) Does Saudi 
law provide sufficient mechanisms for preventing LLC shareholders from becoming 
locked into a business? (2) Are there courses of action available to LLC minority 
shareholders if they find themselves vulnerable to majority owners’ oppression or 
misconduct? (3) Do sufficient reasons exist to justify reforms to the Kingdom’s protection 
for LLC minority shareholders? (4) In what ways do U.S. LLC laws suggest possible 
reforms to KSA LLC law? (5) Should Saudi Arabia adopt any specific provisions from 
U.S. LLC laws, and what benefits would be achieved by doing so? 
 
1.6. Research Structure 
 
 To thoroughly explore the research questions, this dissertation is divided into seven 
chapters. The current chapter introduces the project, describes the importance of the study, 
and identifies the research methodology, objects, and questions. 
Chapter Two provides historical and cultural context for understanding Saudi 
Arabia and its legal system. The chapter includes a brief chronological narrative of the 
Kingdom, its establishment, and its unique legal system. It also discusses the Basic Law of 
Governance of 1992 (the constitution of Saudi Arabia), and its role in structuring the KSA’s 
institutions and government. Finally, the chapter examines the primary and secondary 
sources of law, the Kingdom’s authorities, and its competent courts. 
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Chapter Three introduces the Saudi Companies Regulation of 1965 and the current 
Saudi Companies Regulation (SCR). It also provides an introductory overview of LLCs in 
the Kingdom, including the potential liability of LLC managers, required formalities and 
publications, company management structures, and the validity of contracts establishing 
LLCs. The final section discusses the mandatory and default statutory rules.  
Chapter Four describes the transfer of LLC shares and motivations for restricting 
such transfers. It examines restrictions on transfers under the 1965 SCR and the current 
SCR, the statutory right of first refusal, the legal consequences for breaching the right of 
first refusal, mergers and acquisitions involving LLC shareholders, the problem of fair 
value and bona fide offers, and the alternative valuation methodologies that exist in LLC 
agreements. Comparison to U.S. LLC laws is also made with regard to transferring interests 
and a member’s ability to sell to third parties.  
Chapter Five covers the challenges a shareholder faces in attempting a voluntary 
withdrawal from an LLC, share withdrawal’s adverse impact and costs to company 
creditors, involuntary withdrawal caused by shareholder death or dissolution, calculating 
share value upon withdrawal, statutory limitations on distributions, and creditor 
protections. Comparison to U.S. laws is also made, regarding each of these subjects.   
Chapter Six covers the effectiveness of various judicial protections for minority 
shareholders’ rights. Such protections include judicial dissolution of the LLC in response 
to certain events, such as majority oppression or misconduct. The chapter also explores 
managers’ fiduciary duties, available remedies in the KSA, the judicial dissolution process 
in the U.S., and the available courses of action for dissatisfied LLC members under certain 
circumstances. 
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Finally, Chapter Seven concludes the study by recommending specific amendments 
to correct gaps in the current SCR. The recommendations aim to improve the position of 
minority shareholders in Saudi LLCs. 
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Chapter 2: The Saudi Legal System 
2.1. Introduction 
 
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a relatively new country. It was founded in 1932 
by King Abdulaziz ibn Saud. However, its legal origins date back more than 250 years.24 
Historically, the first Saudi state, named the Emirate of Dir'iya, was formed in 1744 when 
Prince Muhammad bin Saud, the ancestor of Saudi King Abdul Aziz, and Sheikh 
Mohammed bin Abdul Wahab, a religious reformer, created an alliance known as the 
Agreement of Dir’iya. They worked together to correct religious doctrine, apply Islamic 
law, and achieve monotheism. Thereafter, Prince Mohammed bin Saud became the Imam 
of the Muslims and his descendants have  since ruled the Saudi Kingdom.25 Sheikh 
Mohammed Ibn Abdul Wahhab’s goal was to improve the behavior of the community by 
removing all innovations and superstitions that were widespread among the people in the 
Arabia Peninsula at that time.26 Thus, the system of government in the first and second 
Saudi states was simple and relied on tribal traditions that modified the Hanbalite 
interpretations of Islamic law.27 After the establishment of the third Saudi state, the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, King Abdulaziz, developed a strong administrative system and 
the judiciary for the country.28 In 1925, King Abdulaziz issued instructions during his 
                                                 
24 FRANK VOGEL, A CASE COMPARISON: ISLAMIC LAW AND THE SAUDI AND IRANIAN LEGAL SYSTEMS, IN 6 
ISLAM: MUSLIMS AND MODERNITY : CULTURE AND SOCIETY SINCE 1800, 302-303 (Robert W. Hefner ed., 
2011). 
25 Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab was a Sunni scholar of the Hanbali school, considered by his followers 
to be a Reformer of the Islamic religion on the Arabian Peninsula where he encouraged Muslims to get rid 
of innovations and myths, worship one God, and renounce polytheism. For more information about Sheikh 
Mohammed bin Abdul Wahhab and Wahhabism see: MUHAMMAD IBN GAALIH AL-'UTHAYMEEN, 
EXPLANATION OF THE THREE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF ISLAM Available at: 
http://onthesunnah.com/Page_Knowledge/ebooks/3usul.pdf  
26 SATTAM AL TAYYAR, BUSINESS LAWS OF SAUDI ARABIA, 1-2 (First ed. 2010). 
27 S. A. SOLAIM, CONSTITUTIONAL AND JUDICIAL ORGANIZATION IN SAUDI ARABIA, 7-8 (First ed. 1970). 
28 Al Tayyar, supra note 27. 
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announcement of the temporary formation of the head of the judiciary, known as 
"temporary reform materials for the Islamic courts." The King then explained in his speech, 
published in the newspaper Umm al-Qura No. 32 on Aug 9th,1925, about the sources of 
judicial rulings, stating: 
The provisions of Islam are the basis for all rulings, and in this 
fashion Islam will continue to provide the light guiding all believers. 
Islam serves as a faith intended to benefit all people in this world 
and the Hereafter; the truth of Islam and its provisions, therefore best 
ensure joy and happiness and well-being. 29 
 
 Saudi Arabia is an Islamic state whose system of government is a monarchy. There 
is no law that supersedes Islamic law (Shari'a)30, which derives its rulings from the Qur'an, 
the book of God, and the Sunnah, which encompasses the traditions, speeches, and actions 
of the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him). The Qur'an and the Sunnah are considered 
the constitution of the Kingdom.31 There is no formal, written constitution for the Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia. However, I support the point of view of some who believe that the Saudi 
Basic Law of Governance meets all of the criteria and definitions of a constitution, and is 
equivalent to the Constitution in other countries because it describes the authority of the 
state and defines the powers of the King, his cabinet, government agencies, and the 
judiciary. All Saudi laws must adhere to the provisions of Islamic law on a broad scale 
including family law, criminal law, commercial law, contracts, and administrative law. 
Royal decrees are another basic source of law, but they are referred to as Regulations 
                                                 
29  The Supreme Council of the Judiciary's portal, the Council, a description of the judiciary. See: 
https://www.scj.gov.sa/about. (In Arabic). 
30 Shari'ah is what Allah has decreed for Muslims which includes provisions, rules, and systems for the 
establishment of a just life and the maintenance of people's interests and security in the beliefs, worship, 
ethics, transactions and systems of life, with the appointment of various people to regulate the relationship 
of people with their God. See: M. Helmy, Islamic Sharia and its moral virtues, available at at 
http://www.alukah.net/sharia/0/43846/#ixzz4tAcilFrR. In Arabic. 
31 DENNIS CAMPBELL, AND CHRISTIAN T. CAMPBELL., LEGAL ASPECTS OF DOING BUSINESS IN THE 
MIDDLE EAST, 157-159 (2nd ed, 2009). 
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(nizam) rather than laws, indicating that Shari'a prevails. Royal decrees are complementary 
to Shari'a, and all commercial matters dealing with companies, banking, and capital 
markets, are governed by modern regulations.32  
Saudi law is unique in the Islamic world because it is not entirely codified. In a 
number of Islamic countries, Islamic law has been codified and preserved. However, in the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the state considers Islamic law, which is not codified as a whole, 
to be the law of the country, and prevents any law from conflicting with it. Saudi law is, 
therefore, unique not only in comparison with Western countries, but also in comparison 
with other Islamic countries. Non-codification leads to significant differences in 
interpretation and application of the law. In addition, judicial precedents and the concept 
of stare decisis, are not recognized, which may prompt judges to revert to ancient Hanbali 
texts and other Sunni schools33 of jurisprudence or to apply their own judgment known as 
Ijtihad. Because of this, many legal scholars have argued for the codification and 
legitimization of Sharia to remove any ambiguity or doubt.34 
 
                                                 
32  JONATHAN ERCANBRACK, THE TRANSFORMATION OF ISLAMIC LAW IN GLOBAL FINANCIAL MARKETS, 2-
6 (First ed. 2014). 
33 Muslims in the world are divided into Sunnis and Shiites. Sunnis constitute the vast majority, estimated 
at about 85% of all Muslims, while Shiites constitute the smallest percentage of about 15%. The Sunnis are 
divided into four schools: Shaafa'is, Malikis, Hanafis, and Hanbalis. See Christopher M. Blanchard, Islam: 
Sunnis and Shiites  at https://fas.org/irp/crs/RS21745.pdf. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia follows the 
Hanbali school. This is confirmed by the royal decree of King Abdul Aziz in 1928 requiring the judges to 
rule under the Hanbali School in general. However, in cases when the Hanbali school is not applied, and 
instead, a judge is applying another school, the judge must mention the evidence and show justifiable 
reasons. See George Sayen, Arbitration, Conciliation, and the Islamic Legal Tradition in Saudi Arabia, 24 
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L. 905, 958 (2003), available at: 
https://www.law.upenn.edu/journals/jil/articles/volume9/issue2/Sayen9U.Pa.J.Int%27lBus.L.211%281987
%29.pdf. 
34 See ANDREA L. STANTON, ET AL., CULTURAL SOCIOLOGY OF THE MIDDLE EAST, AFRICA, AND ASIA: AN 
ENCYCLOPEDIA (SAGE. 2012). 
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2.2. The Basic Law of Governance 199235 
 
The promulgation of the Basic Law of Governance is one of the most prominent 
features in the current stage of the political and social development of the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia, a stage that we can label the stage of development and reconstruction of 
systems and institutions of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Even though the Basic Law of 
Governance does not describe itself as the Constitution of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, it 
contains sufficient formalities and formal legal standards that allow it to be considered as 
the constitution of Saudi Arabia in accordance with the standards found in the constitutions 
of other countries.36 The origin of the Basic Law of Governance and its source is Islamic 
law, and the Saudi Government and its judicial system are guided by the law of Islam in 
determining the nature of the state, its headquarters and its responsibilities. Islamic law 
also determines the relationship between the ruler and the governed. The first Article of the 
Basic Law of Governance states that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a fully sovereign 
Arab Islamic State. Its religion shall be Islam, and its constitution shall be the Book of God 
and the Teachings of Muhammed (the Qur'an and the Sunnah).37 Governance in the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia derives its authority from the Book of God and the Sunnah of 
his Messenger, both of which govern this Law and all the laws of the State.38The system 
of governance in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia shall be monarchical. Only the sons of the 
Founder, King Abd-AlAziz ibn Abdul Rahman al-Faisal Al Saud, and the sons of his sons 
can be the monarchs of the Kingdom. Allegiance shall be pledged to the most suitable 
                                                 
35 The Basic Law of Governance (al-nizam al-asasi in Arabic) issued on March 1st, 1992 under King 
Fahd bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud by royal decree, concerning the manner of governance in Saudi Arabia, and 
the law, in a simple manner, acts like the Constitution in other countries. 
36 TIM NIBLOCK, SAUDI ARABIA: POWER, LEGITIMACY AND SURVIVAL, 104, 105 (Illustrated ed. 2004). 
37The Basic Law of Governance., supra note 36, Art. 1. 
38  Id Art. 7. 
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amongst them to reign on the basis of the Book of God Most High and the Sunnah of His 
Messenger (PBUH).39 Although Article 44 of the statute explicitly states that the authorities 
in the Kingdom are divided into executive, regulatory, and judicial departments, it 
concludes that the King shall be their final authority. The King has the power to appoint 
and commend judges on the recommendation of the Supreme Council of the Judiciary 
(Articles 52). 
 
2.3. Sources of Law 
 
The Book of God40 and the Sunnah of his Messenger Muhammad are the primary 
sources that govern all of the regulations promulgated in the Kingdom, and they apply to 
all acts of any kind without exception.41 Islamic law is not limited to divine legislation, and 
the Sunnah is not the only source of Islamic law. Secondary sources, including texts 
                                                 
39 Article 5 of the Basic Law of Governance defines the mechanism for the transfer of rule in Saudi Arabia, 
in addition to the "Allegiance Commission Law" which was issued by King Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz in 
October 2006 to select the King and the Crown Prince in the future. Article 5 states that "the King chooses 
the Crown Prince and exempts him by Royal Order." However, with the issuance of the "Allegiance 
Commission Law", this section of the Basic Law of Governance was canceled and replaced by another 
clause stating that Article 6 of the Allegiance Commission replaces the article and that "upon the death of 
the King, the Commission shall call for allegiance to the Crown Prince as the King of the country in 
accordance with this Statute and the Statute of Government." By this text, power was transferred to Prince 
Salman to be King of the country. In June 2017, King Salman bin Abdulaziz issued a royal decree that 
included an amendment to Article 5 of the Basic Law of Governance to read as follows: "The rule shall 
apply to the sons of the founding King Abdul Aziz bin Abdulrahman Al-Faisal Al-Saud and to the sons of 
the sons and the most promising of them to judge the Book of Allah and the Sunnah of His Messenger, 
Peace be upon him, and not apply to the sons of the founding King of the throne of the one branch of the 
offspring of the founding king." This means that the "sons of sons" the descendants of the founder, when 
they rule the kingdom, are not entitled to appoint a crown prince from the same branch to which they 
belong. See, Bureau of Experts at the Council of Ministers, The Law of pledge of Allegiance Commission, 
Saudi Law Compendium, available at: 
https://www.boe.gov.sa/ViewSystemDetails.aspx?lang=en&SystemID=8&VersionID=13. The Basic Law 
of Governance, available at: 
https://www.boe.gov.sa/ViewSystemDetails.aspx?lang=en&SystemID=4&VersionID=240.   
40  Means Qur’an. 
41  DENNIS CAMPBELL, LEGAL ASPECTS OF DOING BUSINESS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, 158  (Kluwer; West 
Pub. Co. 1986).  
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containing the consensus of opinion developed after Muhammad's death (Ijma in Arabic), 
the analogical reasoning (Qiyas), the jurisprudence and independent reasoning of the 
judges (Ijtihad), the public interest (Maslahah Mursalah), Custom (Urf), and the juristic 
preference (Istihsan) may also be referenced in judicial opinions or when drafting 
legislation.42 Saudi Arabia and secondary sources of Islamic law give the King the power 
and the authority to issue regulations, by royal decree. However, the authority of the King 
to issue regulations is subject to the requirement that his decrees conform to the concept of 
siyasa shar'iyya.43 The concept of siyasa shar'iyya implies that in order for decrees to be 
valid, they must be useful to the public, and not contradict the general principles of Islamic 
law.44  
Pursuant to the Saudi Basic Law of Governance:  
The courts shall apply to cases before them the provisions of Islamic 
Shari’ah, as indicated by the Qur’an and the Sunnah, and whatever 
laws not in conflict with the Qur’an and the Sunnah which the 
authorities may promulgate. (Article 48). 
 
“The King shall run the affairs of the nation in accordance with the siyasa 
shar'iyya. He shall supervise the implementation of Islamic Shari’ah and the 
general policies of the State, and the protection and defense of the country.” 
(Article 55). 
 
 
The process of enactment of regulations usually begins when a proposal is 
submitted by a Minister or a member of the Saudi Cabinet working in the Saudi 
                                                 
42 JONATHAN G. BURNS, INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC LAW: PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL, CRIMINAL, AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW UNDER THE SHARI'A (1st ed.  2013). 
43 Siyasa Shar'iyya means the ruler has the power to take any actions, including legislating and establishing 
administrative arrangements by means of Qiyas, Istihsan, Maslahah Mursalah, and Urf, to achieve the 
interests of the public and bring benefits or appropriate services to them, and to reduce harms or activities 
that are contrary to the general principles of Islamic law.  For more information about this concept, see 
FRANK E. VOGEL, ISLAMIC LAW AND LEGAL SYSTEM: STUDIES OF SAUDI ARABIA 43, 44 (Brill. 2000). 
44 See Frank Vogel, supra note 25. 
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Government. The proposal is then reviewed by the Prime Minister who is also the King. If 
the proposed law is approved by the King, then the regulation shall be promulgated by 
Royal Decree, and published in official newspaper.45 The Saudi Government has issued a 
broad range of regulations in all fields, including laws which regulate business transactions 
and corporate businesses. The following is a review of the regulations affecting the 
corporate business and investment environment in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia:46 
(1)  Companies Regulation 
(2)  Commercial Agencies Regulation 
(3)  Public Investment Fund Regulation 
(4) Commercial Books Regulation 
(5)  Commercial Register Regulation 
(6) Settlement Against Bankruptcy Regulation 
(7) Foreign Investment Regulation 
(8) General Investment Authority Regulation 
(9) Trade Marks Regulation 
(10) Capital Market Regulation 
 
2.4. Interpretive Sources  
 
Saudi legislation is often interpreted by reference to the principles of Sharia law and 
Islamic Fiqh.47  Wherever there are gaps in the Saudi legislation, these gaps are generally 
supplemented by reference to Sharia law.48 If any conflict arises between legislations and 
                                                 
45 See Campbell, Supra note 32, at 159. 
46 See Bureau of Experts at the Council of Ministers, Browse the Saudi Laws Compendium, available at 
https://www.boe.gov.sa/mainlaws.aspx?lang=en. 
47 Jonathan Reardon & Asim Almalik, Corporate governance and directors' duties in Saudi Arabia: 
overview at https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/8-608-
8945?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&firstPage=true&comp=pluk&bhcp=1. 
48 Id. 
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Sharia law, Sharia law is likely to prevail.49 Nonetheless, the Judiciary and jurisprudence 
(opinions of jurists) are considered the two important interpretative sources of commercial 
law in Saudi Arabia. As an interpretative source of the law, the judiciary is the set of 
principles adopted by the courts in its past rulings, which are known as "The Legal 
Doctrines".50’51 These principles guide judges in making rulings and formulating solutions 
to disputes that have no resolution in a consensual or customary text. The purpose of the 
judiciary is to bridge the lack of legislation, and not create new legal rules. The judiciary 
in Saudi Arabia does not have the power to legislate, but it can interpret and reconcile 
ambiguous legal texts.52 It is important to recall that, unlike the situation in common law 
countries, the concept of stare decisis is not recognized in Saudi Arabia, which means that 
the prior decisions of a court or a judicial committee have no binding authority on a court 
considering another case involving similar facts.53 The jurisprudence and opinions of the 
legal scholars are non-binding sources of commercial law in Saudi Arabia as well. A judge 
may be guided by these opinions, but he is not obliged to follow a particular opinion. Legal 
literature, research, and comments by jurists on the legal rules play a significant role in 
understanding the provisions of commercial and corporate law, especially when there is a 
new legislation.54 
 
                                                 
49 Id. 
50  YAHYA SAID, AL-WAJEEZ IN SAUDI COMMERCIAL LAW, 32-35 (Al-Maktab Al-Arabi Al-Hadeeth, 7th ed. 
2004). In Arabic 
51 The Legal Doctrines hold a certain persuasive literary power over the judiciary, but they are not binding 
in any way and a judge may choose not to follow them.  
52 MOHAMMED BIN HASSAN AL-JABR, SAUDI COMMERCIAL LAW, 29-30 (4th ed. 1996). In Arabic 
53 See Andrea L. Stanton, supra note 35. 
54 Al-Jabr, supra note 53. 
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2.5. Authority of the State 
  
 Article 44 of the Basic Law of Governance states that the authorities in the 
Kingdom shall consist of the judicial authority, the executive authority, and the regulatory 
authority.55 Article 44 also stipulates that the authorities shall cooperate in the discharge of 
their functions in accordance with the Basic Law of Governance and other laws, and the 
King shall be their final authority.56 
 
A. The Executive Branch 
The executive authority in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia consists of the King as the 
President of the Executive Authority, as stipulated in Article 44 of the Basic Law of 
Governance, and the Council of Ministers.57  The Council of Ministers is composed of 
Deputy Prime Ministers entrusted with the implementation of State regulations and 
decisions by the governmental departments. The Council of Ministers acts as a Cabinet of 
Advisors to the King. The Council of Ministers also participates in representing the 
regulatory authority of the country within the Shura Council58, and has the authority to 
draw up the internal, external, financial, economic, educational, and defense policies as 
well as conduct general affairs of State. It also has the executive power and the final 
authority in financial and administrative affairs of all ministries and other government 
                                                 
55 The Legislative Branch. 
56  The Basic Law of Governance, supra note 36, Art. 44.  
57 The Council of Ministers is the supreme council of government in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
58 (Majlis Al Shura, in Arabic) is the formal advisory body of Saudi Arabia and is considered as the primary 
legislative authority of the state. 
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institutions.59 The King is the Prime Minister,60 and he has the absolute power to appoint 
ministers and deputy ministers, and can remove them from their positions by Royal Order 
as well.61 The Council of Ministers plays a significant role in the supervisory aspect of the 
Government by supervising administrative work, applying regulations, and drafting 
instructions as required. Thus, the Council of Ministers functions within the framework of 
the executive powers granted by the Basic Law of Governance by:  
• Monitoring the implementation of regulations, by-laws and resolutions. 
• Creating and arranging public institutions. 
• Following up on the implementation of the general plan for development. 
• Forming committees for the oversight of the ministries' and other governmental 
agencies in their conduct of business. Those committees may also investigate any 
given case. The committees shall submit the findings of their investigations within 
a set time to the Council of Ministers, and the Council shall consider these findings. 
The Council shall also have the right to form committees of inquiry and to make 
final conclusions which take into consideration governmental regulations and 
stipulations of the by-laws of the various governmental organizations.62 
 Ultimately, the King, as the Prime Minister, seek guidance from the Council of 
Ministers and supervises the general policies and functioning of the State. The King also 
encourages coordination and cooperation among the various governmental agencies in the 
kingdom. He also supervises the Council of Ministers, the ministries and governmental 
agencies, and monitors the implementation of regulations.63  There are currently twenty-
                                                 
59  The Council of Ministers Law, Article 19. Promulgated by Royal Order No. A/13 on August 21, 1993. 
See Bureau of Experts at the Council of Ministers, The Law of The Council of Ministers, available at 
https://www.boe.gov.sa/ViewSystemDetails.aspx?lang=en&SystemID=6&VersionID=11 
60 Id, Article 1. 
61  The Basic Law of Governance, supra note 36, Art. 58. 
62  The Council of Ministers Law, supra note 60, Art 24. 
63  Id, Art 29. There are currently twenty-three ministries and a number of other government agencies and 
institutions in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The twenty-three ministries are as follows: Civil Service; 
Commerce and Investment; Communications and Information Technology; Defense; Economy and 
Planning; Education; Finance; Foreign Affairs; Hajj and Umrah; Health; Education; Interior; Islamic 
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three ministries and a number of other government agencies and institutions in the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.  
The Ministry of Commerce and Investment has the main role of supervising corporate 
activities in Saudi Arabia, and administering the implementation of regulations related to 
commercial and corporate activities.64 In addition, the Saudi Arabian General Investment 
Authority SAGIA65 is responsible for managing the investment environment in the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and providing investment licenses to foreign investors as well 
as coordinating their investment activities with other relevant government agencies. 
 
B. Regulatory (Legislative) Branch66 
Article 67 of the Basic Law of Governance provides that the regulatory authority shall 
have the authority to establish regulations to promote the interests of the State or avoid 
corruption in the affairs of the State in accordance with the rules of the Islamic Shari'a, The 
regulatory authority exercises its powers in accordance with this system and the regulations 
of the Council of Ministers and the Shura Council.67 Article 67 does not explicitly define 
the responsibilities of the regulatory authority of the State, but it refers to the two laws 
establishing the Council of Ministers and the Shura Council. Pursuant to Articles 20, 21, 
                                                 
Affairs, Endowment, Dawa and Guidance; Justice; Labor and Social Development; Municipal and Rural 
Affairs; Petroleum and Mineral Resources; Social Affairs; Transport; Environment; Water and Agriculture; 
General Direction of Youth Welfare; National Guard; and the Ministry of Media. 
64 See The Ministry of Commerce and Investment, Tasks And Responsibilities(2017), available at 
https://mci.gov.sa/en/AboutMinistry/MinistryFunctions/Pages/default.aspx. 
65 The Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority. Established in 2000, it works as a central agency for 
inward investment in the Kingdom. For more information about SAGIA see 
https://www.sagia.gov.sa/en/Pages/default.aspx 
66 Saudi Arabia uses the term "regulatory authority" rather than "legislative authority", in addition to its use 
of the term "regulation rather than law" as stipulated in the Basic Law on Governance, so as not to offend 
the country’s conservative religious elements. See Ercanbrack, supra note 33. 
67 The Basic Law of Governance, supra note 36, Art. 67. 
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and 22 of the Saudi Council of Ministers Law, the Council of Ministers has legislative 
authority in addition to its original executive authority. 
 
Article 20: 
While deferring to Majlis Ash-Shura Law, laws, treaties, 
international agreements, and concessions shall be issued and 
amended by Royal Decrees after deliberations with the Council of 
Ministers. 
 
Article 21: 
The Council of Ministers shall study draft laws and regulations on 
the agenda and vote on them chapter by chapter and then as a whole, 
in accordance with the By-laws of the Council. 
 
Article 22: 
Every minister may propose a draft law or regulation related to the 
work of his ministry. In addition, every member of the Council of 
Ministers may propose what he deems worthy of discussion in the 
Council of Ministers' meetings after obtaining the approval of the 
Prime Minister. 
 
The Shura Council shares with the Council of Ministers the regulatory authority of 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The Shura Council has the power to propose new draft 
regulations, or propose amending existing regulations, and study them in the Council.68 
The decisions of the Shura Council are then submitted to the King, who then decides what 
is to be referred to the Council of Ministers. If the Council of Ministers and the Shura 
Council agree, decisions shall be made after obtaining the approval of the King.69 The 
Shura Council also has the authority to issue opinions on the general policies of the State 
                                                 
68 The Law of the Shura Council, Royal Order No. A/91 (1st March 1992). Article 23. Available at: 
https://www.boe.gov.sa/ViewSystemDetails.aspx?lang=en&SystemID=5&VersionID=10 
69 Id, Art. 17.  
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referred to it by the Prime Minister, including: discussing the general plan for economic 
and social development, expressing an opinion thereon; studying international laws, 
regulations, treaties and agreements; proposing interpretations of regulations; discussing 
annual reports submitted by ministries and other government agencies; and proposing 
anything it deems appropriate.70 These texts, which are contained in the two laws 
establishing the Council of Ministers and the Shura Council, show that there is full 
cooperation between the executive and legislative branches in the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia, and there is no separation between them. 
 
C. Judicial Branch 
Laws in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia rely deeply on the opinions and sayings of 
the scholars (Fiqh),71 and Saudi Arabia usually closely follows the Hanbali School.72 The 
first step taken by King Abdul Aziz, after the establishment of the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia and the completion of the organizing of the Sharia courts, was the issuance of a 
Royal Decree in 1928 determining the sources of judicial rulings and the jurisprudence to 
be followed in the State. The Royal Decree issued in 1928 requires judges to rule pursuant 
to the Hanbali Jurisprudence, unless they show a justifiable reason to follow other ways, 
such as Shafi’, Hanafi, or Maliki schools. 73 
                                                 
70 Id, art. 15. 
71 Fiqh is an Arabic word which refers to the Islamic schools of jurisprudence. The Hanbali School is one 
of the four traditional Sunni Islamic schools of jurisprudence (fiqh), and is the school that Saudi jurists 
usually follow. 
72 Vogel, supra note 25. at 304. 
73  See George Sayen, Arbitration, Conciliation, and the Islamic Legal Tradition in Saudi Arabia, 24 U. Pa. 
J. Int'l Econ. L. 905, 958 (2003), available at: 
https://www.law.upenn.edu/journals/jil/articles/volume9/issue2/Sayen9U.Pa.J.Int%27lBus.L.211%281987
%29.pdf. 
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The Saudi judicial system is a dual judicial system74. This means that there are two 
judicial bodies in the state: (1) the ordinary court, which is linked to a supreme court that 
functions as a court of cassation, and (2) the administrative court (Diwan AlMazalim)75, 
that hears disputes involving government agencies. The ordinary court is competent to hear 
all disputes, except disputes that fall under the jurisdiction of the administrative courts. The 
administrative courts are also linked to a higher administrative court and a court of appeal 
on the second level.76 Commercial and corporate disputes were previously considered 
under the jurisdiction of the Commercial Court that was established pursuant to the Saudi 
Commercial Court Regulation.77 Then, in 1987 the Commercial Courts were replaced with 
the Board of Grievances.78 In 2007, the new Judiciary Law enacted a further 
reorganization, transferring all commercial litigation from the Board of Grievances to the 
ordinary courts, which were to include a specialist commercial court. Although passed into 
law in 2007, this latest change ultimately went into effect as of 2017.79 As a result, there 
has always been a competent judiciary in the Kingdom to hear corporate disputes, but its 
formal name has changed over the years. 
1. The ordinary courts 
 
                                                 
74 The judicial system in some countries consists of two parts. One of which is to adjudicate disputes solely 
between individuals or disputes between them and an administrative body of the government, if they are 
stripped of their privileges by a public authority. The other judicial body is competent to adjudicate 
administrative disputes that arise between individuals and the administration as a result of the exercise of 
its function as a public authority, the administrative judicial body. France is one of the first countries to 
adopt the idea of dual justice. It has established courts specifically to examine its dispute and distinguish it 
by special rules. See ABDULAZIZ BIN MOHAMMED AL-SAGHIR, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW BETWEEN THE 
EGYPTIAN AND SAUDI LEGISLATURES (First ed. 2015). In Arabic. 
75  Known as the Board of Grievances. 
76 See Joseph L. Brand, Aspects of Saudi Arabian Law and Practice,17, 18. 9 B. C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 1, 
46 (1986). 
77 Issued by Royal Decree No. (32) dated 15/1/1350 H. Corresponding to 1931.  
78  The decision of the Council of Ministers No. (421) dated 26/10/1407 H. Corresponding to 1987. 
79  See Figure 1.1. 
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The judiciary in the Kingdom has developed significantly after the issuance of the 
new judicial law80, which brought huge changes to the system of litigation within the 
ordinary courts in 1975. Under the new system, for the first time, cases were heard on two 
levels. The ordinary courts in the Kingdom were divided into two groups: courts of first 
instance (trial courts); and courts of appeal which have the jurisdiction to hear disputes for 
the second time, through different chambers, concerning disputes that have been previously 
resolved by the first instance courts.81 The new judicial law also created a Supreme Court 
to monitor the proper application of the provisions of Islamic Shari'a and the applicable 
regulations through its review and jurisdiction over judicial decisions issued or supported 
by the courts of appeal.82 In general, the current system of ordinary courts consists of: The 
Supreme Court, the courts of appeal, and the courts of first instance, which include the 
general courts, criminal courts, family courts, commercial courts, and finally labor courts. 
The ordinary court system is organized hierarchically and expressed diagrammatically 
below in figure 1.1: 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
80 The Law of Judiciary, Royal Decree No. M/78 dated 19/09/1428 H. Corresponding to 1 October 2007. 
See Bureau of Experts at the Council of Ministers, The Law of Judiciary, available at 
https://www.boe.gov.sa/ViewSystemDetails.aspx?lang=en&SystemID=131&VersionID=160#search1 
81 Id, Article 9. 
82 Id, Article 13. 
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Figure 1.1 
 
  
a. Supreme Court 
 
 The Supreme Court is the highest judicial authority in the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia. According to the Judiciary Law, there is only one supreme court at the top of the 
judicial system in the Kingdom.83 The Judiciary Law determines the jurisdiction and scope 
of review by the Supreme Court. Article 11 declares that the Supreme Court shall oversee 
the proper application of the provisions of Sharia and the laws issued by the King which 
                                                 
83  Id, Art. 10. 
Supreme Court
Appellate Courts
Courts of First Instance
General Courts Family Courts Criminal Courts
Commercial 
Courts Labor Courts
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are not inconsistent with Sharia in cases under the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts in 
relation to the following: 
(1) Review of judgments and decisions issued or supported by courts of appeals 
relating to sentences of death, amputation, stoning, or qisas (lex talionis retribution) 
in cases of criminal homicide or lesser injuries. 
(2) Review of judgments and decisions issued or supported by courts of appeals 
relating to cases not mentioned in the previous paragraph or relating to ex parte 
cases or the like without dealing with the facts of the cases whenever an objection 
to the decision is based upon the following: 
(a) Violating the provisions of Sharia or laws issued by the King which are not 
inconsistent with Sharia. 
(b)  Rendering of a judgment by a court improperly constituted as provided for in the 
provisions of this and other laws. 
(c) Rendering of a judgment by an incompetent court or panel. 
(d) An error in characterizing the incident or improperly describing it.84 
 
b. Appellate Courts 
 
 Following the issuance of the new Judiciary Law in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
in 2007, the Court of Appeal was established according to the new judicial system. The 
Courts of Appeal are divided into panels based on subject matter, such as Jural, Penal, 
                                                 
84 Id, Art. 11. 
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Family, Commercial, and Labor panels.85 Courts of Appeal have jurisdiction over 
appealable judgments rendered by Courts of First Instance.86 
 
c. Courts of First Instance 
 
I. General Courts: 
General courts consist of specialized panels that include panels for execution and for 
ex parte and similar cases.87 The jurisdiction of the Courts of First Instance includes all 
cases and disputes except those explicitly excluded by the law. As general courts, they are 
particularly competent in the examination of property disputes and disputes relating to 
traffic accidents.88 
 
II. Criminal Courts: 
The criminal courts are concerned with all criminal cases, including cases of 
punishment, Qisas (lex talionis), Hadd (Qur'anic prescribed punishment), and tortious 
cases as well as the adjudication of cases involving juveniles.89 Each court is further 
composed of specialized panels, and each panel is composed of three judges except for 
cases determined by the Supreme Judicial Council which shall be reviewed by one judge.90 
 
                                                 
85 Id, Art. 16. 
86 Id, Art. 17 
87 Id, Art. 19. 
88  Law of Procedure Before Sharia Courts, article 31. Royal Decree No. M/1 dated 22 / 1 / 1435 H. 
Corresponding to November 26, 2013. Available at 
https://www.boe.gov.sa/ViewSystemDetails.aspx?lang=en&SystemID=125&VersionID=303 
89  Law of Criminal Procedure, article 28. Royal Decree No. M/2 dated 22 / 1 / 1435 H Corresponding to 
November 26, 2013. Available at 
https://www.boe.gov.sa/ViewSystemDetails.aspx?lang=en&SystemID=127&VersionID=304#search1  
90 The Law of Judiciary, supra note 81, Art 20. 
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III. Commercial Courts: 
The administrative courts and the Board of Grievances (Diwan AlMazalim) were the 
competent authorities to deal with commercial and corporate disputes until the issuance of 
the new judicial system in 2007, which transferred the jurisdiction to the ordinary courts. 
As a result, the commercial courts became the competent authority to deal with commercial 
and corporate disputes. The commercial courts began to operate officially on Thursday 
September 21, 2017.91 They deal with all cases and disputes resulting from the violation of 
commercial regulations, bankruptcy cases, and corporate disputes.92 Commercial courts 
are composed of specialized panels, and each panel consists of one or more judges as 
determined by the Supreme Judicial Council.93 
 
IV. Labor Courts: 
They deal with disputes relating to labor contracts, wages, and all cases resulting from 
violations of Saudi labor law.94,95. Labor Courts are composed of a number of specialized 
panels, and each panel consists of one or more judges as determined by the Supreme 
Judicial Council.96 
 
V. Family Courts: 
                                                 
91 Even though the new judicial system was enacted in 2007, its actual implementation took more than 10 
years, until the Ministry of Justice announced that it had officially enabled the commercial courts to start 
functioning. See Ministry of Justice, News, available at: 
https://www.moj.gov.sa/ar/MediaCenter/news/Pages/NewsDetails.aspx?itemId=359 
92 Law of Procedure Before Sharia Courts, supra note 89, Art. 35.  
93  The Law of Judiciary, supra note 81, Art. 22. 
94 Law of Procedure Before Sharia Courts, supra note 89, Art 34. 
95 Labor Law, Royal Decree No. M/51 dated 23 / 8 / 1426 H. Corresponding to September 27, 2005. 
Available at: 
https://www.boe.gov.sa/ViewSystemDetails.aspx?lang=en&SystemID=186&VersionID=201#search1  
96 The Law of Judiciary, supra note 81, Art. 22. 
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It deals with all matters of personal status such as marriage, divorce, inheritance, and other 
family matters.97 Family Courts are composed of one or more panels, and each panel 
consists of one or more judges appointed by the Supreme Judicial Council, and may include 
specialized panels as needed.98 
 
2. Administrative Courts  
 
 
The Board of Grievances (Diwan AlMazalim)99 is an independent administrative judicial 
court linked directly to the King, and it has only jurisdiction over claims against the Saudi 
Government.100 The Administrative Courts are organized hierarchically as expressed 
diagrammatically below in figure 1.2: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
97 Law of Procedure Before Sharia Courts, supra note 89, Art 33. 
98 The Law of Judiciary, supra note 81, Art. 21. 
99  Established pursuant to Royal Decree No. M/51, 17 Rajab 1402. Corresponding to 10 May 1982.  
100 Law of the Board of Grievances, article 1. Royal Decree No. M/78 dated 19 / 9 / 1428 H. Corresponding 
to 1 October 2007. Available at 
https://www.boe.gov.sa/ViewSystemDetails.aspx?lang=en&SystemID=132&VersionID=161#search 
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Figure 1.2:101 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As in ordinary courts systems, the decisions of the highest court bind the lower courts.102 
Article 13 of the Law of the Board of Grievances determines the Administrative Courts’ 
jurisdiction which includes the following: 
(A) Cases relating to rights provided for in civil service, military service, and 
retirement laws for employees of the Government and entities with independent 
corporate personality. 
(B) Cases requesting revocation of final administrative decisions filed by the persons 
so affected where the appeal is based on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction, defect 
                                                 
101  Id, Art. 8. 
 
102 Id, Art. 11. and Art. 12. 
High Administrative 
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Administrative Courts 
of Appeal 
Administrative Courts
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in form or cause, violation of laws and regulations, error in application or 
interpretation thereof, and/or abuse of power. 
(C) Tort cases initiated by the persons so affected against the administrative authority’s 
decisions or actions. 
(D) Cases related to contracts to which the administrative authority is a party. 
(E)  Disciplinary cases filed by the competent authority. 
(F) Requests for execution of foreign judgments and arbitration awards.103 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
103 Id, Art. 13. 
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Chapter 3: Introductory Overview to the LLC in Saudi Arabia 
 
3.1. Scope 
 
In contrast to certain Western countries like the United States, which have enacted 
statutes specifically governing LLCs, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia regulates all types of 
companies under one act (the Saudi Companies Regulation). Although some SCR sections 
pertain only to specific forms of business entity, many of its general provisions, such as 
penalty rules, apply to all companies equally. In comparison to the Companies Regulation 
of 1965, the new SCR introduced several changes to the rules governing LLCs. What 
follows is a historical explanation of the Companies Regulations’ role in the Kingdom, as 
well an overview of key provisions applicable to LLCs. The chapter also discusses 
contractual obligations among company owners, the validity of contractual agreements 
forming LLCs, and mandatory and default statutory rules. 
 
3.2. Saudi Companies Regulation 
 
A. Introduction 
 
The first law enacted in Saudi Arabia to regulate commercial transactions between 
traders in the kingdom was the Saudi Commercial Law (known as the Law of Commercial 
Court) in 1931.104 This law is still in force today, but now its scope of application has 
become limited to a minimal number of businesses and commercial transactions since the 
                                                 
104 The Law of Commercial Court issued by High Order No. 32 (15 Muharram 1350/June 2, 1931). 
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Saudi legislature introduced amendments to it. Some of the sections that regulated certain 
subjects, such as companies and commercial papers, were abolished in the Law of 
Commercial Court and are now governed by their own regulations. The first chapter of the 
Law of Commercial Court contained a special section that established very limited types 
of commercial companies.105 However, over time, this law could not keep up with social 
developments or local and international changes to global trade, especially regarding 
corporate transactions. Thus, the first Companies Regulations was issued in 1965. 
Furthermore, in 2015, the Saudi legislature released the new Saudi Companies Regulation, 
introducing some noteworthy changes to certain types of companies, including LLCs. 
 
B. Enactment of the First Companies Regulation in 1965106 
 
The emergence of the oil industry in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the 
kingdom’s consequent renaissance in the middle of the last century affected all aspects of 
life, having a major impact on trade diversity and increasing the number of large urban 
projects. Often, it was necessary to establish companies with the financial, technical, and 
administrative capabilities to manage these projects.107 Since these companies were in 
urgent need of laws to regulate their work and to provide adequate protections for investors 
(which the Law of Commercial Court had failed to do), the legislature had to develop new 
comprehensive regulations for companies. The Companies Regulations clarified the 
procedures for the formation of companies as well as the conduct of their activities and the 
                                                 
105 Id. 
106 Saudi Companies Regulations issued by Royal Decree No. M/6 (1385/3/ 22 H. 1965). 
107 ALEXEI VASSILIEV, THE HISTORY OF SAUDI ARABIA, 462, 463 (1st ed. 1998). 
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dissolution and liquidation of their entities. The explanatory note in the Companies 
Regulations Proposal of 1965 stipulated the following: 
Although the companies established in this short period were involved in 
all aspects of financial activities, whether commercial or industrial, having 
capital requirements of several hundred million SR, they increased the 
demand for interactions with government individuals and departments and 
the need for regulations to govern them. At that point, a few articles 
contained in the Commercial Court Law had not been sufficient to address 
all corporate issues at the time of corporate establishment, during the 
exercise of their business, or during their dissolution and liquidation.108 
 
The Companies Regulations, therefore, introduced new types of business entities 
to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and organized them according to the requirements of the 
Saudi market and the needs of businesses at that time, which included the establishment of 
LLCs.109 Even though these regulations have been modified several times since they were 
issued (more than fifty years ago),110 they have become outdated, failing to meet recent 
requirements and increasing corporate responsibilities and complexities concerning shares, 
bankruptcy, and more complicated business transactions.111 Therefore, the Saudi 
legislature considered the kingdom’s needs when issuing the new Saudi Companies 
Regulation in 2015. 
 
                                                 
108 Saudi Companies Regulations, explanatory note (1965). 
109 Saudi Companies Regulations, Art. 2 (1965). 
110 On July 17, 2007, the Saudi legislature issued amendments to two articles (158 and 180) of the previous 
Companies Regulations. These articles dealt with determining the capital of LLCs that required an immediate 
injection of capital when the capital decreases by fifty percent to avoid involuntary dissolution. 
Article 158 of the previous Companies Regulations was amended to read as follows: “the capital of 
the LLC shall be determined by the shareholders in the Articles of Association” instead of “the capital of the 
LLC shall not be less than SR 500,000.” In addition, Article 180 of the previous Companies Regulations was 
amended to require capital injections or dissolution when an LLC’s amount of loss is half of the capital 
instead of three quarters of the capital. See Royal Decree No. M/60 (03 Rajab 1428/July 17, 2007). 
111 Saudi Companies Regulations (1965). 
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C. The Issuance of the New Saudi Companies Regulation112 
 
Due to fluctuations in oil prices and recent shocks to the Saudi economy, the Saudi 
government has moved to further support the private sector, lessening its dependence on 
oil revenues. The government issued the new Saudi Companies Regulation to build a more 
reliable platform for private sector investment. These regulations represent a significant 
step by the Saudi government to attract both Saudi and foreign investors. The new 
regulations aim to establish a set of principles and entities that will strengthen the 
commercial and investment sectors in the kingdom and to create sustainable economic 
development and institutions for the benefit of the business community and the nation. The 
following is a discussion of the most important changes introduced by the new Saudi 
Companies Regulation. 
 
3.3. Corporate Forms 
 
The new Companies Regulation in the Kingdom regulates five types of business 
entities which include: General Partnerships (sharikat al-tadamun), Limited Partnerships 
(sharikat al-tawsiya al-basita), Joint Venture Companies (sharikat al-mahasu), Joint Stock 
Companies (JSC) (sharikat al-musahama), and Limited Liability Companies (LLC) (al-
sharika dhat mas’uliyya al mahdudah).113 The three types of corporate entities that were 
permitted by the previous regulations: Cooperative Companies (al-sharika ta’awuniyya), 
Partnerships Limited by Shares (sharikat al-tawsiya bi’l ashum), and Variable Capital 
                                                 
112 The New Saudi Companies Regulations issued by Royal Decree No. M/3 (28/1/1437 H/November 12, 
2015). 
113 Saudi Companies Regulations, Art. 3. 
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Companies (al-sharika dhat ras al mal al qabil li tarir), have been eliminated, and it is no 
longer possible to establish such companies.114 Companies that were previously formed 
under the old regulations, and are now prohibited, must adopt another form of business 
entity permitted under the new regulations or they will be deemed null and void, and their 
partners will be held personally and jointly liable for the obligations of the voided 
company.115 The new regulations related to general partnerships, limited partnerships, and 
joint ventures provided only limited changes to those entities the previous companies 
regulations, while significant changes have been made to the provisions regarding the JSCs 
and LLCs.  
The different business entity forms used in the KSA each involve substantially different 
ownership rights. In partnerships, a partner can voluntarily withdraw and force the 
partnership’s dissolution. This ability to exit and force a dissolution creates leverage that 
helps keep other partners honest. Joint stock company owners have access to public 
markets, providing a ready ability to sell if the company ceases to be a desirable investment. 
LLC shareholders, on the other hand, lack similar exit rights, and may not voluntary 
withdraw and trigger a buy-out of their company shares. However, there are reasons for 
this difference in treatment. LLC owners are not given the right to voluntarily withdraw, 
and thereby trigger a buy-out right, because such an ability is viewed as prejudicial to LLC 
creditors. The right of partners to voluntarily withdraw does not present an equivalent 
concern. Partners are personally liable for partnership debts and therefore creditors have 
an alternative remedy. 
 
                                                 
114 Id. 
115 Id. 
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3.4. The Number of Shareholders of LLC 
 
Although it was not possible to form an LLC with less than a minimum of two 
shareholders under the old regime, the new SCR permit the formation of a single 
shareholder LLC.116 The liability of an individual founder for the debts of the company is 
limited to the amount of funds allocated to the company's capital.117 A single shareholder 
has the powers of the Manager, the Supervisory Board, and the General Assembly of the 
LLC.118 Nevertheless, an LLC with a single shareholder is subject to the following: 
 
1- A single-shareholder may only own one single-shareholder LLC. 
2- Such an LLC may not incorporate or acquire another LLC owned by a single 
shareholder.119,120 
The number of shareholders in an LLC cannot exceed fifty, and if the number of 
shareholders goes beyond the maximum, the company must change its status to a JSC 
within one year. If it fails to do so, then it will be deemed dissolved by the operation of 
law.121 The regime has excluded any increase in the number of shareholders (above fifty) 
if such increase results from inheritance or bequest.122 
                                                 
116 Saudi Companies Regulations, Art. 154. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. 
120 The Saudi Companies Regulation, Article 55, also permits the formation of a single shareholder JSC in 
the following situations:  
- The JSC is owned by the Saudi Government. 
- Saudi Government establishments. 
- Entities wholly owned by the Saudi Government. 
- Any JSC with a minimum of SAR5m capital.  
121  Saudi Companies Regulations, Art. 151.  
122  Id. 
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3.5. Capital and Shares 
 
The new SCR does not impose a minimum capitalization requirement on an LLC. 
Instead, IT states that the company's paid-up capital should be sufficient for the purpose 
for which the company was established, and that the company's paid-up capital should be 
determined in its Article of Association.123,124 Foreign investors are still subject to the rules 
of SAGIA (Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority) regarding the minimum paid-in 
capital requirement for foreign investors, depending on the type of industry that the LLC 
engages in and its business activity. SAGIA permits a foreign investor to own 100% of an 
LLC, but there are some exceptions to that permission. In certain types of business 
activities, SAGIA requires a minimum percentage of Saudi ownership in the foreign owned 
company. 125 The table below illustrates the minimum capital requirements and the 
percentages of Saudi ownership required in foreign investments according to the type of 
business activities: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
123 Saudi Companies Regulations, Art. 160. 
124 The new SCR also reduced the minimum share capital required for JSCs. The minimum share capital 
required for JSCs under the old regime was SR 2 million. The new SCR required JSCs to have SR 500,000. 
as the minimum share capital at start up (Article 54). 
125 Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority, Investment Services Guide, available at 
https://www.sagia.gov.sa/en/InvestorServices/InvestmentServicesGuide/Documents/GENERALRULES.pdf. 
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Business Type Minimum Capital Minimum Saudi Ownership 
Industrial  SR 1,000,000 / USD 266,666 - 
Commercial  SR 20,000,000 / USD 5,333,333 25% 
Agricultural SR 25,000,000 / USD 6, 666, 666 - 
Communications  - 40% 
Communications Value Added - 30% 
Real Estate Financing  SR 200,000,000 / USD 53, 333, 333 40% 
Real Estate Development SR 30,000,000 / USD 8,000,000 - 
Management of Construction 
Projects, Detailed Engineering 
Design and EPC Contracts 
 
- 
 
25% 
 
 The primary legislative purpose for the minimum paid-up capital was to protect the 
LLC creditors and nurture confidence in financial markets.126 Increasing the capital of an 
LLC requires the approval of both MoCI (The Ministry of Commerce and Investment) and 
all shareholders, while a decrease in capital requires approval by a super majority of 
shareholders, as well as MoCI.127,128 Additionally, a resolution to decrease capital requires 
LLCs to solicit potential objections from any and all creditors. If a creditor objects, the 
                                                 
126 See Doing Business, why are minimum capital requirements a concern for entrepreneurs?  at 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/~/media/WBG/DoingBusiness/Documents/Annual-Reports/English/DB14-
Chapters/DB14-Why-are-minimum-capital-requirements.pdf. 
127 Saudi Companies Regulation, Art. 174. 
128 Saudi Companies Regulations, Art. 177. 
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company shall pay him his debt if it is currently due, or, in the event of a future due date, 
provide a sufficient guarantee to fulfill it at that time.129’130 
 
3.6. The Statutory Reserve 
 
The statutory reserve of the company is used primarily to cover the company's losses 
or to increase its capital. The new Companies Regulations, as they were required under the 
old regulations, still  mandate LLCs to set aside 10% of their yearly profits to fund the 
companies’ statutory reserves.131 LLCs were also required under the previous Companies 
Regulations to make contributions from the companies' profits to the statutory reserves, 
and these contributions were to continue until they reached 50% of the company's share 
capital.132 Under the new Companies Regulations, the minimum total statutory reserve 
requirement has been reduced from 50% to 30% of the company’s capital.133,134 
 
3.7. Piercing the LLC Veil 135 
 
LLCs are generally considered separate legal entities, with a shareholder’s liability 
limited to the amount of capital they have contributed to the company. Thus, no shareholder 
shall be liable for the debts of the company, obligations incurred or losses thereof, except 
                                                 
129  Id. 
130  See the discussion in Chapter 5 
131 Saudi Companies Regulation, Art 176. 
132  The Saudi Old Companies Regulations, Art. 176. 
133 Saudi Companies Regulations, Art 176. 
134  The new SCR also reduced the minimum total statutory reserve requirement of the JSCs from 50% to 
30% of a company’s capital. Article 129. 
135  Refers to a situation in which the competent authority may disregard the separate corporate existence 
and impose personal liability on the managers (directors) or shareholders of the company. 
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to the extent of his or her capital contribution.136 Once a shareholder pays the full amount 
of his share in the LLC capital contribution as required by the SCR, a shareholder’s liability 
will be limited to this share and not beyond.137 If a limited liability company incurs debts 
or losses that exceed its capital, and is unable to meet these debts or cover the loss, it 
becomes bankrupt. In such a scenario, creditors only have a claim against the company to 
the extent of its corporate assets. If the LLC fails to meet its obligations and faces 
liquidation, the personal assets of the individual owners are generally exempt from any 
claims or liabilities related to the LLC’s business activities.  
There are, however, certain exceptions to this general rule, such that shareholders 
or managers of a limited liability company can be personally and jointly liable for claims 
against the LLC.138  
Specifically, the LLC corporate veil may be pierced in the event of misconduct, or 
negligent failure to act in a manner required by SCR. Such malfeasance or negligence not 
only subjects the officer or shareholder responsible to potential personal liability, but can 
also similarly affect other shareholders and managers in the LLC. It is therefore critical 
that LLC owners be aware of circumstances that may lead the LLC to lose its limitation on 
personal liability, as such awareness will be a significant help in avoiding such scenarios.139 
                                                 
136 Saudi Companies Regulation, Art. 151. 
137 Id, Art. 157. 
138 Piercing the veil of LLCs is an available remedy under the Saudi Companies Regulation. Under certain 
conditions, this remedy is available not only for third parties who are dealing with the LLC, but also for 
other affected partners and managers who incurred losses by reason of their participation in an LLC whose 
vail has been pierced.  
139  The joint and personal liability of shareholders and managers under the SCR is mandatory (public-
order) in regard to all Managers, and as to any shareholders involved in actions causing the veil to be 
pierced. LLC owners cannot agree in their Article of Association to vary such liability. The SCR prohibits 
any agreement among shareholders to exempt any manager or shareholder from assuming personal or joint 
liability. See Saudi Companies Regulation (Article 164). The SCR also does not allow any agreement in the 
LLC Articles of Association exempting any shareholder from bearing losses in the event the LLC faces 
losses, even if such losses are limited to the shareholder's capital contribution, unless a shareholder's 
contribution to the business is a service. See Saudi Companies Regulation (Article 9). 
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What follows is an explanation of the specific circumstances that may trigger a piercing of 
the LLC veil under the SCR.  
 
A. Capital Reduction 
Under the old Companies Regulations, if the LLC’s losses exceeded 50% of its 
capital, and the company's shareholders took no action to inject more capital, the 
shareholders could potentially lose their LLC limited liability protection.140 The risk 
that a serious reduction in capital could lead to personal liability led many startup 
businesses to avoid forming LLCs. The new Companies Regulations, however, do not 
permit piercing the corporate veil in the event of such a reduction in capital. Under the 
new regulations, if a company's losses exceed 50% of its capital, and shareholders fail 
to take certain required legal steps within 90 days, the LLC is deemed dissolved by 
operation of law.141 In such a scenario, managers of the LLC may still face criminal 
sanctions if they: (1) fail to take appropriate or legally required actions upon learning 
that losses have reached one half of the company’s capital; (2) fail to make the required 
announcements; or (3) fail to call a shareholder meeting once company losses exceed 
50% of its capital.142  
 
B. Formation Defects 
                                                 
140 The Old Saudi Companies Regulations, Art. 180. 
141 Saudi Companies Regulations, Art. 181. 
142 Id, Art. 211. 
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Any defects in an LLC formation can also threaten the limitation on shareholder 
personal liability. A limited liability company that is established in violation of the 
provisions of the SCR is considered invalid. If the invalidity was determined as a result 
of the violation, the shareholders who caused it will be jointly liable to the rest of the 
shareholders in the LLC and third parties for the damage caused by such invalidity due 
to defects in an LLC formation.143 The SCR requires that both the LLC Article of 
Association and any subsequent amendments be in writing, and authenticated by the 
competent authority.144 Failure to do so renders the Article of Association or any 
amendment thereafter null and void.145 To be valid, an LLC’s Article of Association 
must also include all information specified under the SCR, and be signed by all 
shareholders. In particular, an LLC Article of Association must include the following 
information: 
(1) The type of company, its name, purpose and its head office. 
(2) The names of the shareholders, their places of residence, professions and 
nationalities. 
(3) The names of the members of the Supervisory Board, if any. 
(4) The amount of capital, the portion of capital in cash and the portion in kind, with a 
detailed description of the portions in kind, their value, and the names of their 
offering shareholders. 
                                                 
143 Id, Art. 159. 
144  Applications for approval of a company’s formation agreement are submitted electronically via the 
Ministry of Commerce and Investment website. The formation agreements signed electronically must be 
authenticated by the nearest notary public, in order to document formation of the company. See Ministry of 
Commerce and Investment, issuing a Contract for Establishing a Company (2016), available at 
https://mci.gov.sa/en/ServicesDirectory/Pages/Companies-2015-02.aspx. 
145 Saudi Companies Regulations, Art 12. 
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(5) A ratification by the shareholders to distribute all shares of capital and to fulfill the 
full value of these shares. 
(6) The method of distributing profits. 
(7) The company's start and end date. 
(8) The form of notifications that may be sent by the company to the shareholders.146 
 
The LLC Article of Association must also be published in order for the SCR to deem 
it effective in regard to third parties. The old Companies Regulations required the managers 
of LLCs, within thirty days of establishing or amending their Articles of Association, to 
publish said Articles of Association in the official gazette or a newspaper.147 In addition, 
the company was required to list itself in the commercial register in accordance with the 
provisions of the Commercial Register Regulations.148 The new Regulations require the 
publication of the Articles of Association only on MOCI’s149 (Ministry of Commerce’s) 
website, and no longer require their publication in the official gazette or a local 
newspaper.150 Nevertheless, an LLC’s managers are still obliged to enter the company into 
the commercial register within 30 days of formation in order to comply with The 
Commercial Register Regulations.151 An LLC will be deemed invalid if the Article of 
Association is not in writing, the required information is not included, or the Article is not 
signed by all shareholders.152 In addition to causing SCR to deem the LLC invalid, 
violation of LLC formation rules will also lead to penal sanctions when the commission of 
                                                 
146 Id, Art. 156. 
147 The Saudi old Companies Regulations, Art. 164. 
148 Id. 
149  The Ministry of Commerce and Investment. 
150  Saudi Companies Regulation, Art. 158. 
151 Id. 
152 Saudi Companies Regulations, Art. 159. 
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a crime in which criminal responsibility is held is in place. Any person who fails to perform 
his or her duty with respect to publication of the company's establishment contract, any 
amendments thereof, or its registration in the commercial register in accordance with the 
SCR and CRL (Commercial Register Law) is subject to a fine of not more than five hundred 
thousand SR.153 
 
C. Management Error and Violation of Law  
The same penalties apply to LLC managers if they become jointly liable by violating 
either the SCR itself, the company's Article of Association, or should they commit clear 
errors while performing their obligations.154 By contrast, Supervisory Board members will 
not be liable for any actions taken by managers, and may not be questioned about them, 
unless they became aware of manager errors and failed to notify the General Assembly.155 
An LLC auditor will be liable for any damages his or her professional errors cause for the 
company, the shareholders or third parties. If more than one auditor caused the error, they 
will each be jointly liable for the damages resulting from their errors.156’157 
 
D. Single-Shareholder LLC  
                                                 
153  Id, Art. 213. 
154 Id, Art. 165. 
155 Id, Art. 172. 
156 Id, Art. 136. 
157  Article 136 relates to provisions for the auditor of joint stock companies. The Saudi Companies Law 
Article 166 explicitly states that the auditor of a limited company is subject to the same provisions as an 
auditor in a joint stock company. Therefore, this article regarding the determination of civil liability for an 
auditor also applies to the auditor of a limited liability company. 
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The SCR explicitly states that the corporate veil of a single-shareholder LLC will be 
pierced and the owner of the company subject to personal liability for any company losses 
or obligations with respect to third parties, in the following situations: 
(a) The owner of a Single-Shareholder LLC liquidates the company in bad faith before 
its date of expiry or before the achievement of the purpose for which it was established. 
(b) If the business of the company and the owner's other private business are not 
separated. 
(c) If the owner has done business on behalf of the company prior to the LLC acquiring 
its legal personality.158 
 
E. Valuation of In-Kind Capital Contribution  
The SCR stipulates that all LLC capital contributions in cash must be deposited in a 
bank licensed by the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA), and said bank must not 
disburse such cash shares before completion of company attestation procedures and 
registration in the commercial registry.159 As for contributions in kind, the application for 
LLC establishment and registration must be accompanied by a report prepared by an expert 
or an authorized appraiser, stating the fair value of such contributions.160 The report must 
then be submitted to the General Assembly for consideration. If the Assembly decides to 
reduce the value set for the contributions in kind, such reduction must be approved during 
the meeting. If they refuse to approve the reduction, the company’s articles of Association 
                                                 
158 Saudi Companies Regulation, Art. 155. 
159 Id, Art. 157. 
160 Saudi Companies Regulations, Art. 61. 
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will be considered null and void with regard to all its shareholders.161 In that event, the 
shareholders will be personally and jointly liable toward third parties for the right 
estimation of the shares in kind. However, any claim of liability under this provision will 
only be considered if raised within five years from the date of fulfilling the registration 
procedures.162 
 
F. Fraudulent Act 
Article 165 of the SCR states clearly that LLC managers will be jointly liable for any 
losses or damages that their fraudulent conduct causes to the company, the shareholders, 
or third parties.163 However, the SCR does not include any definition of what might 
constitute a "Fraudulent Act". The courts in this situation will most likely consider what 
constitute an act of fraud under the Shari ‘a, or Islamic, Law. Under Islamic law, fraud may 
be committed by way of actions, statements, or failures to disclose.164 Islamic legal schools 
of thought generally agree that two major elements must be present to constitute an act of 
fraud: 
(1) Exploitation by means of trickery. 
(2) Inducement of the other party.165 
                                                 
161  Id. 
162 Id, Art. 157. 
163 Id, Art 165. 
164 See Accounting Research Institute & Faculty of Accountancy and UPENA Malaysian Accountancy 
Research and Education Foundation, Tadlis In Islamic Transactions (2010) Universiti Teknologi MARA). 
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Nevertheless, the concept of fraud in Islamic jurisprudence is a very broad one and its 
application within the context of corporate malfeasance under LLC law is unclear under 
the Saudi legal system. 
 
3.8. Holding Companies166 
 
Holding companies have, for the first time, been specifically recognized and provided 
for in the new SCR. The new Regulation permits LLCs and JSCs to choose to be 
characterized as holding companies by adding the word “holding” to the company's name. 
The revised SCR states that a holding company shall hold a controlling interest in its 
subsidiaries, either by owning more than half of such companies’ capital, or by controlling 
the subsidiaries’ board of directors.167 The purposes of the holding company are also 
defined as follows: 
(a) Managing its subsidiaries or participating in the management of the companies it 
owns shares in and providing support to them. 
(b) Investing its funds in shares and other financial instruments. 
(c) Acquiring and utilizing industrial property rights, including patents, industrial and 
commercial trademarks, franchise rights, and other intangible rights, and leasing 
them to its subsidiaries or others. 
(d) Owning real estate and other movable properties that are deemed necessary to 
performing the company’s activities. 
                                                 
166 Holding Companies have been defined by the Companies Regulations as joint stock or limited liability 
companies that aim to control other joint stock or limited liability companies called affiliated companies. 
Article 182. 
167 Saudi Companies Regulations, Art. 182. 
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(e) Providing loans, guarantees, and financing to its affiliate companies. 
(f) Any other legitimate purpose that comports with the nature of the company.168 
 
3.9. Publication of LLC Articles of Association 
 
The old SCR required LLC managers, within thirty days of establishing or amending 
their Articles of Association, to publish the Articles in the official gazette or a 
newspaper.169 They were additionally required to register the company in the commercial 
register in accordance with the provisions of the Commercial Register Regulations.170 The 
new SCR requires publication of the Articles of Association only on MOCI’s171 website, 
and no longer requires official gazette or local newspaper publication.172 LLCs managers 
are still obliged to enter the company into the commercial register within 30 days in order 
to comply with The Commercial Register Regulations.173 
 
3.10. Issuing Sukuk174 and Other Debt Instruments 
 
                                                 
168 Id, Art. 183. 
169 The old Saudi Companies Regulations, Art. 164. 
170 Id. 
171  The Ministry of Commerce and Investment. 
172  Saudi Companies Regulation, Art. 158. 
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INSOLVENCIES: A CASE STUDY OF EAST CAMERON PARTNER, 32-35 (Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. 2016) 
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The SCR prohibits LLCs from entering into an initial public offering (IPO).175 
Therefore, LLCs cannot be established, increase their capital, or borrow for their account 
through an IPO, and may not issue shares or bonds that are offered to the public through 
an IPO or represented in tradable Sukuk.176 It is clear that the Saudi legislature reached this 
decision after taking into account the nature of LLCs and the personal considerations of 
their shareholders. However, LLC shares themselves are not restricted from trading, and 
an LLC shareholder may assign his or her share to another shareholder or to third parties,177 
in accordance with the terms of the company's Articles of Association.178 JSCs, on the other 
hand, are permitted to issue debt instruments or negotiable financing Sukuk, in accordance 
with CMA179 regulations.180 
 
 
3.11. Management Structure 
 
An LLC is usually managed by one or more managers, typically referred to as general 
managers. In addition to its general managers, an LLC is also managed by a General 
Assembly,181 comprising all of the company’s shareholders. The LLC must also have an 
auditor, and, for LLCs with more than 20 shareholders, a Supervisory Board consisting of 
three or more shareholders is required. All required positions must be included in the 
                                                 
175 Saudi Companies Regulation, Art. 153. 
176  Id. 
177  See the discussion in Chapter 4. 
178 Id, Art. 161. 
179  (CMA) The Capital Market Authority of Saudi Arabia is the Saudi Government’s financial regulatory 
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180 Saudi Companies Regulations, Art. 105-125.    
181 Like JSCs, the Companies Regulations require LLCs to have a General Assembly comprising all of the 
company’s owners, and a Supervisory Board when the number of the shareholders exceeds 20. 
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company’s Articles of Association.182 What follows is an explanation of LLC managing 
bodies under the SCR.  
 
A. The Managers  
 
The LLC’s shareholders select the number of managers it will have.183 The number 
chosen must be referenced in in the company's Articles of Association or in an independent 
document, with the number in effect for either a fixed or indefinite period of time.184 If 
more than one manager is chosen, the SCR also authorizes an LLC, pursuant to shareholder 
approval, to form a Board of Managers.185 The Articles of Association must specify the 
duties of the Board of Managers, as well as the voting percentage required for any of its 
decisions.186 General Managers are required to prepare annual financial statements for the 
company, as well as a report on the company's activities and any management proposals 
regarding profit distribution. This information must be provided within three months of the 
close of the financial year.187 Such documents, as well as a copy of the auditor’s report, 
must also be sent to the MoCI and to each of the company's shareholders within one month 
of their preparation. Each shareholder has the right to request that General Managers call a 
meeting of the General Assembly of shareholders to discuss any of these documents.188 
                                                 
182  Saudi Companies Regulations, Art. 172. 
183  An LLC in the United States is permitted to be run and managed by its owners without having to 
appoint a specific manager to be responsible for the company’s operations. In contrast, LLCs in Saudi 
Arabia have more formalities in regard to the management of the company. Under Saudi law, LLCs are 
required to have at least one General Manager to run the LLC as well as the required company’s General 
Assembly.      
184 Saudi Companies Regulations, Art. 164. 
185Id.  
186Id.  
187 Saudi Companies Regulations, Art. 175. 
188 Id. 
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B. The General Assembly 
 
Similarly to Joint Stock Companies, LLCs have a General Assembly where all 
shareholders are members. The General Assembly and its resolutions must comply with 
numerous legal requirements.  The Assembly must meet at least once a year, within the 
four months following the end of the fiscal year, at the invitation of the LLC's manager and 
in accordance with conditions set out in company's Articles. The Assembly may also meet 
at any other time upon request of the company managers, the supervisory board, the 
auditor, or shareholders representing at least one-half of the company's capital.189 
Shareholder (or "partner") decisions are issued by the General Assembly. However, 
companies with fewer than 20 shareholders may solicit written opinions from the 
shareholders in lieu of a meeting. In such companies, the manager must send each 
shareholder a registered letter containing all proposed resolutions to be voted upon by the 
shareholder “in writing”.190 All shareholder decisions are valid only if approved by 
shareholders representing more than one-half of the company's capital, unless the company 
Articles require a larger majority.191 In the event shareholders fail to reach the required 
majority when voting on decisions during their first deliberation and consultation, the law 
provides that the shareholders must be invited to a second meeting via registered letter. 
However, the decisions made at this second meeting must be approved only by a majority 
of shares represented at the meeting, whatever percentage of the company’s capital they 
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represent, unless the company's Articles of Association provides otherwise.192 A decision 
to alter an LLC’s nationality or increase its capital must be approved by all shareholders. 
A capital increase can be achieved either by raising the nominal value of existing shares or 
by issuing new shares. In the event an increase in capital is approved, all shareholders 
increase their capital contribution in proportion to their respective share of the capital.193 
All other amendments to the company’s Articles of Association may be approved by 
shareholders representing at least three-quarters of the capital, unless the Articles provide 
otherwise.194  
The SCR requires that the General Assembly’s agenda at its annual meeting include 
the following items: 
(a) Hearing manager reports on the company's activities and financial position during 
the financial year, the report of the auditor, and the report of the Supervisory Board, 
if any. 
(b) Discussing and ratifying financial statements. 
(c) Determining the percentage of profit to be distributed to shareholders.  
(d) Appointing managers of the company or members of the Supervisory Board, if any, 
and determining their remuneration. 
(e) Appointing the auditor and determining his or her fees. 
(f) Discussing any other matters falling within the authority of the General Assembly 
under the SCR or the LLC’s Articles of Association.195 
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193 Saudi Companies Regulations, Art. 174. 
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The General Assembly may not deal with matters other than those on the agenda, unless 
necessary to address new facts which come to light during the meeting. If a shareholder 
requests that a particular issue be included in the agenda, the company's managers must 
respond to the request, as otherwise the shareholder will have the right to appeal to the 
General Assembly.196 Each shareholder has the right to discuss issues on the General 
Assembly’s agenda, and managers are obliged to answer shareholder questions.197 
 
C. The Supervisory Board 
 
If an LLC contains more than 20 shareholders, the SCR requires a Supervisory Board 
be appointed and expressly designated in the company's Articles of Association. The Board 
must consist of at least three shareholders. If an LLC grows to include more than 20 
shareholders after its formation, the Supervisory Board must be appointed at the earliest 
reasonable time.198 The General Assembly may re-appoint Supervisory Board members 
after their terms of service expire, or it can choose to appoint different shareholders. The 
General Assembly may also remove board members at any time, if there is an acceptable 
reason. Company managers have no power to vote in the election or removal of any 
Supervisory Board member.199 Supervisory Board authority includes the power to monitor 
company operations, to express its opinion on matters presented to it by the managers, and 
to designate the types of actions which require prior authorization from the Supervisory 
Board.200 The Supervisory Board must also submit an annual report to the General 
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Assembly, at the end of each financial year, detailing the results of its monitoring activities.  
Supervisory Board members may not be held liable for any actions taken by LLC managers 
unless the members were aware of manager misconduct and failed to inform the General 
Assembly.201 The SCR does not prevent an LLC with fewer than 20 shareholders from 
forming a Supervisory Board if it so desires. 
 
D. The Auditor202 
 
SCR Article 166 requires an LLC to have one or more auditors, in accord with the same 
provisions governing auditors of JSCs. The auditor must review and monitor company 
accounts. The auditor is entitled to inspect the company's books, records, and other 
documents, and to request additional information or clarification whenever he or she 
believes it necessary to ascertain the company's assets and liabilities.203 The auditor is 
obligated to submit a report to the General Assembly regarding any issues on which he or 
she has sought necessary information or clarification from company managers.204 
 
3.12. Validity of Contracts Generating LLCs 
 
                                                 
201 Id. 
202  The auditor of the company must be authorized to work in the Kingdom. He or she operates with 
independence, must be competent and experienced, and have proper qualifications. The regulations with 
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employee of any of them. (Article 133). 
203 Saudi Companies Regulation, Art. 134. 
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LLC agreements and contracts among shareholders are enforceable and valid only 
if the terms and provisions comply with Sharia law and Companies Law. For a contract to 
be valid under Islamic law (including contracts establishing and organizing companies), 
several features must be present.205 Complete satisfaction and accord among the parties 
must occur regarding their willingness to enter into the contract, including their full 
approval of all contract terms, specifically the company’s purpose, capital, and method of 
management. If a shareholder’s consent is invalid, as in cases of coercion, fraud (Tadlis), 
mistake, or injustice, the company’s Article of Association will be void.206,207 Additionally, 
the company’s founding purpose must be lawful and feasible, or else the company’s 
formation will be deemed invalid. The SCR also prohibits LLCs from engaging in banking, 
finance and savings, or insurance activities; any LLC formed for these purposes is therefore 
void.208  
An essential condition for a company’s contracts to be valid is compliance with the 
multiplicity of shareholders rule resulting in the approval of two or more wishes to establish 
the company.209 The multiplicity of shareholders is a general rule, and the SCR has 
introduced new exceptions with regard to the single-shareholder LLCs and a single-
shareholder JSC. The Companies Law also requires delivery of each shareholder’s capital 
                                                 
205 MONZER KAHF, ISLAMIC FINANCE CONTRACTS 41–42 (1st ed. 2013). 
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contribution, whether the contribution is cash, in kind, or services, as delivery of capital is 
necessary to guarantee the company to creditors.210 Furthermore, the company’s contract 
must not contain any terms that prevent any of the shareholders from obtaining every share 
in the profits, and it must agree on the specified percentage of profit distribution, even if it 
is only a few portions. Moreover, the company may not exempt any of the shareholders 
from bearing losses incurred by the company, and any agreement that deprives any 
shareholder from sharing in either profits or losses from the company will be considered 
invalid.211 
 
3.13. Mandatory or Default Rules  
  
  Part of this research involves examining the extent to which default or mandatory 
rules better serve the interests of minority LLC shareholders. Western legal literature 
contains extensive discussion on whether corporate regulations should be mandatory, and 
thus not subject to modification, or default, thereby permitting contractual modification if 
shareholders agree.212’213 
Scholars in favor of mandatory corporate rules offer several justifications. First, 
shareholders may at times need protection from a company’s board of directors, and 
minority shareholders may also need protection from controlling shareholders.214 Non-
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mandatory rules potentially enable  controlling shareholders to devise resolutions which 
benefit the majority at the expense of minority shareholders, so long as they have the voting 
power to do so.215 Further, minimum mandatory rules are essential to fill any gaps in a 
company’s Articles and prevent controlling shareholders from misusing the Articles when 
unexpected situations arise.216 Under this theory, an LLC agreement is a long-term 
relational contract in which benefits for all participants significantly depend on unstated 
assumptions, which cannot always be satisfactorily articulated in advance.217 Since it 
would be impractical to expect parties to negotiate ahead of time for protection against all 
possible abuses which might arise, such unforeseeable circumstances argue for certain 
minimum, non-waivable standards enforceable by the courts.218 Additionally, many small-
business investors are not particularly sophisticated or experienced, and often invest at the 
behest of friends or family without considering all possible risks. Mandatory shareholder 
protections are thus important to guard against potential future oppression.219 A second 
argument for mandatory rules is that they play a significant role in protecting third parties, 
and particularly a company’s creditors.220 Rules allowing piercing of the corporate veil, 
legal capital rules, and duties owed to creditors during a company’s insolvency are all 
important protections for creditors and other third parties, and should be mandatory.221  
Scholars who support the default approach argue that mandatory rules decrease 
flexibility and prevent shareholders from negotiating rules most appropriate for their own 
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individual company.222 Imposing mandatory protections for minority investors in closely 
held companies dictates a uniform standard of conduct that considerably limits shareholder 
freedom.223 Investors and businesspeople have diverse risk preferences and investment 
objectives, and accordingly differ extensively regarding the ideal set of governing rules.224 
Under this theory, the best protection against the threat of majority oppression is the 
particular agreement negotiated by the shareholders themselves, who know better than the 
government how to structure a company agreement suited to their unique circumstances. 
Non-waivable mandatory legal protections, under this view, are too burdensome and 
inefficient to fit every company’s needs.225 Economists and corporate scholars generally 
believe that private parties are best positioned to protect their own interests when entering 
into voluntary agreements, and mandatory rules only serve to unnecessarily complicate that 
process.226 The ability of investors in closely-held companies to bargain directly with each 
other supports maximizing their contractual freedom.227 Some contend that scholars 
arguing for mandatory minority shareholder protections are doing so because they 
mistakenly think courts cannot distinguish between knowing and voluntary contractual 
waivers, and unknowing or involuntary waivers.228 Courts, however, are more than capable 
of determining whether minority shareholders have been clearly deprived of default 
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protections without any compensation for their increased risks.229 Default rules therefore 
do not leave minority investors completely helpless, as any contractual waiver will be 
judicially scrutinized to make sure it comports with the parties’ reasonable expectations.230 
Thus, the proper solution for the dilemma of minority investor vulnerability is not 
mandatory rules, but rather default rules which can be waived, but only knowingly.231 
Another factor in analyzing the benefits of mandatory versus default rules is 
whether the country in question is a developed or developing one.232 Some commentators 
argue that mandatory company rules are necessary in developing countries to offset the 
lack of existing institutions which might otherwise protect investors.233 Countries lacking 
stable and reliable judicial systems, effective market institutions, knowledgeable and 
sophisticated market participants, and reliable internal corporate governance systems need 
the certainty of mandatory rules.234 Under this view, countries that rely more heavily on 
default protections, such as the U.S. and other advanced economies, mange to do so only 
because of complementary institutions that make up for any deficits in negotiated corporate 
rules.235 Paedreas maintains that an enabling/default corporate law structure will generally 
fail to protect minority shareholders in countries lacking reliable legal and economic 
institutions.236 Therefore, Paedreas argues that adopting American-style corporate law only 
works for countries with American-style supporting institutions, and that developing 
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nations should not seek to replicate U.S. corporate rules.237 Bolodeoku, on the other hand, 
rejects this view, arguing that the country’s development status should not dictate one 
approach over the other, and that purely mandatory or purely default systems are never 
ideal in the first place.238 He contends that many countries have developed relatively well-
functioning markets despite corrupt or inefficient judicial systems, and that extensive 
mandatory rules are not necessarily required.239 Bolodeoku further argues that an extreme  
"defaultization"  corporate law approach may encourage managerial despotism regardless 
of how well-developed a country’s institutions are, leading to minority shareholder 
abuse.240 Bolodeoku ultimately contends that some mixture of mandatory and default 
corporate law approaches is both necessary and unavoidable.241 
The SCR generally contains more mandatory provisions than U.S. corporate 
legislation, which may be justified by the assumption that Saudi Arabian investors are less 
sophisticated than their American counterparts, and thus require more protection. 
Additionally, the SCR requires LLCs to use and file a specific form template for their 
Articles of Association, with parties retaining the right to modify and opt out of the non-
mandatory provisions. This requirement could be justified by the KSA’s relative lack of 
sophisticated attorneys capable of drafting business contracts when compared to the U.S., 
where more investors have access to competent counsel. Analysis of Saudi LLC Articles 
of Association shows such agreements virtually always follow the default template, despite 
the wide diversity of businesses which operate as LLCs, with different business purposes 
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and objectives.242 Shareholder discomfort in deviating from pre-drafted templates could be 
one of the reasons that Saudi corporate legislation contains more comprehensive mandatory 
rules then in the United States. 
An additional issue debated in default regimes is the appropriate starting point in 
determining the legal provision for any particular issue. The most common stance 
regarding default rules is the majoritarian approach.243 This approach selects the rule which 
the majority of relevant companies would prefer as a default if they had to address a specific 
controversy related to the rule.244 Other scholars favor minoritarian rules as the starting 
point for default rules.245 The minoritarian approach picks a default rule which benefits the 
weaker side in a potential controversy, thereby leaving it up to the more powerful interest 
to opt out of the default rules if they are able.246 For example, Bebchuk and Hamdani argue 
that if a legislator must decide between two possible default arrangements, one which 
benefits a company’s managers and the other that benefits its shareholders, the rule 
favoring shareholders should be the default. The reason is that management generally will 
have more power to circumvent and opt out of the rules if that is truly the better approach, 
whereas the shareholders might be stuck under the opposite default rule.247 Some 
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minoritarians argue that corporate and LLC statutes should include default or template 
agreement provisions which "nudge" shareholders to protect themselves against any 
potential majority oppression. Again, the reasoning is that majority interests will be able to 
opt out of such defaults when appropriate, but minority shareholders might not, arguing for 
a pro-minority “default”.248  
Another issue debated in the literature is the role that “menu options” should play 
in non-mandatory/enabling statutes governing corporate law.249 Unlike default rules, which 
apply when corporate agreements are silent on a subject, menu options only govern if they 
are affirmatively selected by shareholders and included in their LLC agreement.250 Some 
argue that menus options in corporate statutes are unnecessary, as investors and managers 
will address their business arrangements in the way best able to secure their desired 
outcome, regardless of which options a statute lists.251 The counter-argument is that menu 
options reduce and minimize transaction costs, by providing clear choices for the parties 
to debate and select from.252 Menu laws thus decrease the time and money spent 
formulating company arrangements.253 Further, menu options serve to protect all parties, 
especially uninformed or unsophisticated ones, by making them aware of approaches that 
they might otherwise fail to consider.254 Listokin contends that the presence or absence of 
corporate menu options leads to significant outcome variations, as do variations in default 
                                                 
248  Benjamin Means, supra note 217, at 1183. 
249 Yair Listokin, What Do Corporate Default Rules and Menus Do - An Empirical Examination, 6 J. 
Empirical Legal Stud. 279 (1111). Available at 
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/38f8/98799f4fcf2203d607727458af3d99a84b0c.pd 
250 Id, at. 280. 
251 Id, at. 281. 
252 Id. 
253 Id. 
254 Ian Ayres, Menus Matter, 73 U. Chi. L. Rev. 3 (2006), available at 
https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir=1
&article=5352&context=uclrev 
 65
rules.255 He contends that policymakers and judges cannot defer entirely to private 
arrangements between company managers and investors, but rather must seek to positively 
shape such agreements.256 Legislators must therefore invest the time and effort to create 
"value-maximizing" menu options and default laws.257 Such menu options should be 
responsive to the diverse operating conditions that corporations may encounter.258 
 Some scholars argue that mandatory rules are necessary to protect a company’s 
creditors, as they are not parties to the company’s agreement.259 A notable example of 
mandatory rules designed to protect creditors are legal capital rules, such as that used in 
the KSA,260 as explained earlier, imposing LLC minimum capital requirements by 
statute.261 Others contend that mandatory legal capital rules are unnecessary, and that 
creditors can protect themselves through contractual obligations.262 According to this view, 
contractual covenants are more adaptable and flexible, avoiding the excessively rigid 
company financial structures created by a mandatory legal capital rule.263 Proponents of 
legal capital rules argue that only sophisticated and powerful creditors can protect their 
rights through contract, while other creditors, and especially involuntary creditors like tort 
victims, require mandatory protections.264 
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Two questions addressed in this paper are whether corporate legal protections for 
minority shareholders should be mandatory or default, and, if default rules are preferable, 
the proper approach to setting those defaults. 
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Chapter 4: LLCs Transfer of Shares 
 
4.1.LLCs Transfer of Shares in General  
A. Introduction 
 
An ability to transfer shares is critical for a shareholder wishing to exit an LLC, and 
many LLC statutes (or the jurisdiction’s relevant general statute) therefore protect the right 
to do so. Shareholders wanting to exit an LLC by selling their stake also often desire to sell 
to third parties.265 However, the right to transfer shares is often subject to the consent of all 
co-owners, or at least to the consent of the majority of them.266 Many LLC laws also impose 
other restrictions on shareholders’ right to transfer shares. One such restriction guarantees 
the non-transferring shareholders a priority right to purchase the shares of a co-owner 
seeking to transfer shares to a third party. This is known as the right of first refusal 
(ROFR).267 The greater the number of transferability restrictions, the more difficult it is for 
a shareholder to liquidate his stake and thereby exit the company.268 A minority LLC owner 
seeking to sell is therefore often placed in a weak position, and vulnerable to the actions of 
majority owners.269 This vulnerability can lead to a minority shareholder selling to the 
majority at a below-market price in order to exit the company.270 A minority’s lack of 
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leverage may place him or her at a disadvantage should any break in relations with the 
majority take place, as the only alternatives will be complying with majority wishes or 
selling for less than fair-market value.271 Majority-minority shareholder disputes can 
therefore lead to litigation and material losses for shareholders as a whole, unless the 
company's Articles of Association (or Operating Agreement as it is known in the U.S.) 
provide clear procedures for addressing such disputes.272  
 
B. Transferable Ownership  
 Transferable ownership refers to rules governing the alienability of specific 
categories of property, such as shares in a business entity or real property.273 In a business 
context, it commonly refers to a transfer of ownership between two parties in a business 
entity, such as a partnership, an LLC, or a corporation.274 However, each form of business 
entity has a different ownership structure, and different rules that govern its transactions in 
a transfer or sale of an ownership interest.275 LLC transfers of ownership interest (shares) 
are carried out in accordance with specific legal procedures, procedures that are typically 
described in the LLC’s constitutional documents.276 In Saudi Arabia, however, 
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shareholders often rely on default statutory rules which are then incorporated into the LLC 
agreement. Generally, ownership of an LLC share entitles a shareholder to (1) the right to 
receive distributions from the LLC, and (2) the right to participate in management.277 Some 
jurisdictions, such as the U.S, limit the transferable LLC ownership interest, absent consent 
from the other shareholders, to only financial rights.278’279 By contrast, a transferable LLC 
share in Saudi Arabia is defined to include both management and financial rights. The 
Saudi regime allows for the assignment of economic rights (the right to receive 
distributions from the LLC) to a third party, but management rights cannot be assigned to 
anyone besides an existing LLC shareholder.280 Saudi LLC law thus includes a complete 
bar to transferring management rights to a non-owners, while most U.S. LLC statutes allow 
transfer of members’ managerial authority to a non-owners upon the consent of the other 
members.281 
 
C. Motivations for Restrictions on Transfers 
Restrictions on transfers are common in closely held businesses. Restricting the transfer 
of shares is one of the defining features of an LLC in most jurisdictions, although the type 
and nature of the restrictions vary considerably.282 Most jurisdictions prohibit LLCs from 
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offering their shares as tradable instruments, turning to public offerings to increase their 
capital, or issuing negotiable shares or bonds.283 The reasoning behind such prohibitions is 
preserving the “private” character of the LLC as a “close company” and protecting the 
entity’s shares from being used for risky, speculative ventures.284 The restrictions also 
reflect the underlying purpose of the LLC as a business entity. That purpose is enabling 
investors, who may have personal ties to each other, to engage in business while limiting 
their personal liability to the amount of capital they contribute to the LLC.285 Investors 
thereby benefit from both the closed nature of the company as well as their limited liability 
toward the company's obligations.286 
Typical restrictions on the transferability of LLC shares include the requirement for the 
consent of the other shareholders and the right of first refusal, which gives existing 
shareholders the ability to prevent transfers to third parties. In some cases, both restrictions 
apply.287 The restrictions are designed to prevent a newcomer from gaining controlling 
over company management.288 Shareholders typically wish to avoid sharing management 
duties with outsiders whom they do not know and with whom they did not agree to act as 
co-owners. This resistance to sharing management duties is especially pronounced when 
the LLC is owned by a single family, who may views outsiders as threatening the 
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company’s growth and stability.289 Lécia Vicente’s dissertation, "The Requirement of 
Consent for the Transfer of Shares and Freedoms of Movement: Toward the Liberalization 
of Private Limited Liability Companies," offers the following economic rationale for 
transfer restrictions:   
“I maintain that criteria of economic rationality determine the inclusion of 
restrictions in the companies’ articles. When partners incorporate these 
business associations they attribute a greater value to those restrictions than 
to the right to freely resign from the company. They attribute a greater value 
to restrictions on transfers than to the attainment of immediate gains as a 
result of the sale of shares in a public market. They view these restrictions 
as more valuable than the possibility of decreasing investment risks by 
means of a greater dispersal of the share capital. This is so because the value 
of human capital should be added to the share value of the corporation. It is 
important for a member to maintain a close relationship with her or his 
peers. Kinship, loyalty and trust are three other reasons for the inclusion of 
restrictions. PLLCs often emerge from family relationships. So, when a 
shareholder sells his or her shares without the company’s prior consent they 
are inevitably depriving other shareholders of that accrued value. 
Furthermore, shareholders normally agree on the division of profits, the 
exclusion or entry of new shareholders, and the acquisition of shares in other 
corporations to guarantee that the integrity of the ownership structure and 
control of the company stay as they were initially envisioned”.290 
 
 Restrictions on transfers, such as requiring company, managerial or shareholder 
consent for any such transfer, may sometimes lead to negative results, including more 
aggressive behavior between shareholders.291 This is true because even when the law or 
articles of associations provide mechanisms for shareholders to avoid being locked-in to 
the business, a shareholder who nonetheless remains locked in can still be a source of 
conflict within the company.292 An additional feature of transfer restrictions is that they 
                                                 
289  Id, at. 126. 
290 Lécia Vicente, The Requirement of Consent for the Transfer of Shares and Freedoms of Movement: 
Toward the Liberalization of Private Limited Liability Companies, 46-47, available at 
http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/32211/2014_Vicente_OA_AuthorsVersion.pdf?sequence=3 
291 Id, at. 46. 
292 Id. 
 72
may be motivated by a desire to prevent one shareholder from assuming operating control 
over the company.293  
The right of first refusal (ROFR) is a common transfer restriction device in both the 
U.S. and the KSA. ROFR is either provided for by statute, as in Saudi Arabia, or included 
in the corporate agreement, such as in the U.S. ROFR may lie either with the non-
transferring shareholders, the company, or both, in each case granting the right holder the 
option to acquire any transferred shares before they can be sold to a third party. The ROFR 
does not absolutely bar transfers to a third party, but merely requires the transferring 
shareholder to first offer his or her shares to other shareholders or the LLC.294 The ROFR 
restriction is typically designed to satisfy one or both of the following two objectives: 
(1) Discouraging outsiders, to a certain degree, from offering to purchase shares from 
existing shareholders. However, ROFR does not completely forbid third parties 
from making an offer.295 
(2) Granting the company control, by choosing to purchase the shares being 
transferred, over which outsiders it will allow to become new shareholders in the 
company.296 
 
4.2 LLC Transfer of Shares in Saudi Arabia 
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A. Restrictions on Transfers (The 1965 SCR vs. The New SCR) 
Under Islamic fiqh297, a partner within a partnership is not permitted to transfer 
ownership of his interest to third parties. This is true regardless of whether such a transfer 
is with or without consideration, or whether the other partners consent to the transfer. Such 
a transfer simply terminates the partnership and requires that it be re-established by a new 
agreement listing the new joining partners.298 Modern commercial and business practices 
are inconsistent with such a rule, and legislators have been pressured to modify its overly 
rigid requirements. Such reforms, though,  have not entirely abandoned the general 
principle that partners to a partnership retain the right to bar entry to any new partner.299 
As a result, the SCR provides that a partner's interest in a general and limited partnership 
cannot be transferred to third parties without the consent of all partners, or without 
complying with any other terms and conditions established in the partnership agreement.300 
Regarding an LLC’s transfer of shares, the SCR permits a shareholder to transfer his shares 
to a  third party, but only upon complying with certain restrictions. These restrictions have 
undergone several changes throughout the drafting and revision process which created the 
SCR itself, and LLC law in particular. 
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A transfer of shares is the only lawful manner for leaving an LLC under Saudi 
regulations.301 The SCR explicitly permits the transfer of shares to both an existing 
shareholder and to a third party. The rules governing the transfer of shares underwent 
several changes subsequent to the issuance of the new SCR. One of the most important 
changes in the new SCR relates to the requirement that the non-transferring shareholders 
approve a transfer of shares. The previous SCR required, by mandatory rule, the 
amendment of the LLC’s Articles of Association whenever a shareholder sought to transfer 
shares in the LLC to a third party, as well as the prior approval of all non-transferring 
shareholders.302 The notaries public further required the non-transferring shareholders to 
sign an amendment to the Articles of Association, giving them the right to veto any share 
transfers.303 It was therefore impossible, under the original SCR, for a shareholder to 
transfer shares to a third party without the required consent of the remaining shareholders. 
This meant that a shareholder seeking a transfer might find himself in an unenviable 
position, locked into the business as long as he failed to find a buyer able to secure the 
necessary approval from the remaining shareholders. The veto right over third-party 
transfers was criticized as leaving many shareholders, and particularly minority 
shareholders, vulnerable to oppression by the majority.304 For example, if minority 
shareholders were not satisfied with the financial position of the business, or with the other 
shareholders, they lacked the right to exit the LLC. Since the SCR did not permit a 
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shareholder seeking to exit the LLC any alternative to a transfer of shares, deadlock often 
resulted when such a shareholder failed to secure the required approval.  
As a consequence, shareholders seeking to exit were inevitably forced to accept an 
undervalued offer from the remaining shareholders.305 The only alternative for minority 
shareholders unable to secure approval for a third-party transfer was submitting to a 
permanent lock-in to the business. The remaining shareholders were not required to 
purchase the shares in the event they refused to consent to a third-party transfer, and 
typically would only do so on terms extremely favorable to them. There was also no 
mandate for the company itself to repurchase the shares, giving the other shareholders the 
absolute discretion to prevent the LLC from repurchasing the shares. The reason was that 
such a repurchase would result in reduction of the LLC’s paid-in capital, and such 
reductions are subject to shareholder approval.306  
The Saudi legislature recently amended this transfer restriction, and the consent of other 
shareholders is no longer required for sales to a third party. This amendment was clearly a 
response by the Saudi legislature to the problems experienced by minority shareholders 
trying to exit an LLC. The new law therefore does specifically address the imprisonment 
of an LLC shareholder blocked from exiting the company. The new law, however, does 
maintain the non-transferring shareholders’ right to control the identity of the transferee, 
in order to bar the entry of undesirable individuals to the company, while at the same time 
seeking to protect the interest of the exiting shareholder who cannot secure approval for 
the new third-party trasnferee.307 The law strikes this balance by giving the non-transferring 
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shareholders hold two options. They have a choice of purchasing the shares proposed for 
transfer, or they can decline to exercise this ROFR within the time period specified by law, 
at which point the third-party transfer proceeds to completion.   
Under the new SCR, LLCs are required to maintain a share register with the Ministry 
of Commerce and Investment (MoCI), record all transfers in the LLC share register, and 
then inform the Commercial Registrar of any such transfers in order for them to be valid 
and effective.308’309 These recent reforms clearly grant shareholders far greater freedom 
than they had previously to exit the company and not continue as a co-owner in the 
business. The changes therefore provide greater protection to minority shareholders from 
potentially aggressive behaviors by the majority, such as arbitrary rejections of proposed 
third-party transfers. However, the new law’s mandatory ROFR for existing shareholders, 
gives them the right to block any proposed transfer to a third party.310 Thus, even under the 
new law, shareholders have no unrestricted right to freely transfer their shares to third 
parties. Any single remaining shareholder can prevent such a transfer by exercising the 
ROFR within the specified time period. The amended transfer law is ultimately an attempt 
to balance the LLC’s ability to preserve its status as “close company” while still protecting 
minority shareholders from the worst abuses permitted under the previous law.311 A 
shareholder wishing to exit can now do so, even if unable to win approval for a third-party 
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transfer. At the same time, the legitimate interest of the remaining shareholders in 
preventing unwanted partners is preserved, protecting the LLC from unwanted risks.312 
The ROFR still presents difficulties for the transferring shareholder. The sale of a non-
controlling minority share can already prove difficult, if not impossible, to accomplish,313 
and the ROFR only adds to the challenge by potentially discouraging third-party 
bidders.314’315 While the SCR no longer requires unanimous shareholder consent in order 
to transfer shares, its transfer restriction rules continue to be interpreted broadly to allow 
such restrictions in LLC agreements. Shareholders who choose to include this restriction 
therefore retain the right to ban transfers which lack unanimous consent.316 This study has 
found numerous examples of such restrictions in existing KSA LLC agreements.317 In such 
cases, the transferring shareholder is also bound by the ROFR, in addition to the consent 
requirement.  In sum, LLC owners are generally free to use the LLC agreement to impose 
whatever transfer restrictions they desire, and such restrictions are usually upheld by Saudi 
judicial rulings.318 The only exception are clauses which create a complete ban on share 
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transfers, as such clauses are not permitted.319  What follows is an explanation of the 
legislative development of the ROFR under the Saudi Companies Regulation.  
 
B. The Statutory Right of First Refusal (ROFR)  
 
The ROFR within an LLC, or the pre-emptive right as it is referred to in some 
jurisdictions320, is one of the essential characteristics of this type of business entity.321 The 
right creates a restriction on the freedom of new owners to enter the LLC, with a 
corresponding restriction of the ability of shareholders to exit the company through a sale 
to third parties.322 The Saudi legislature first recognized the LLC as a legal entity in 1965, 
almost ten years after the Egyptian legislature did so.323 Saudi Arabia also adopted Egypt’s 
mandatory restrictions on the transfer of shares to third parties, thereby following the 
French, who originated this approach.324 The Saudi legislature adopted the LLC as an entity 
in order to address a need that traditional business entities failed to meet.325 In particular, 
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small and medium-sized enterprises did not want to operate as a joint-stock company, 
which required a certain minimum number of shareholders. Such enterprises also did not 
want to form partnerships, as that would fail to limit shareholder’s personal liability toward 
the company’s debts. There was thus a demand for an entity which would address the 
previous two issues while still permitting a closely held company that could exclude 
unwanted outside owners who might destabilize the business.326 Thus the LLC’s limits on 
transfers to third parties were motivated chiefly by the desire to preserve the personal and 
intimate nature of the company.327 Some argue that a second motivation for the transfer 
restriction was preventing speculation in LLC shares.328 This view contends that protecting 
the closed nature of the LLC would require only a mandatory ROFR restriction, rather than 
a complete statutory ban on third-party transfers, and that the law could have left it to the 
LLCs themselves to decide if further transfer restrictions were warranted,.329 Therefore, it 
is likely that preventing speculation was one of the purposes behind the ban on share 
transfers to third parties. Ultimately, the legislature not only imposed a ROFR, but 
subjected the right to complex and detailed procedures which had the effect of slowing 
potential third-party transfers and therefore discouraging harmful speculation.330 
The ROFR was labelled as a "right of preference" held by the non-transferring 
shareholders, and required the transferring shareholder to inform all other shareholders of 
the potential third-party transfer agreement.331 The ROFR process consisted of two 
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stages.332 The first stage granted non-transferring shareholders the right to consent, 
whereby any individual shareholder could object to the potential new third-party owner.333 
The second stage involved actual exercise of the ROFR, with the non-transferring 
shareholders required to purchase the shares originally intended for the third-party 
purchaser.334 Failure to exercise the ROFR within the period specified either by statute or 
the LLC agreement terminates the right, permitting the third-party transfer to go forward. 
In such a case, the third-party transferee becomes a company shareholder with all financial 
and participatory management rights possessed by the transferring owner.335 
The Saudi legislature has passed several revisions to the ROFR law since its 
original enactment. One important amendment recently made law affects the method for 
valuing shares acquired through ROFR. Under the previous version of the law, the 
shareholder proposing a transfer, for consideration, to a third party had to notify the 
remaining shareholders, via the LLC’s manager, of all conditions of the transfer. Any 
shareholder could then exercise a ROFR within 30 days of notification, and thereby acquire 
the shares based on their “real value.” If a shareholder contemplated a third-party transfer 
without consideration, the remaining shareholders could exercise a right to buy at a value 
previously approved in the company’s most recent annual budget.336 This procedure has 
now undergone two sets of revision. The first revision under the new SCR eliminated the 
reference to consideration in the proposed third-party transfer and set the ROFR purchase 
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price at the fair market value of the shares in question.337 This change eliminated the vague, 
undefined concept of “real value” for pricing shares, which had led to numerous 
shareholder conflicts. The revised SCR permitted LLCs to employ a different valuation 
methodology and time period for exercising ROFR in their Articles of Association, 
eliminating “real value” as the default measurement.338 The revision highlighted the 
importance of providing a clear valuation methodology in the LLC’s Articles of 
Association. Under this first version of the new SCR, Article 161 provided the following 
explanation:  
If a shareholder wishes to transfer its shares to others, either with or 
without consideration, the shareholder must first notify the other 
shareholders of the transfer conditions through the LLC’s manager. 
In this case, any interested shareholder can buy the shares at fair 
value within 30 days of being notified, unless the shareholders have 
agreed on an alternative valuation method and duration in the LLC’s 
Articles of Association. If more than one shareholder exercises his 
or her right of first refusal, the shares must be divided among them 
in accordance with their proportion of shares in the capital of the 
LLC.339 
 
The new law thus permitted ROFR purchase valuations to be contractually agreed 
upon between the shareholders, in the LLC’s Articles of Association (or shareholders’ 
agreement), rather than dictated by statute.340 Upon the issuance of the revised SCR’s, 
however, a new question arose: was the shareholder’s right to transfer shares and depart 
the LLC a right that can be exercised as a right of first offer, by simply offering the shares 
to the other shareholders? Or was it only a right exercisable when the transferring 
shareholder succeeds in obtaining a third-party offer, as a ROFR? Some argued that the 
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new SCR was unclear on whether such a right applied only as a ROFR, as opposed to 
including a right of first offer.341 This ambiguity was ultimately resolved by the Saudi 
legislature’s subsequent amendments to Article 161 of the new SCR, which governs LLC 
share transfers and the ROFR.342 The following is the language of Article 161 as it reads 
following this second set of amendments: 
A shareholder may transfer its share to other shareholders in accordance 
with the terms of the Company's Article of Association. If the shareholder 
wishes to transfer its share to others, it shall notify the other shareholders 
through the LLC Manager, including the name of the proposed buyer and 
the terms and conditions of sale. The LLC manager shall inform the other 
shareholder as soon as such notice is received. Any shareholder may request 
a redemption of the share being transferred within 30 days of a receipt of 
the manager's notice at the agreed price, unless the LLC Article of 
Association provides for another valuation methodology or a longer period 
for exercising the right of first refusal. If more than one shareholder requests 
the redemption, the shares shall be divided among them in accordance with 
their shares proportions in the company's capital. If no request is made 
during the said period, the shareholder has the right to transfer its shares to 
a third party.343 
 
The second set of amendments to Article 161 thus entail two essential changes: 
(1) By stating explicitly that a transferring shareholder must state the name of the 
proposed buyer and the terms and conditions of the sale, the legislature clarified 
that the other shareholders hold a ROFR, and not a right of first offer.   
(2) In the absence of the LLC Articles of Association specifying an alternative 
valuation method, the default valuation of any share being transferred is determined 
by the third-party-offer, as the fair market value is no longer the default value. 
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The new valuation method views the third-party purchase offer as the best method for 
determining market price in connection with a ROFR purchase. LLC shareholders can 
either incorporate this default valuation method into the company’s Article of Association, 
or agree on a different ROFR valuation methodology.344 Although the law therefore allows 
different methodologies and time periods for exercising the ROFR, the ROFR itself is a 
mandatory right of the non-transferring shareholders which LLCs cannot eliminate in their 
Articles of Association.345 Clearly, Saudi law prioritizes the rights of non-transferring 
shareholders by requiring LLCs to provide for a ROFR, thereby restricting share 
transferability.  One ambiguity in the SCR is whether the ROFR applies when one 
shareholder wishes to sell shares to a presently existing shareholder, as opposed to an 
outside third party. Some jurists believe the ROFR belongs to all LLC shareholders, any 
of whom may exercise this right, regardless of whether shares are being sold to a third party 
or to another shareholder.346 Others argue that the ROFR does not apply to purchases by 
an existing shareholder, as long as the transfer will not lead to the remaining shareholders 
sharing management duties with an unapproved outsider.347 My belief is that the latter view 
is the more plausible interpretation of when the Saudi legislature intended the ROFR to 
apply. SCR Article 161 states that ROFR is triggered only when a shareholder seeks to 
transfer shares to “others,” meaning third parties, without any indication the requirement 
applies to an internal transfer among LLC shareholders.  
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The governing court has adopted this interpretation, ruling that the ROFR under Article 
161 does not apply to an internal transfer between shareholders. The case 
(No.1447/1/G.1426H)348 involved an LLC refusing to approve a transfer sale between two 
existing shareholders, who happened to be brothers. The LLC claimed the transfer violated 
Article 161’s ROFR provision, which the LLC had incorporated into its Articles of 
Association, interpreting the ROFR as applying to transfers between existing 
shareholders.349 The court rejected the LLC’s interpretation, reasoning that “[t]he right of 
first refusal shall only apply in cases where the transfer is made to a third party, other than 
an existing LLC shareholder. In this case, where one shareholder transfers shares to another 
shareholder, no ROFR exists. Applying the ROFR to internal transfers would be going 
beyond the legislative intent, which was empowering shareholders to prevent the entry of 
unwelcome outside owners”.350 The court thus grounded its reasoning on the principle that 
ROFR exists to protect the company from unwanted outside owners, a danger not present 
with an internal shareholder transfer. While this is undoubtedly correct so far as it goes, 
unrestricted internal transfers may alter the ownership percentage enjoyed by the 
transferring shareholders.351 
Some scholars believe that the ROFR should extend to internal shareholder transfers, as 
such a restriction is necessary to preserve the balance of voting power within the 
company.352 I agree with these scholars. It is true that the legislature intended ROFR be 
used to preserve the “private” and intimate character of an LLC, allowing shareholders to 
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prevent the entry of strangers. However, internal transfers which change the balance of a 
shareholder’s proportionate voting powers pose a separate danger, potentially permitting 
one or more shareholders to take control of the business.353 It is therefore important that 
the ROFR apply to such internal transfers, with all shareholders given an equal option to 
invoke it. As noted, however, Saudi LLCs cannot rely on the SCR if they wish to apply the 
ROFR to internal shareholder sales. Rather, they must place such a ROFR within the 
relevant section of the LLC’s Articles of Association, in order to avoid any potential for 
misunderstanding or conflict in the future. The SCR explicitly states that the ROFR does 
not apply to, and cannot be exercised regarding, transfers of shares undertaken by a 
shareholder’s heirs after his or her death354, or shares transferred via judicial ruling issued 
by a competent authority.355  
One important question that may arise is the proper resolution when a shareholder seeking 
to disinvest from the company by transferring shares does not receive any offers, either 
from non-transferring shareholders or third parties. The new SCR has significantly 
increased an LLC shareholder’s freedom to sell his or her shares without having to obtain 
approval from all other shareholders, once the period for exercising ROFR expires. 
However, the new law does not clarify the consequences when a transferring shareholder 
fails to get a purchase offer, as the ROFR potentially discourages third parties from making 
such offers.356 The ROFR can at times make shares essentially unmarketable, as buyers 
resist bidding on shares that ROFR may ultimately prevent them from purchasing.357 The 
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reason is that a potential third-party purchaser must estimate the price of the specific shares, 
the possibility of a bid being successful, and the expenses associated with making that 
bid.358 A ROFR imposes potentially uncertain negotiation costs for the prospective 
purchaser, thereby discouraging such bids.359 The third-party purchaser also needs to gather 
information in order to asses share value.360 Combined, information gathering and 
negotiation requirements form a large part of transaction costs.361 Existing shareholders 
will also possess a significant informational advantage over third-party buyers.362 This 
informational advantage must be factored into the third party’s decision to bid.363 The third 
party knows that if a share’s actual value is higher than the third-party bid, the co-owner 
will exercise his or her ROFR.364 Conversely, the co-owner will likely allow the third-party 
sale to proceed if the purchase price is excessive in relation to a stake’s actual value.365 
In addition to the disincentives to third-party buyers created by the ROFR, a 
shareholder seeking to exit the LLC faces the additional obstacle of finding a willing buyer 
for minority shares. An investor will seldom be willing to assume the risk of owning a 
minority LLC share.366 Such shares lack sufficient voting power to control company 
operations, and of course face the same obstacles to re-sale experienced by the original 
minority shareholder.367 As a result, minority shareholders seeking to exit are frequently 
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unable to secure fair value from third-party sales.368 The absence of willing third-party 
purchasers, as mentioned, then fails to trigger ROFR for the existing shareholders. In 
practice, minority shareholders find themselves locked-in to a business they wish to exit 
and become vulnerable to majority oppression and other abusive majority conduct. 
This issue was addressed by the Board of Grievances in a ruling (No. 
96/T/3.1424H)369 addressing a shareholder agreement to purchase shares of those wishing 
to sell, pursuant to an agreed upon valuation formula, even in the absence of a third-party 
offer. The Board ruled this provision did not conflict with SCR Article 161’s requirement 
that LLC owners must obtain a third-party offer before the remaining shareholders can be 
compelled to purchase the shares in question. The court’s decision thus creates one 
mechanism for preventing a shareholder without a third-party offer from being locked into 
the company.  
 
C. Enforcing the Right of First Refusal 
One means by which LLC minority shareholders may protect themselves is to file an 
action requesting a court to enforce the ROFR procedures governing sales to non-LLC 
shareholders.370 To prevail in such an action, the shareholder seeking to transfer must first 
comply with the required procedures and notifications needed to trigger the ROFR. The 
SCR requires that the following procedures take place:  
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(a) A shareholder seeking the transfer shall first notify the non-transferring 
shareholders about his or her desire to transfer the share, including the name of the 
proposed buyer and the terms and conditions of the sale, and such notification shall 
be made through the LLC’s manager.371   
(b) A shareholder seeking acquisition of the share being transferred shall make the 
request within 30 days of receipt of the manager's notice, at the agreed price, unless 
the LLC Article of Association provides for another valuation methodology, or for 
a longer period for exercising the ROFR.372 
(c) If the transferring shareholder has multiple shares to be transferred, and more than 
one shareholder wishes to acquire those shares, then the shares shall be divided 
among them in accordance with their respective proportion of the company's 
capital.373 
(d) If there is only a single share being transferred, and more than one shareholder 
requests the acquisition of the single share, then the share shall be allotted to all the 
shareholders seeking to acquire it. However, shareholders must remember that a 
single share of an LLC is indivisible374, and if there is more than one owner of a 
single share, an LLC reserves the right to suspend any rights relating to the share 
until its multiple holders decide who among themselves shall represent the others 
with regard to the share’s managerial and economic rights.375 
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Saudi law does not designate a specific deadline by which the transferring shareholder 
shall notify the remaining LLC shareholders about the proposed transfer and third-party 
offer. The notice must, however, include: (1) the name of the proposed buyer and (2) 
sufficient information about the proposed buyer to determine his identity, as the proposed 
buyer’s identity plays a significant role in the remaining shareholders decision whether or 
not to approve the transfer.376 The notice must also include the number of shares being 
transferred, as this information allows the remaining shareholders to determine whether the 
proposed transfer will affect their control over the company.377 The SCR expressly requires 
that the transfer notice to the remaining shareholders be made through the LLC Manager.378 
The Saudi legislature adopted this requirement to avoid potential disputes over whether 
notice was properly given, particularly in LLCs which have close to the maximum allowed 
50 shareholders. The SCR does not specify the manner or method of giving notice to the 
LLC manager, and thus any reasonable method of communication suffices.379 A question 
that arises here is: would it be considered invalid notice if the transferring shareholder 
decided to communicate directly with each of the other shareholders? The most likely 
answer is that notifying other shareholders through the LLC Manager is not absolutely 
required, and communicating directly with the other shareholders would be sufficient. In 
such a situation, getting the signatures of the remaining shareholders would be one example 
of how to obtain the necessary proof of notice.380 It is recommended that an LLC’s Articles 
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of Association specify the manner and the method of communications deemed acceptable 
under such circumstances.  
 Another issue is whether share transfers which fail to follow the ROFR procedures 
listed in the SCR would be deemed invalid. The most likely answer is that third-party 
transfers which violate Article 161 will be considered null and void by mandatory operation 
of law. The Court of Appeal reached just such a decision in case (No. 792/2/G.1419.H), 
holding that a share sale made in violation of Article 161 is legally invalid. The case 
involved a transferring shareholder who did not notify the company or other shareholders 
about the proposed transfer, in violation of both the company’s Article of Association and 
the SCR.381 The court ruled that the non-transferring shareholders had the right to nullify 
the sale to the third-party purchaser, as they were not given the opportunity to exercise 
ROFR prior to the sale.382 The above-mentioned case makes clear that Article 161 
requirements are mandatory as a matter of public policy, and any sale failing to comply 
with its provisions is legally invalid.383 However, the ability to nullify the sale in question 
was a right reserved only to the non-transferring shareholders, as that is who Article 161 is 
designed to protect.384 
 
D. The Limited Liability Company as Holder of The Right of First Refusal 
The SCR does not specifically grant a ROFR to the LLC itself.385 The majority view is 
that LLC shareholders can create such a right in their Articles of Association, the right 
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applying to situations where no existing shareholders seek to exercise ROFR themselves.386 
In such circumstances, the LLC can apply to purchase any shares being transferred to a 
third party, within either 30 days of receiving notice of transfer or any other time period 
specified in the LLC agreement.387 Even with this right, however, the LLC faces the 
obstacle of financing the proposed purchase. The SCR does not specify how the LLC 
should finance such a purchase. However, several other principles govern the method of 
financing, with the most important of these principles being capital stability.388 Capital 
stability serves as the company’s minimum debt guarantee and is an important means of 
safeguarding LLC creditor and customer interests.389 It is also based on the theory that 
creditors have claims only against the company, and not its owners, due to the limited 
liability LLC shareholders enjoy regarding company debts and obligations.390 The question 
thus arises whether an LLC may permissibly use its statutory reserve funds to purchase 
shares. The prevailing view is that this is not permissible, as it would defeat the legislative 
purpose of ensuring minimum capital reserves to cover company losses and any 
unanticipated crises.391 The LLC is required to contribute 10% of its annual profits to the 
statutorily-mandated reserve.392 Such annual contributions may be suspended only if the 
statutory reserve has reached one-half of the LLC’s paid-up capital.393 Ultimately, then, 
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LLC share purchases can be financed only from the "voluntary” or “special” company 
reserves. “Special” reserves are created when shareholders agree to designate a percentage 
of LLC annual profits toward a fund which may then finance LLC share purchases through 
its ROFR.394 Additionally, LLC profits may be used to directly purchase the shares in 
question.395 However, in the absence of reserve profits allocated for share purchases, the 
LLC is limited to using its paid-up capital.396 When using paid-up capital, LLC 
management must follow all required procedures for reducing such capital, including 
obtaining the approval of the shareholder General Assembly required when amending the 
Articles of Association.397 Practically speaking, satisfying all the steps necessary to reduce 
LLC capital is extremely difficult, if not impossible.398 If the LLC does successfully 
acquire the transferred shares, it must then abolish those shares.399 In summary, although 
the SCR itself does not grant an ROFR to the LLC, it permits LLCs to create such a right 
through its Articles of Association. This enables the LLC to protect itself from unwanted 
shareholders in the event no individual shareholder exercises a ROFR.  
E. Corporate Mergers and Acquisitions Involving LLC Shareholders 
Mergers and acquisitions raise the question of whether the ROFR enables LLC 
shareholders to block sales of a parent company to a third party by exercising their right to 
purchase the parent company’s LLC shares. The uncertainty arises because Saudi law 
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permits outside business entities to hold shares in an LLC400, but the SCR does not address 
how the ROFR applies to the outside entity’s shares if that entity itself is sold.401 If the 
corporate LLC shareholder, for example, were acquired by another company, resulting in 
an indirect change in ownership of the LLC’s shares, would the law give the LLC’s other 
shareholders the right and priority to recover the shares owned by the acquired company? 
The question arises because the LLC shares themselves not being transferred, but a new 
(indirect) owner of the shares, who might be objectionable to the remaining shareholders, 
is now part of the LLC.  
Under the SCR, a merger can assume one of two specific forms. In the first form, 
the annexing company completely absorbs the purchased company, and it ceases to exist. 
The absorbing company retains its legal personality and continue its operations, assuming 
all assets and liabilities of the absorbed company as of the date of annexation.402 The second 
form is a merger by consolidation, where two or more companies merge to form a new 
entity, and the assets and liabilities of the merged companies become the property of the 
new entity.403 The similarities between mergers and transfers of shares by individual 
shareholders, in terms of permitting new third-party owners into the LLC, create issues in 
two types of situations. 
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The first situation arises when a company is acquired by another company, and the 
shareholders of the absorbed company become new shareholders in the absorbing 
company. Is it permissible for the shareholders of the absorbing company to object to the 
entry of the new shareholders? The objection would be that the new shareholders from the 
absorbed company are "third parties," and that the existing shareholders therefore have a 
ROFR to purchase the newly issued shares. This argument, however, seems clearly invalid, 
if not frivolous.404 The transfer of individual shares to a third party is not analogous to third 
parties entering the company through a merger, as the merger, unlike an individual transfer, 
is a collective action necessarily approved by the company itself.405 Allowing the acquiring 
company’s shareholders to purchase the new shares would undermine a fundamental 
principle of mergers, which is the transfer of all assets and liabilities to the absorbing 
company.406 The acquiring company is compensating the owners of the absorbed company 
by issuing them new shares in exchange for their shares in the prior company which 
terminated upon the merger.407 The acquiring company has legally obligated itself to this 
exchange, and only done so after approval by a general meeting of shareholders, as required 
for amending the Articles of Association.408 
 The second situation, which much more closely resembles an individual share 
transfer, occurs in either of the following two hypothetical scenarios: 
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(1) Company (A) is acquired by company (B), and company (A) owns shares in the 
limited liability company (C). As a consequence of the merger, company (A) 
transfers its assets, liabilities, and shares to the absorbing company (B), which 
therefore becomes the new owner of company (A)’s shares in company (C). Should 
this transaction trigger a ROFR for company (C)’s shareholders, permitting them 
to purchase (B)’s shares?    
(2) Company (A) merges with company (B) to form company (C), a new company, 
and the assets and liabilities of both companies become the property of the new 
company (C).  If one of the merged companies (A or B) owns shares in the limited 
liability company (D), company (C) thus becomes become a new shareholder of 
company (D). Does such an event trigger a ROFR for company (D)’s existing 
shareholders?  
 
It certainly seems reasonable to contend that, in both hypothetical scenarios, the answer 
is “yes,” a ROFR will be triggered. The reason is that, in both cases, new owners entered a 
company without the consent of the existing shareholders, thereby threatening the private 
character of the LLC. The LLC’s existing shareholders were not a party to the mergers in 
question, and therefore a ROFR is necessary to protect the LLC’s right to be free of 
unwanted third-party owners. 
The Saudi Board of Grievances, the former competent commercial court, issued an 
opinion interpreting SCR Article 161 in light of the ROFR issues raised by the preceding 
hypotheticals. The case (No.43/1/G 1419H)409 involved plaintiffs who were minority LLC 
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shareholders seeking judicial enforcement of their ROFR when a parent company holding 
shares in their LLC was up for sale. The plaintiffs argued they should have a ROFR as to 
the parent company’s LLC shares before the parent company’s sale went through.  The 
parent company (first corporate defendant) argued that no ROFR should exist because it 
was not transferring its LLC shares to a third-party, but rather was itself being purchased 
by an outside company (second corporate defendant).410 The court ultimately rejected the 
plaintiffs’ claims, holding that “rights of first refusal are only available in the event of a 
direct transfer of the LLC shares themselves, and not upon a change in ownership of the 
company holding the LLC shares.”411 The court found no such direct transfer had taken 
place, and thus no ROFR existed, enabling the defendants to prevail.412 
The court’s interpretation of Article 161 as described above leaves LLCs facing 
numerous potential issues. Failure to permit shareholders, who may be a minority in the 
LLC, to exercise the ROFR in such situations leaves them vulnerable to outside third-
parties hoping to circumvent ROFR protections.413 Allowing corporate entities to own 
shares in LLCs without providing some protection to the remaining shareholders in the 
event such entities change owners could lead LLCs to fall under the control of outside 
companies without regard to minority shareholder rights.  Some Articles of Association I 
have examined include provisions controlling the extent to which the company can: (1) 
own shares in other companies or merge with them; and (2) participate with others in the 
establishment of joint stock companies or limited liability companies to carry out similar 
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or complementary activities.414  However, such agreements do not protect the LLC and 
shareholders from unwanted transfers of shares occurring as a result of mergers and 
acquisitions involving a shareholder or shareholder’s corporate parent. This exception to 
the ROFR should lead LLCs to think further about whether they truly wish to permit other 
business entities as shareholders. LLCs should also consider drafting their Articles of 
Association in a manner permitting such entities to own LLC shares, but also granting the 
remaining shareholders ROFR in the event the corporate shareholder changes ownership. 
Such provisions would help avoid the uncertainty and potential dispute that may arise when 
a corporate LLC shareholder is subject to a merger or acquisition. LLCs which consider 
this serious issue in advance will assist shareholders in keeping unwanted owners out of 
the LLC, thereby helping to prevent management conflict within the company.     
 
F. The Problem of Fair Value and Bona Fide Offer   
The new SCR values transferred shares based on the amount of the third-party offer, 
and also gives LLCs authority to set a different valuation method in their Articles of 
Association (or shareholders' agreement). New businesses may add the default SCR 
provision to their agreement, and this is most commonly done in the Gulf States.415 The 
default provision allows LLC owners to transfer their shares to a third party, without 
consent and restriction from any other shareholders, but gives the non-selling shareholders 
                                                 
414  About 35% of the examined Articles of Association contains such provisions regarding Mergers and 
Acquisitions, and the LLC’s participation in other businesses. See the example of published Article of 
Association of RTK Limited Liability Company, Um Al-Qura Newspaper 1439/2/21, No. 4697. Article three 
of this agreement state that “The LLC may acquire shares in other existing companies or merge with it and 
have the right to participate with others in the establishment of joint stock companies or limited liability 
companies, after fulfilling the requirements of the regulations and instructions followed in this regard.” 
415 Gulf States are the (GCC) Gulf Cooperation Council member states, which including Saudi Arabia, The 
United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar and Kuwait.  
 98
a ROFR at the price offered by the third-party purchaser.416 This default arrangement, 
however, can lead to abuses. The transferring shareholder has an incentive to inflate the 
third-party offer, especially in family-run LLCs where the remaining shareholders will 
resist an outside owner under almost any circumstances.417 The transferring shareholder 
might also artificially raise the price in order to block the remaining shareholders from 
acquiring the shares, as punishment for past quarrels between these shareholders.418’419 
Such abuses are possible because the SCR criminally penalizes shareholders for false 
valuation declarations regarding in-kind share contributions to the LLC, but has no such 
penalty for false statements regarding third-party sale offers.420   
Under Islamic fiqh, Al-Soriyah is a concept prohibiting false claims regarding a 
contract’s existence or any of its contents, including the price.421 Al-Soriyah specifically 
forbids a seller and buyer from using deception to deprive third-parties of their preemption 
right to acquire the property in question. Such prohibited deceptions include exaggerating 
a purported sale price to prevent those with preemption rights from purchasing the 
property.422 If such fraudulent conduct is proven, the underlying transfer contract will be 
deemed null and void, and those with preemption rights will be able to claim redemption 
at a fair value.423 Still, despite Islamic jurisprudence’s knowledge of Al-Soriyah, a 
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comprehensive rule applicable to different situations and circumstances has not been 
created.424 As a result, Al-Soriyah’s application to ROFR violations among LLC 
shareholders is unclear under Saudi law. Moreover, even if an Al-Soriyah violation is 
proven, no set penalties are defined. This uncertainty underscores the importance of 
including appraisal provisions in LLC Articles of Association or Shareholder Agreements, 
thus limiting controversy regarding the true value of shares subject to third-party purchase 
offers. Without such appraisal provisions in place, valuation disputes complicate any 
potential settlement.425  
 
G. Alternative Valuation Methods 
The vast majority of Saudi LLCs do not consider the importance of appraisal 
provisions when establishing a company. Their Articles generally contain only very simple 
provisions, such as adopting SCR default provisions regarding the transfer and sale of 
shares.426 As a result, valuation disputes among shareholders have been the subject of 
numerous cases in recent years. Such disputes can cause a business to collapse, and many 
legal voices have called for establishing an independent body for appraising fair share value 
at the time of transfer.427 A few LLCs have attempted to address this concern by creating 
alternative valuation methods for transferred shares, independent of the alleged third-party 
purchase price.428 One such method determines LLC share value according to the LLC’s 
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last annual budget and book value, which should be calculated from the company’s Balance 
Sheet.429’430 Common language establishing such a provision reads as follows: "The 
assignment, sale or other disposal of any asset or related group of assets of the company 
and its value shall be determined as previously approved in the company's last annual 
budget and according to the Balance Sheet."431 The problem with using book value for 
determining the price of a transferring share is that book value rarely reflects the actual or 
fair value of the company.432 Fair value, although difficult to define accurately, should 
reflect the actual value of the firm as a going concern.433 A second method for valuing 
transferred shares stipulates that a general shareholder meeting shall determine the price, 
once the ROFR is triggered. The problem with this method is that share value is ultimately 
determined by the majority shareholders, leaving minority shareholders vulnerable to 
potential abuse. 
 Valuation challenges can arise even when an exit is approved and the general 
valuation method settled.434 Questions such as whether an appraiser should settle 
disagreements as to fair market value, how many appraisers there should be, how they 
should be appointed and chosen, and who will bear the related expenses are all issues that 
shareholders would be wise to address at the time of the company’s formation.435 Such 
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clauses prove beneficial when a shareholder and third party attempt to undermine the 
ROFR by claiming an exaggeratedly high offer price.436 Permitting valuation methodology 
details to be settled at the time of a shareholder exit, or relying on the statutory provision 
alone, invites dispute.   
 
4.3 LLC Transfers of Interest in the United States  
A. Limitations on Transfer  
The United States historically treated transferability of unincorporated firm 
interests as subject to tax factors determined by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)437 and 
Kintner regulations.438 The Kintner regulations evaluated four company characteristics in 
determining whether an entity is taxable as a corporation for federal income tax purposes: 
(1) continuity of life, (2) corporate-type management, (3) limited liability, and (4) free 
transferability of interests.439 A business organization was classified as a corporation for 
tax purposes if it possessed three of these four characteristics.440 A business organization, 
including an LLC, wishing to avoid double taxation and be taxed instead as a pass-through 
entity, could therefore possess no more than two of the Kintner characteristics, the two 
normally being centralized management and limited liability of its owners.441 This test 
changed in 1997 when the IRS promulgated the “check-the-box” rule, which dropped the 
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four characteristics approach, and allowed unincorporated firms to elect to be taxed as 
partnerships. As a result, an LLC with two or more members is subject to pass-through 
taxation by default unless it elects to be taxed and treated as a corporation.442 In spite of 
this change, the partnership origins of LLCs have resulted in LLC statutes that continue to 
resemble partnership statutes. As a result, LLC statutes provide for free transferability of 
only economic (financial) rights, such as the right to LLC distributions and to a share in 
profits and losses, but not management (voting) rights, the transfer of which usually 
requires consent from all non-transferring members.443 The majority of LLC statutes 
expressly exclude management rights when defining ownership interests, and therefore 
such rights cannot be freely transferred to third parties. The Uniform Limited Liability 
Company Act (ULLCA)444 Sections 501 (A) and (B) and Section 502 state the following:  
A member is not a co-owner of, and has no transferable interest in, property 
of a limited liability company. A distributional interest in a limited liability 
company is personal property and, subject to Sections 502 and 503, may be 
transferred in whole or in part. A transfer of a distributional interest does not 
entitle the transferee to become or to exercise any rights of a member. A 
transfer entitles the transferee to receive, to the extent transferred, only the 
distributions to which the transferor would be entitled.445 
 
The Delaware Limited Liability Company Act (DLLCA) Sections 701 and 702 
contain similar language:  
                                                 
442  Id, at. 19, 20. 
443 Id, at 292. 
444 The Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (ULLCA) is a uniform act promulgated in 1995 by the US 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws ("NCCUSL") for the governance of limited 
liability companies by U.S. states. It has been amended in 1996 and 2006. The ULLCA was adopted in nine 
US jurisdictions, including California, the District of Columbia, Florida, Idaho, Iowa, Nebraska, New 
Jersey, Utah, and Wyoming. Carter G. Bishop, The Uniform Limited Liability Company Act: Summary & 
Analysis.  at https://ssrn.com/abstract=930417. The Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act 
(RULLA), which the NCCUSL promulgated in 2006, has been adopted by 17 states to date. Bench & Bar 
of Minnesota, Why You May Need an LLC Update in 2017 at http://mnbenchbar.com/2017/06/llc-update/. 
445 See UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT (ULLCA) 501§ 502§ (1996).  
 103
A limited liability company interest is personal property. A member has no 
interest in specific limited liability company property. A limited liability 
company interest is assignable in whole or in part except as provided in a 
limited liability company agreement. The assignee of a member's limited 
liability company interest shall have no right to participate in the 
management of the business and affairs of a limited liability company 
except as provided in a limited liability company agreement or, unless 
otherwise provided in the limited liability company agreement, upon the 
vote or consent of all of the members of the limited liability company.446 
 
U.S. LLC statutes therefore generally distinguish between economic rights, which 
are treated as transferable interests, and management rights. In contrast, U.S. corporations 
law provides that the transfer of stock shares as personal property entitles the transferee to 
acquire both financial and management rights. Such financial rights include the right to 
receive interim and liquidating dividends, and management rights include voting on the 
directors’ election, M&A transactions, and corporate voluntary liquidation.447 LLCs’ lack 
of free transferability448 in management rights, due to the consent requirement, potentially 
leaves LLC minority members stuck with an illiquid investment, and therefore vulnerable 
to management deadlocks and majority oppression.449 However, the transferability limits 
on management rights is a default rule which LLCs can waive, thereby permitting the free 
and full transfer of a member’s ownership interest.450 The issue of potential management 
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deadlocks has also been addressed by some LLC statutes which create a member right to 
voluntary dissociate from the LLC and receive the value of their interests.451 
 
B. The Nature of the Right of First Refusal (ROFR) 
 
 Generally, U.S. LLC statutes do not provide for a ROFR. As a result, American 
LLCs typically create a ROFR through provisions in their operating agreements.452 
American LLCs rarely impose an absolute ban on transferring membership interests. 
Instead, transferring membership interests is generally permitted if the other members 
agree to it, or in the event they refrain from exercising their ROFR on any proposed third-
party transfer.453 Besides members’ ROFR, operating agreements also typically grant 
ROFR to the LLC itself.454 However, giving a ROFR to the LLC alone, without an 
accompanying right for non-transferring members, might not protect minority shareholder 
interests if they cannot force the LLC to exercise that right in any given situation.455 LLCs 
therefore prefer to give the non-transferring members a ROFR to be exercised in the event 
the LLC itself fails to exercise ROFR.456  
By itself, a ROFR provision does not guarantee that a member will be able to transfer 
his share, either to the non-transferring members or to a third party.457 Members, especially 
those holding minority interests in an LLC, may face difficulty in obtaining suitable third-
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party offers. For members who fail to obtain a third-party offer, no ROFR is triggered on 
behalf of the LLC or non-transferring members.458 Moreover, if default rules on 
transferable membership interests apply, making only a member's financial rights in an 
LLC freely transferrable, and not any management rights, the price a third party will be 
willing to pay is accordingly reduced.459 The price of a membership interest without voting 
rights will naturally be lower than the price of an interest with both economic and voting 
rights.460 As a result, American LLCs, when wishing to guarantee a member the right to 
transfer his or her interest in the future, usually include a “Right-to-Force-Sale” clause in 
a separate agreement, typically a buy-sell agreement.461 LLCs typically permit members to 
freely transfer their interest to a co-owner without triggering the ROFR, since such 
transfers do not result in the entry of a new stakeholder to the business.462 However, an 
LLC operating agreement lacking any provisions governing transfers between co-owners 
could lead to one or more owners seizing control over the business. LLCs that understand 
this risk create provisions applying ROFR to transfers between co-owners, in addition to 
those with third parties.463  
Less prevalent than the ROFR, the Right-of-First-Offer is another device that American 
LLCs include in their agreements.464 In such an arrangement, members are permitted to 
offer their interests to a third party only after first permitting the LLC and other members 
the opportunity to purchase within a specified period of time.465 Any sale to a third party 
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must then also contain same terms and conditions, and price, previously offered to and 
rejected by the LLC and other members.466 ROFR clauses are generally seen as preferable 
to Right-of-First-Offer provisions, and are most commonly used by unincorporated 
business entities. The reason is that ROFR clauses give the company more control over 
share transfers, as ROFR situations will only arise when a member receives a bona fide 
third party offer to purchase the interest.467 
 
C. Mergers and Acquisitions Involving LLC Members  
 
As in the KSA, U.S. LLCs permit other business entities, such as a corporation or 
another LLC, to become shareholders in the business.468 Thus, it is very common for one 
corporation, which could be a subsidiary of another, larger corporation, to possess interests 
in an LLC.469 In this situation, contractual provisions on the ROFR and transfer of interests 
play a significant role in permitting LLC members, and particularly minority interests, to 
control who they will permit to be co-owners.470 American LLCs, and even other forms of 
business entities, usually take this issue into account when drafting the company’s 
operating agreement. Doing so avoids the potential threat that their business could be 
controlled by a corporation with whom they have not chosen to conduct business.  
However, if ROFR provisions are not clear as to what transactions should be 
restricted and what might trigger the ROFR, the holders of the ROFR could easily be 
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circumvented.471 In Northeast Communications of Wisconsin, Inc. v. CenturyTel, Inc., 516 
F.3d 608 (C.A.7 (Wis.), 2008), the court held that the ROFR was not triggered when one 
member of a limited partnership switched corporate parents.472 The parties to the lawsuit, 
Casco Telephone, Universal Cellular, Northeast Communications, Lakefield 
Communications, and Wayside Telecom., formed a limited partnership to operate as a joint 
venture and engage in the cellular communications market. Wisconsin RSA and the 
partnership agreement addressed and contained specific provisions governing the 
partnership’s transfer of interests and the extent of ROFR applicability. These provisions 
were addressed in section 11.5 of the partnership agreement, which stated the following:  
Any provision of Section 11.1 to the contrary notwithstanding, it is understood and 
agreed that Casco Telephone Company, Universal Cellular ... and Lakefield 
Communication, Inc. may transfer their respective partnership interest to one of 
their respective affiliates at any time without consent or restriction from any other 
partner. In the event of any sale, transfer, or other disposition of ownership or 
control by Casco Telephone Company, Universal Cellular... or Lakefield 
Communication, Inc. of their respective Partnership Interest, the non-selling entity, 
or affiliate of the non-selling entity, shall have, to the exclusion of all other partners, 
exclusive right for a period of thirty (30) days from the date of receiving notice 
from the selling partner of its interest to sell part or all Partnership Interest, the right 
to purchase the interest of the selling partner or a portion of said interest., .....Any 
interest not so purchased by Casco Telephone Company, Universal Cellular... or 
Lakefield Communication, Inc., or their respective affiliates, from the other or 
others at the termination of the 30–day period, shall be subject to purchase by any 
of the other partners. It is the intention of the parties that this paragraph shall apply 
only to sales by Casco Telephone Company, Universal Cellular... or Lakefield 
Communication, Inc. or their affiliates to each other, or their affiliates, so as to give 
each of these entities the first right and option to purchase additional interests in the 
Partnership.473 
 
 The district court based its ruling on the last sentence of section 11.5, “It is the 
intention of the parties that this paragraph shall apply only to sales by [the three determined 
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members], or their affiliates to each other, or their affiliates.” Since none of the three 
members mentioned in section 11.5 transferred any interest to another member specified 
in the section, the court ruled that no ROFR was triggered.474 The court’s ruling emphasizes 
the importance of the parties to an agreement clarifying whether a change in a member’s 
ownership, or the corporate parent of a member, activates the ROFR regarding that 
member’s interest.475  
 LLC members could also lose their right to acquire the transferring shares when 
other provisions in the LLC agreement conflict with the ROFR. In Minn. Invco of RSA # 
7, Inc. v. Midwest Wireless Holdings, LLC, an LLC’s minority members claimed that their 
ROFR in the LLC agreement should be triggered upon a parent company’s sale to a third 
party, giving them the right to purchase the parent company’s LLC shares.476 The court 
rejected this claim, holding that the "drag along" provisions in the LLC agreement pre-
empted the ROFR provisions, thereby permitting the parent company to “drag along” its 
shares to its new owner.477 
In general, contractual obligation provisions on transfers of interest and the ROFR must 
clearly and explicitly state the events which will trigger the ROFR, such as:  
(a) A direct transfer of a member’s interest to a third party. 
(b) A transfer between members.  
(c) A corporate-level transaction resulting in a direct or indirect change of a member’s 
ownership. 
(d) A transfer to a member's affiliates. 
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(e) A transfer by a member’s affiliate to another affiliate.478 
 
In the United States, LLC members have the responsibility to be clear and explicit in 
their membership agreement about which events trigger the ROFR. This clarity will help 
holders of minority interests to avoid losing control over the business, as well as avoiding 
the possibility of litigation in the event of a controversial transaction. 
 
D. The Fair Value and Valuation Methods  
1. Bona Fide Offer as A Valuation Methodology  
The ROFR provision in LLC agreements typically selects the price being offered by a 
third-party purchaser as the fair value at which the ROFR holder may purchase a share 
from the transferring member.479 American LLCs have faced issues when attempting to 
apply such provisions in practice. One difficulty is that even when a third-party offer seems 
genuine, determining the actual seriousness of the offer and the extent to which that third 
party is likely to complete the transaction is hard to measure.480’481 Thus, a member seeking 
the transfer may be able to create a fictitious outside bid from a third party and successfully 
conceal its falsity, thereby raising the transferring interest price.482 Nevertheless, LLCs that 
understand this potential problem when drafting their agreements are able to include 
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provisions protecting against abuse during the ROFR process, which may include some or 
all of the following:    
(a) Requiring a written and signed offer from a proposed purchaser submitted with the 
transferring member's Notice of Intent to Transfer to the other members and the 
company.483 Generally, a prospective purchaser will not take the step of signing an 
offer sheet if there is no real intention of buying the interest.484  
(b) Requiring significant upfront payment by the proposed purchaser to the transferring 
member in a manner which can be documented for the non-transferring members, 
such as receiving a copy of the check from a proposed purchaser.485 
(c) An LLC agreement providing in advance a specific price (Agreement Price) that a 
transferring member will receive regardless of the actual value at the time of 
proposed transfer.486 One drawback to an Agreement Price, however, is that the 
transferring member may sell at a price that is less than actual fair market value.487  
 
2. Appraisal Method   
As an alternative to valuation based on bona fide third party offer price, some ROFR 
agreements provide that the value of any share subject to ROFR be set by the appraisal 
method.488 American LLCs often set the ROFR at a market price determined by an 
independent appraisal, which they could refer to in case of any disagreement as to the 
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interest’s fair value.489  There are a number of variations as to the appraisal methodology 
employed in such agreements. One commonly used appraisal provision provides that, in 
the event of a valuation dispute between buying and selling members which cannot be 
resolved within a set period of time, typically 30 days, the value shall the average of 
valuations as determined by three independent appraisers.490 Each party will be entitled to 
choose one appraiser, and the two appraisers will choose a third appraiser.491 Some 
appraisal agreements add a further step and provide for the right to apply to a court for 
selection and appointment of an additional appraiser in the event the initial independent 
appraisers fail to conduct their process in the time and manner agreed to by the parties.492  
Another commonly used appraisal provision states that the ROFR purchase price be 
equal to the purchase price offered by a third party purchaser only if such third party offer 
consists of cash or promissory note.493 These agreements often require the selling member 
to accompany any Notice to Sell with a good faith estimate by the selling member of the 
fair market value of any non-cash consideration.  The market value of the non-cash 
consideration shall then be determined to be equal to either (1) The Seller's Estimate, or 
(2) an amount determined by an independent appraiser selected by the managers (if the 
company is a manager-managed LLC), with the managers then having sole discretion to 
select between the amount as determined by the first or second method.494  
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LLC appraisal agreements also often apportion the expenses of any appraisal carried 
out under the agreement, commonly assigning to each party involved the cost of their own 
selected appraiser and one-half of the cost of any mutually agreed upon appraiser.495 For 
example, if three appraisers conducted an appraisal, each party would compensate the 
appraiser it appointed, with the third appraiser’s expenses borne equally by each party.496 
Still, having an appraisal provision introduced by the members in their agreement 
whenever a ROFR option triggers will not always avoid problems. Most outside buyers 
will be unwilling to invest the time and money required for due diligence on a proposed 
purchase if they know that the company can step in and buy the interest regardless of the 
price offered by the outside purchaser.497 As a result, many LLC agreements distinguish a 
member’s voluntary transfer of a membership interest, where there is a third party offer, 
and an involuntary transfer, as in the case of a member’s death, incapacity, or 
bankruptcy.498 Such agreements state that, with a voluntary transfer, any bona fide third 
party offer shall determine the ROFR price.499 In the case of an involuntary transfer, on the 
other hand, they will refer to the Purchase Price Section introduced in their agreements.500 
 
E. Payment Terms 
The method and instrument through which the payment is made is usually agreed upon 
in advance in the company's constitutional documents. The non-transferring owners are 
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often obliged by the LLC operating agreement to follow either the same method and 
mechanism as provided in the third party proposed offer, or the specific payment terms 
agreed upon in the LLC operating agreement. An example of the first approach is the 
following language:  
Upon the exercise of a right to purchase and provided the right is exercised 
with respect to all of the Interest in the Company offered, the purchase shall 
be closed, and payment made on the same terms and conditions as those on 
which the Offeror proposes to transfer the Interest in the Company. If the 
proposed offer is for consideration other than cash or cash plus deferred 
payments of cash, the purchasing Members may pay the present value cash 
equivalent of such other consideration or may pay using the same 
instrument as contemplated by the proposed offer.501 
 
Other LLC agreements follow the second approach and provide for remaining members 
the right to purchase, once the purchase option is triggered, at either the Agreement Price 
or at its fair value as determined by Payment Terms set out in the agreement. In this way, 
LLCs can agree on Deferred Payment502 Terms once the right of first refusal is triggered, 
regardless of the payment instrument of the proposed offer.503 An example of language 
dictating this second approach is the following: 
The company and the non-transferring owners shall have the right to 
purchase the interest of the transferring owner at the Agreement Price (or at 
its fair value) and payment terms selected in the "Payment Terms" section 
of this agreement.504 
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 Agreements can thus have a plan requiring a down payment of a specific amount 
due at the time of transfer,505 with the remaining balance divided over monthly or yearly 
installments until the entire purchase price is paid in full.506 
 
4.4 Summary and Analysis  
 
A. The Statutory Provisions  
The Saudi legislature has shown historical progress with regard to the transfer of LLC 
shares, as the consent of the other shareholders is no longer required for transferring a share 
to a third party. ROFR, however, still applies to any transfer proposal, thereby making it 
difficult for shareholders seeking a transfer, especially those holding minority shares in the 
LLC, to carry out their proposed transaction. Obtaining the consent of other shareholders 
to a new shareholder’s entry is typically not the major obstacle to a third-party transfer, as 
a new minority owner could not affect business operations. Rather, the practical difficulty 
arises in finding a third-party willing to become a minority owner. The lack of ready third-
party purchasers leaves minority shareholders vulnerable in company disputes, resulting in 
potential management deadlock, minority oppression, or other disruptions to company 
operations.    
The difficulties of selling minority shares poses several additional questions. First, does 
Saudi law provide for other mechanisms through which a shareholder might avoid being 
locked-into a business?  Second, are there any remedies available to an LLC minority 
                                                 
505 STEVEN C. ALBERTA, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES: A PLANNING AND DRAFTING GUIDE,188 (1st ed. 
2003). 
506 Id. 
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owner if they become vulnerable to majority owner misconduct?507 U.S. LLC statutes, as 
explained, do not allow for the assignment of a member’s management rights without the 
consent of the other members. Therefore, members holding minority interests in U.S. LLCs 
are vulnerable to management deadlock, as well as to majority owner misconduct. 
However, there are two fundamental differences between Saudi and U.S. LLC laws. The 
differences are: (1) The ROFR in Saudi law is a mandatory right that shareholders may not 
omit from their LLC agreements, in contrast to U.S. LLC law which leaves that 
determination up to the LLC members themselves; (2) U.S. LLC statutes separate 
management and economic rights in the event a member transfers his or her interest, in 
contrast to Saudi law which does not allow such a division in cases of transfer.  Based on 
these differences, two questions then arise. First, should the rules governing ROFR be 
mandatory or default rules? Second, is the U.S. approach of distinguishing between the 
transferability of controlling and economic rights an optimal model to apply in KSA?  
1. Should the rules governing the right of first refusal be mandatory or default rules? 
The right of first refusal protects minority investors by providing them an opportunity 
to increase their position in the business, if desired, in order to avoid the risks associated 
with being a minority shareholder.508 Such protection is especially important in closely 
held companies where minority owners have limited control over management of the 
business and lack a liquid market in which to sell their shares.509 The essential ROFR 
                                                 
507 Infra chapter 6. 
508 GARY R. TRUMAN, UNDERSTANDING BUSINESS VALUATION: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO VALUING SMALL 
TO MEDIUM SIZED BUSINESSES, 576-577 (5th ed. 2017). 
509 Alison Bird, Top Ten Minority Investors Protections at 
http://www.turinasbird.com/2016/01/12/corporate-law/minority-investor-protections.  
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distinction between the US and KSA legal systems is that the SCR grants LLC shareholders 
a mandatory ROFR that the shareholders cannot waive in their Articles of Association, 
whereas US LLC statutes generally do not provide for such right. The US system thus 
grants LLC owners maximum freedom to include or not include ROFR provisions in their 
agreements.  
There is currently great debate among corporate law scholars as to the extent corporate 
law statutes should contain default versus mandatory rules.510 Those supporting mandatory 
rules offer several main arguments.511 First, mandatory rules protect shareholders whose 
lack of sufficient information or foresight would otherwise lead to unfair or prejudicial 
agreements.512 Second, mandatory rules also protect non-owners such as a company’s 
creditors and consumers.513 Scholars favoring default rules counter that private parties are 
generally in the best position to know their own interests, and that mandatory rules 
therefore limit contractual freedom to an unnecessary extent, particularly when company 
agreements have little effect on third-parties.514 Pro-default rule scholars generally admit 
that the case for mandatory rules is much stronger with regard to third-party protections, 
such as piercing the corporate veil or the legal capital rule.515 However, provisions such as 
the right of ROFR, where no third-party interest is threatened, should not be subject to 
mandatory rules.  
                                                 
510 Brett H. McDonnell, Sticky Defaults and Altering Rules in Corporate Law, 60 S.M.U. L. Rev. 383, 384 
(2007). Available at https://scholar.smu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1448&context=smulr. 
511 Id, at. 389. See the discussion in Chapter 3. 
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513 Id. 
514 Id, at. 383. 
515  See the discussion in the next chapter about the legal capital rule.  
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 Pre-emptive rights under U.S. law, which share certain similarities with the ROFR, 
have undergone several historical changes which are also important to our analysis.516 Pre-
emptive rights give shareholders the right to purchase any additional or subsequent shares 
that a company proposes to issue. Although not focusing on existing shares like ROFR 
agreements, pre-emptive rights serve a similar purpose by protecting minority investors 
whose interests may be threatened by any change in the ownership percentage of a 
company's shares.517 It is therefore significant that the U.S. has gradually eliminated 
mandatory pre-emptive rights, giving parties the contractual freedom to include or omit 
them from company agreements.518 Corporate laws in most U.S. states no longer include 
mandatory pre-emptive rights.519  
The mandatory pre-emptive right as initially established by case law protected 
individual shareholder's ownership voting power.520 Many doubts then emerged regarding 
the application of such mandatory pre-emptive rights.521 Some scholars argued against the 
rule by pointing out that as the only function of such a rule was to protect shareholder 
voting rights, the rule had relevance to those holding non-voting shares.522 Later, the 
mandatory pre-emptive rights rule became a tool to guard against aggressive behavior by 
majority owners, as most cases where the issuance of new shares harmed minority 
shareholders also involved breaches of fiduciary duty by the controlling shareholders or 
                                                 
516 Amal Abu Awwad, Shareholders’ Preemptive Rights in Listed and Closely-Held Corporations and 
Shareholders’ Protection Methods at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2739375. 
517 Technical committee of The International Orgnization of Securities Commissions, Protection of 
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the board of directors.523 Therefore, the U.S. today has eliminated the mandatory 
preemptive rights rule by reasoning that shareholder protection is ensured by fiduciary 
duties and market liquidity, eliminating the need for pre-emptive rights.524 In closely held 
companies where minority stakeholders have no liquid market in which to sell, it is 
therefore more important that legal tools exist for protecting minority shareholders from 
diminished voting power.525  
From my perspective, a similar analysis should apply to ROFR doctrine, as the 
desirability of mandatory ROFR depends upon the existence of other legal protections for 
the rights of minority investors, most importantly fiduciary duties.  If the law provides 
clearly for fiduciary duties that managers and controlling shareholders owe to the LLC and 
other shareholders, then there is less need for mandatory ROFR. Lawmakers should 
therefore see that mandatory ROFR might not be the appropriate legal protection for LLC 
shareholders when other legal tools would provide equivalent protection while also 
respecting the contractual freedom of LLC owners to decide for themselves on ROFR 
desirability. Therefore, the ROFR should be a default provision, allowing parties to opt out 
if they feel their interests would be better served without this measure. 
2. Is the U.S. approach of distinguishing between the transferability of controlling 
rights and economic rights an optimal model to apply in KSA? 
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The LLC statutes of most U.S. states generally permit the free transferability of a 
member’s economic rights.526 The transfer, however, of a member’s controlling rights527 
typically requires the consent of the other members.528 Scholars have identified a historical 
reason for this distinction between economic and controlling rights. 529 Prior to the 
promulgation of the check-the-box rule, free transferability was a corporate characteristic 
for purposes of U.S. federal income tax law.530 Thus, LLC statutes follow partnership law 
in distinguishing between a member’s economic and management interests in order to 
avoid corporate double taxation.531 The LLC rule is also intended to protect existing 
members from having to share management responsibilities with an outside person who 
might prove personally or managerially incompatible with current members,532 while 
simultaneously providing a member with some level of liquidity.533 
Whatever its merits, the approach has also been criticized in several respects. First, the 
restriction on transferability of management rights may leave LLC minority owners stuck 
with an illiquid investment, and vulnerable to management deadlocks.534  Second, the 
restriction tends to discourage third party offers and add to the challenges of any sale. New 
investors often want  to participate in LLC management and gain some control over 
company resolutions.535 Under current law, a buyer may be forced make any purchase offer 
                                                 
526 The buyer receives only the right to share in profits and capital distributions. 
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to a transferring member contingent upon obtaining the consent of all non-transferring 
members.536 Such restrictions also significantly affect the price a transferor might 
receive.537 The purchase price will be lower if the buyer acquires only the transferor’s 
economic interests, as opposed to both the economic and controlling interests.538 Thus, 
while the restriction on transferring management rights is intended to protect LLC 
members from management interference caused by to unwanted new members, it hinders 
any member seeking full market value for a transfer, as obtaining full market value requires 
the consent of non-transferring members. Also, in situations where an LLC member has 
successfully transferred all financial rights to a third party, the transferor remains able to 
impact company management. This raises the possibility that the transferor would not act 
in the best interests of the company, given the absence of any personal financial stake.  
Some U.S. LLC statutes attempt to address this last issue. For example, the Uniform 
Limited Liability Company Act (ULLCA) permits LLCs to expel any member has 
transferred all of his distributional (financial) interests in the LLC to third parties.539 I 
believe that the KSA would be best served by not permitting a split between financial and 
management rights, and should therefore decline to follow the U.S. model.    
 
B. The Provisions of LLC Agreements  
                                                 
536 Id. 
537 Id. 
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539 See UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT (ULLCA) 601(5)(ii) § (1996). States that “A member is dissociated 
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(ii) there has been a transfer of substantially all of the member's distributional interest, other than a transfer 
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LLC operating agreements in the United States pay notably more attention to regulating 
the procedures for transferring members' interests than do such agreements in KSA. For 
instance, in the ROFR context, U.S. operating agreements usually contain provisions 
clarifying whether corporate-level transactions, such as mergers and acquisitions, resulting 
in an indirect change of ownership for the LLC, trigger the ROFR.540 Such provisions 
protect LLCs as well as their minority owners from being controlled or directed by 
corporations not originally parties to the LLC agreement. In contrast, and despite many 
complicated cases arising in the courts as a result, Saudi LLCs agreements generally lack 
provisions regulating corporate-level transactions involving one or more LLC 
shareholders. Regarding valuation methods for transferred shares, American LLCs adopt 
several different models. One commonly used method, as previously discussed541, 
determines the price of a transferring member's interest based on a third party bona fide 
offer. U.S. operating agreements have created innovative solutions to minimize any 
potentially fictitious bid from a third party. One solution is requiring a written, signed offer 
from a proposed purchaser to be submitted along with the transferring member's Notice of 
Intent to Transfer. A second solution is requiring a significant upfront payment by the 
proposed purchaser, in a manner which can be documented for the non-transferring 
members.542  
American LLC agreements frequently adopt the appraisal method for determining the 
actual value of a transferring interest.543 I agree with those who argue that this use of the 
appraisal method discourages third party offers. It seems clear that most outside buyers 
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will be unwilling to invest the time and money required for due diligence on a proposed 
purchase where the company can then buy the interest itself, regardless of the price offered 
by the third party. Perhaps the ideal model in U.S. LLC operating agreements is that which 
uses an appraisal method only in cases of a member’s interest being involuntary 
transferred.544  
LLC agreements in KSA that I have analyzed generally do not address valuation 
matters in advance. As a result, they do not guard against the problem of false or inflated 
third-party offers, as also do not provide in advance for valuation methods in cases of 
involuntary transfers. This lack of foresight leaves many valuation issues to be decided on 
a case-by-case basis, which often   invites disputes between shareholders. Another 
significant aspect of American LLC agreements is the determination of payment terms for 
transferred shares, such as dividing the payment into monthly or yearly installments.545 
This proves important, especially when a share’s market value is very high, making 
purchase through a single payment difficult within the limited period for exercising ROFR. 
Despite its importance, the LLC Articles of Association in the KSA do not include similar 
provisions. Without such a provision, members risk losing the option of acquiring 
transferred shares when the price is high, as the courts in such situations are likely to require 
full payment to the transferring shareholder. However, certain provisions and restrictions 
clauses permitted in American LLC agreements, such as “drag-along” and “tag-along” 
rights, may be unenforceable under Sharia Law, and thus do not exist in Saudi LLC 
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agreements.546  Because the provisions in question fail to provide the necessary certainty 
required in business transactions, they remain untested in Saudi Arabian courts.547 
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Chapter 5: Withdrawal and Buyout Rights 
 
5.1. Introduction  
 
Withdrawing from an LLC can be challenging, as it may require the individual to not 
only withdraw his or her investment, but also to liquidate the entity or impose on the 
company a sizeable payout. Thus, while the right of voluntary withdrawal from an LLC 
provides significant protection for a shareholder’s rights, exercising it can have a negative 
effect on the corporate entity and may lead to investor losses.548 Notwithstanding this down 
side, the right of voluntary withdrawal remains highly important in resolving disputes 
between owners, especially when mutual continuation within the LLC becomes 
impossible.549 Even when a shareholder’s ability to transfer LLC shares is not restricted by 
law or a company's constitutional documents, minority shareholders still face practical 
difficulties in transacting the sale. As discussed previously, the principal difficulty is 
finding someone willing to purchase minority shares at a fair price and become the new 
minority shareholder of the company.550 Therefore, a minority shareholder might prefer to 
seek withdrawal and receive a capital return, as opposed to facing possible losses through 
the sale of minority shares. LLC statutes vary as to whether a shareholder (or a member) 
has a right to withdraw from the LLC prior to the date of its dissolution. They also differ 
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on when such a withdrawal is allowed and whether the withdrawing shareholder is entitled 
to a buy-out, dissolution, or neither option.551 
 
5.2. Why might a shareholder seek to withdraw and receive a capital return?   
Besides a minority investor exercising withdrawal rights to avoid abuse or misconduct 
by majority owners, there are a number of other reasons which could lead a shareholder to 
withdraw from the LLC and seek a capital return. The following are some of the possible 
reasons:  
(1) An LLC shareholder may seek withdrawal because the purpose for which the 
company was established cannot be achieved.552 
(2) Other shareholders have breached the LLC Agreement, or failed to perform as 
required and agreed upon in the LLC agreement.553 
(3) A shareholder cannot agree with the other shareholders on a business strategy.554 
(4) Desiring to invest in another business, if the LLC is no longer making an adequate 
profit.555 
(5) Shareholder personal or business conflicts.556 
(6) The disability of the shareholder.557 
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Whether a shareholder’s reason for seeking withdrawal relates to the business, other 
shareholders, or a personal situation, withdrawal is a significant exit mechanism, allowing 
a shareholder to depart the LLC and protect his or her investment whenever the need arises. 
 
5.3. The Adverse Impact of Share Withdrawal and Its Costs to Company Creditors  
Although voluntary withdrawal offers significant protections for a shareholder's rights, 
exercising such a right can lead to negative consequences for the LLC. Depending on the 
size of the withdrawing shareholder’s stake, the required capital distribution to the 
withdrawing owner may undermine the company's financial integrity.558 In a worst-case 
scenario, the LLC may not survive.559 Even if the company can afford the withdrawal 
payment, large capital reductions can affect the LLC’s ability to efficiently operate, and 
particularly its ability to invest or expand.560 Large capital withdrawals may also increase 
the risks for LLC creditors.561 As a result, many jurisdictions, including the KSA, impose 
LLC minimum capital requirements under a statutory Legal Capital rule.562 The Legal 
Capital rule functions primarily as a creditor-protection device which prevents the debtor 
LLC from arbitrarily reducing assets through shareholder distributions.563 The tension 
between the interests of company shareholders and those of its creditors is the motivation 
behind the Legal Capital rule, as it is presumed that shareholders will otherwise be free to 
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take advantage of their limited liability in order to act against the interests of company 
creditors.564 The legal capital rule thus serves as a statutory margin of error protecting 
company creditors from default.565 The United States has, however, gradually eliminated 
the legal capital rule, preferring other devices for protecting creditors.566 Most U.S. LLC 
statutes presently rely on individual shareholder liability rules, such as piercing the 
corporate veil, as well as improper distribution rules, to protect company creditor 
interests.567’568 U.S. creditors also have the option of protecting themselves from 
shareholder actions through restrictive covenants.569 This chapter will later discuss in 
greater detail the full protections available for creditors in both the KSA and United States.   
 
5.4. The Case of Saudi Arabia 
A. Shareholder’s Voluntary Withdrawal   
Following the French Company Law approach, which much of the Saudi 
Companies Law is modeled after,570 a single shareholder has no absolute right to withdraw 
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from the LLC before its date of expiry.571 The most natural manner for a shareholder to 
exit from the LLC is to transfer his or her shares to an existing shareholder, or a third party, 
as explained in the previous chapter.572 There is, however, an important legal distinction 
between a shareholder's unilateral withdrawal without the consent of the other 
shareholders, and one which obtains such consent. Saudi Arabian law on a shareholder’s 
ability to join and withdraw from a company is largely influenced by the nature and type 
of the company, as well as the effect any changes in capital might have on its viability.573 
Companies are generally classified as either companies with fixed capital574 or companies 
with variable capital.575 A fixed-capital company, such as the LLC, must retain its paid-in 
capital as stipulated in either its original Articles of Association or the latest amended 
version.576 Under the Saudi Companies Regulation (“SCR”), an LLC may therefore not 
decrease the paid-in capital amount listed in its Articles of Association unless it follows 
the full procedures for amending the Articles, including obtaining both shareholder and 
Ministry of Commerce and Investment (“MoCI”) approval.577’578 Fixed-capital companies 
thus provide shareholders with less freedom to join or exit the company, as issuing new 
shares or re-buying existing shares will likely increase or reduce its paid-in capital.579 
Should a company be unable to complete the procedures for increasing or reducing the 
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LLC’s subscribed capital, the company may not make distribution to a withdrawing 
shareholder. The end result is a shareholder who cannot exit the company unless he or she 
finds a new shareholder to purchase the shares. The legal capital rule thus constrains cash 
payments to LLC shareholders, and any withdrawal of shares requires approval by a 
general meeting of shareholders as well as obedience to the creditor protection 
mechanism.580 In this fashion, fixed-capital companies become characterized not only by 
stable capital, but also by stable shareholders. Variable capital companies, by contrast, may 
alter their paid-in capital capacity, with a corresponding ability to alter their shareholders 
as well. A fixed-capital company is called a closed company, while a variable-capital 
company is called an open company.581 In Saudi Arabia, a shareholder’s freedom to exit a 
closed company, such as an LLC, is quite limited.  
Significantly, the SCR’s only reference to shareholder withdrawal from an LLC is 
the withdrawal permitted once the LLC reaches the expiration date specified in its Articles 
of Association. Reaching the expiration date terminates the company, and no extension of 
the company’s term is permitted before its completes an exit process which includes 
disbursement of all company equity to the departing shareholders.582 Whether a 
shareholder’s withdrawal is legal under Saudi partnership law depends partly on whether 
the entity in question is a term or perpetual-existence company. Under the General 
Partnerships law (sharikat al-tadamun), a partner in a perpetual-existence partnership may 
withdraw at any particular time.583 In a term partnership, however, where an expiration 
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date is specified in the partnership agreement, a partner may not withdraw at any time prior 
to that expiration date.584 The reasoning behind this distinction is that a partner 
withdrawing from a perpetual-existence company does not violate the original agreement, 
as the firm was created to last only so long as its owners desired.585 Early withdrawal from 
a term partnership, on the other hand, violates the original agreement, discarding the 
mutually-agreed upon ending date.586 A single partner’s right to withdraw from a perpetual-
existence partnership cannot be extinguished by law because losing that right would 
infringe on personal freedom, locking the partner into an unwanted legal relationship for 
life.587  
The question then arises whether Saudi Arabia permits the establishment of a 
perpetual-existence LLC, where there is no expiration date in its formation documents. The 
answer is that such an LLC is not permitted. The SCR explicitly states that an LLC’s 
Articles of Association must contain both a starting and an expiration date before being 
submitted to the MoCI for ratification and approval.588 In short, establishing an LLC with 
an unlimited term is not possible in Saudi Arabia.  
The SCR’s failure to reference any means of withdrawing from an LLC aside from 
withdrawal upon expiration might be explained by the above-mentioned impossibility of 
                                                 
announce such withdrawal to the remaining partners at an appropriate time. Otherwise, the competent 
judicial authority may oblige him to continue in the company and to pay compensation when required.” 
Id. Article 2 of the SCR states the following: "A company is defined as a contract under which two 
or more persons undertake to participate in an enterprise for profit, by contributing a share in the form of 
money or work, or both of them, with a view to dividing any profits (realized) or losses (incurred) as a 
result of such enterprise." 
584 Id. 
585 ERNEST KAY, LEGAL ASPECTS OF BUSINESS IN SAUDI ARABIA, 21, 22 (GRAHAM & TROTMAN, FIRST ED. 
1979). 
586  Id. 
587 Id. 
588 The Saudi Companies Regulation, Art. 156. 
 131
creating a perpetual-existence LLC. However, even if it were theoretically possible for an 
LLC shareholder to withdraw prior to LLC expiration, the LLC’s legal capital requirement 
would frustrate the object of such a transaction. It would do so by preventing the LLC from 
repurchasing the shares of the withdrawing shareholder. However, the SCR does not 
explicitly prohibit LLC owners agreeing to a shareholder’s withdrawal prior to the 
expiration date. In order to accomplish this action, though, specific procedures for 
maintaining the LLC’s legal capital must be followed, as the most important Saudi 
restrictions on LLC shareholder withdrawal relate to capital stability. Withdrawals that do 
not reduce capital, on the other hand, such as the departing shareholder assigning shares to 
an existing shareholder or outside third party, are not problematic.589  
As mentioned, withdrawals that would result in returning the departing 
shareholder’s capital contribution must comply with several specific procedures. The 
withdrawing shareholder must obtain the consent of the other shareholders, as well as their 
approval for reducing the LLC’s subscribed capital. LLC shareholders must therefore vote 
in the general meeting to approve the particular number of shares that the LLC will acquire, 
as well as the price the company will pay for them. More specifically, reduction in the 
LLC’s capital can only be accomplished by completing the following procedures:  
(a) The general assembly must approve both the withdrawal of shares and reduction of 
the company's subscribed capital. Such approval must be authorized by 
shareholders representing at least three-quarters of the LLC’s capital.590 
                                                 
589  Ernest Kay, supra note 586. 
590 This requirement is found in Article 174 of the Saudi Companies Law, which states that the unanimous 
consent of all shareholders must be obtained prior to changing the nationality of the company or increasing 
its capital. All other resolutions requiring amendment of the company's Articles of Association, including a 
reduction in capital, can take place with the consent of shareholders representing at least 75% of the 
company's capital. The Saudi Companies Regulation, Art. 174. 
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(b) The resolution to reduce capital must be published in a daily newspaper distributed 
in the city where the company's head office is located. In addition, the company's 
creditors must be invited to submit their objections, if any, to the shareholders’ 
decision within sixty days from the date of publication. If a creditor objects and 
provides proof of such objection, the company must pay any debt that is due, or 
provide a sufficient guarantee of future payment if the debt is not yet due.591 
(c) The LLC owners must provide the MoCI a draft amendment of the company's 
Articles of Association, including any language reducing the company's capital. A 
detailed and certified disclosure statement must be submitted by the company's 
auditor, stating the names and addresses of the creditors who objected to the 
decision to reduce capital, as well as the name of each creditor whose debt was 
repaid or provided with a sufficient guarantee of future payment. Furthermore, the 
draft amendment must be accompanied by a shareholder declaration of solidarity 
and joint responsibility for any debts that have not been included in the detailed 
disclosure statement.592 
(d) If the company does not have any debts, the owners may submit to the MoCI a 
declaration, approved by the auditor, stating their joint responsibility for any debts 
accumulated after the approval of the amendment of the Articles of Association. In 
such a case, the shareholders are exempted from undertaking a creditors’ 
notification and the reduction in capital procedure may be completed.593  
 
                                                 
591 The Saudi Companies Regulation, Art. 177. 
592  Id. 
593 Id. 
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As the required procedures make clear, the main legislative purposes behind restricting 
LLC capital reductions are protecting its creditors and therefore maintaining public 
confidence in financial markets. The restrictions are seen as the cost companies must pay 
in order to gain the benefits of limited liability.594 LLC shareholders with debt will 
otherwise have large potential inducements to behave opportunistically at the expense of 
the company's creditors.595 Shareholders might distribute assets to themselves in a number 
of ways, such as share buybacks or assuming  exorbitant salaries.596 Such distributions 
would reduce company equity below the level creditors relied upon when originally 
deciding to extend credit.597 Limited liability is deemed a privilege enjoyed by 
shareholders, while obviously having drawbacks from creditors’ point of view.598 The 
Legal Capital rule is thus inherently linked with limited liability, requiring shareholders to 
make certain capital contributions to the company which may not be returned during the 
LLC’s existence, except as provided by law.599 
One downside to the restrictions on share repurchases is a possible increase in the costs 
associated with any LLC shareholder conflicts.600 The restrictions will at times preclude a 
company from acquiring a dissenting shareholder’s shares, increasing the chances of 
shareholder deadlock which might affect company operations.601 The restriction on share 
                                                 
594 Hasan Erdem, supra note 565, at 36. 
595 Luca Enriques and Jonathan R. Macey, Creditors Versus Capital Formation:  e Case against the 
European Legal Capital Rules, 86 Cornell L. Rev. 1165 (2001). Available at: 
h6p://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol86/iss6/1. 
596 Id. at. 1169. 
597 Id. 
598 THOMAS BACHNER, CREDITOR PROTECTION IN PRIVATE COMPANIES: ANGLO-GERMAN PERSPECTIVES 
FOR A EUROPEAN LEGAL DISCOURSE, 94-97 (CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS, FIRST ED 2009). 
599 Id. 
600 EILIS FERRAN & LOOK CHAN HO, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE LAW, 8, 9 (OXFORD UNIVERSITY 
PRESS, REVISED ED 2014). 
601 Luca Enriques, supra note 596. 
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buy-backs also makes investments in LLCs less liquid, reducing their attractiveness to 
external investors.602 LLCs may reduce capital in order to make distributions to an 
individual shareholder seeking to withdraw, but the numerous procedural hurdles, 
including creditor veto power, increase the transaction costs.603 The creditor veto power 
also potentially encourages creditors to opportunistically insist on side payments in order 
to consent to the capital reduction.604  Thus, under the Saudi legal system, a shareholder’s 
ability to withdraw from an LLC prior to expiration, while theoretically possible, faces 
numerous practical obstacles.    
 
B. Shareholder’s Death 
Under the SCR, the death of an LLC shareholder does not, of itself, cause the LLC’s 
dissolution, unless the operating agreement provides otherwise.605 Moreover, a 
shareholder’s death does not grant the surviving shareholders a right to buyout606 the 
deceased shareholder’s heirs or devisees.607 Rather, the shares of the deceased shareholder 
will be transferred, by operation of law, directly to his heirs or any other beneficiaries of 
his will.608 If the new owners succeeding to the deceased shareholder’s shares hold such 
shares jointly, the SCR requires them to designate a sole owner for purposes of dealing 
                                                 
602 Id. 
603 REINIER KRAAKMAN, THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL 
APPROACH, 126 (OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS, THIRD ED 2017). 
604 Id. 
605 Id, Art. 179. 
606  Article 161 of the SCR expressly excludes transfers of shares by inheritance or bequest from being 
subject to the right of first refusal.  
607 Id, Art. 161. 
608 NABIL SALEH, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF SAUDI ARABIAN AND OMANI COMPANY LAWS: STATUTES 
AND SHARI'A, 148 (NAMARA First Ed. 1981).   
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with the LLC and representing the shares’ managerial and economic rights in the LLC.609  
Thus, the decedent’s heirs may exercise the full rights of an LLC shareholder, including all 
management (voting) and financial rights possessed by the original shareholder. The 
transfer of any shares to the heirs or beneficiaries of the deceased shareholder must be 
recorded in the company's register in order to be made effective.610 The surviving 
shareholders have no right to either deny the new owners entry to the LLC or to restrict 
their management or other shareholder rights in any fashion, unless such restrictions are 
express provided for in the LLC agreement.611 On the other hand, the heirs are also 
responsible for any debt, obligation or other liability the decedent owed to the LLC or the 
other shareholders at the time of his death.612 The SCR is generally silent about the right 
of LLC shareholders to restrict the transfer of a deceased member's shares in the company 
to his heirs or other beneficiaries. However, the majority view is that an LLC agreement 
can provide for such restriction and also give the surviving shareholders the right to buyout 
the heirs of the deceased shareholder, if such a buyout is made for a fair value.613 Thus, an 
LLC’s shareholders can prevent the entry of a deceased member’s beneficiaries to the LLC 
by providing for such a restriction in the LLC agreement, thereby protecting the company’s 
intimate character  while also entitling the heirs to an immediate distribution. Similarly, an 
LLC agreement may provide for the entity’s dissolution upon the death of any of the 
shareholders.614  
                                                 
609 A LERRICK & Q J MIAN, SAUDI BUSINESS AND LABOR LAW: ITS INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION, 
162 (GRAHAM & TROTMAN. 1982). 
610 The Saudi Companies Regulation, Art. 162. 
611 ABDULRAHMAN GORMAN, THE PREEMPTIVE RIGHT IN THE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY: 
COMPARATIVE STUDY, 230 (First Ed.1995). In Arabic. 
612 Id, 231. 
613 Id, at. 240. 
614 Id. 
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C. Determining a Share’s Value  
Article 161 of the SCR provides LLC shareholders with the right to acquire any share 
being transferred to a third-party,615 at the same price proposed by the prospective buyer.616 
In such a situation, determining the share’s value proves relatively easy, as the price is 
determined by the third-party offer, unless the shareholders provided for another valuation 
method in the LLC agreement. When no such offer exists, determining share value is more 
difficult. One transfer scenario with no third-party offer is a shareholder’s death, when the 
shareholders have agreed that such a death triggers ROFR under the LLC agreement, and 
one or more shareholders exercise their ROFR toward the decedent’s shares. Similarly, the 
withdrawal of an LLC shareholder at the LLC’s expiration date can also create a valuation 
issue, as this event will trigger a vote for continuing the company’s business to avoid 
dissolution of the LLC, with the decision resting in the hands of the majority 
shareholders.617 SCR Article 180 expressly states that an LLC shareholder wishing to  
withdraw at the expiration period has the right to do so by selling his share to a third-party, 
if one can be found, and, if not, to have his share purchased at fair value by the remaining 
shareholders,  or as stipulated in the LLC’s agreement.618 When no third-party offer 
materializes, the question of what price to attach to the withdrawing share presents itself.  
Because many Saudi Articles of Association that I have examined contain terms as 
low as five years,619 situations often arise where minority shareholders seek to withdraw 
                                                 
615  See the discussion in the previous chapter. 
616 The Saudi Companies Regulation, Art. 161. 
617Id, Art. 180.  
618 Id. 
619 At least 25% of the examined Articles of Association provided for such relatively short terms. 
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and, for reasons discussed earlier, no third party makes an offer.620 In this scenario, many 
Articles of Association employ the default rule of SCR Article 180, which entitles the 
withdrawing shareholder to receive “fair value,” but does not specify the method for 
determining such a value.621 Other LLC agreements stipulate that a share’s “fair value” 
shall be determined by the company’s auditors at the end of each financial year, with the 
auditor’s report then requiring approval at the annual shareholder general assembly 
meeting.622 The problem that arises under the latter method is that the determination of 
share value is ultimately determined by the majority shareholders, leaving minority 
shareholders vulnerable to potential abuse. Another question which arises under this 
method is how to determine share value if no particular value achieves a majority. In light 
of these uncertainties, it is imperative that shareholders seriously consider the valuation 
methodology to be applied in such circumstances. Failure to do so will likely lead to 
disputes with minority shareholders at the time of withdrawal, or with heirs in the event of 
a shareholder’s death.      
 
 
                                                 
620  See the Published Article of Association of Metsu Plant Saudi Arabia Limited Liability Company. Um 
Al-Qura Newspaper, 1438/9/9, No. 4673. 
621 See the Published Article of Association of Nesma Onor Contracting Limited Liability Company, Um 
Al-Qura Newspaper, 1438/9/2, No. 4672, p. 41. Also, See the Published Article of Association of RTK 
limited liability company, Um Al-Qura Newspaper, 1439/2/21, No. 4697. 
622 See A Lerrick & Q J Mian, supra note 610, at. 160, 161. 
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5.5. Withdrawal Rights in The U.S.  
A. Voluntary Withdrawal  
In the absence of a relevant provision within an LLC operating agreement, state law 
generally governs member withdrawal rights in the United States.623 There is presently 
considerable variation among statutory default rules governing both members’ withdrawal 
rights, and the related right to receive a distribution upon withdrawal.624 The Uniform 
Limited Liability Company Act (ULLCA) permits a member to "dissociate"625 from an 
LLC at any time, simply by expressing the desire to withdraw.626 Under the original 
ULLCA first promulgated in 1995, the effect of a member’s withdrawal depends on the 
duration and management structure627 specified in the LLC’s operating agreement.628 
Duration and management structure control how withdrawal affects a member’s 
management and financial interests, as well as the continuing viability of the entity.  
Regarding duration, an LLC can be either at-will, meaning without a specified length 
of existence, or for a specific term.629 Upon a member’s voluntary withdrawal from an at-
will company, the LLC must purchase the withdrawing member’s interest at its fair value, 
                                                 
623 See Sandra K. Miller, A New Direction for LLC Research in a Contractarian Legal Environment, 76 S. 
Cal. L. Rev. 351, 432 (2003). At http://www-bcf.usc.edu/~usclrev/pdf/076202.pdf. 
624 Id. 
625 "Dissociation" as used in the ULLCA refers to all situations where the LLC member is no longer 
associated with the business, including the withdrawal or death of a member. See Laurel Wheeling Farrar; 
Susan Pace Hamill, Dissociation from Alabama Limited Liability Companies in the Post Check-the-Box-
Era, 49 Ala. L. Rev. 909, 940 (1998). At 
https://www.law.ua.edu/pubs/lrarticles/Volume%2049/Number%203/farrar.pdf. 
626 UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT§§ 601-602, 6B U.L.A. 607 (1996). Section §601(1) states that: A member 
is dissociated from a limited liability company upon the occurrence of any of the following events: (1) the 
company's having notice of the member's express will to withdraw upon the date of notice or on a later date 
specified by the member. Section § 602(a) states that: Unless otherwise provided in the operating 
agreement, a member has the power to dissociate from a limited liability company at any time, rightfully or 
wrongfully, by express will.  
627 In the U.S., LLCs can choose to be either Manager-Managed or Member-Managed.  
628 See Carter G. Bishop, The Uniform Limited Liability Company Act: Summary & (and) Analysis, 51 Bus. 
Law. 51, 84 (1995). 
629 Id, at 73. 
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which is determined at the time of withdrawal.630 The manner of this purchase, however, 
depends on the at-will LLC’s management structure.631 Withdrawal from a member-
managed LLC will generally cause the company’s dissolution, absent an agreement to 
continue reached by the remaining members within ninety days of the member’s 
withdrawal.632 Absent such agreement, the LLC is required to wind up its business and 
perform a liquidation distribution to each of its members.633 If a majority of the remaining 
members agree to avoid dissolution, then the LLC must purchase the withdrawing 
member’s interest at its fair value.634 A purchase offer must be delivered to the withdrawing 
member within thirty days of the withdrawal date.635 If the company fails to purchase the 
dissociated member's distributional interest, ULLCA preserves the member's right to 
petition a competent court for the company’s dissolution.636  
By contrast, a member’s withdrawal from a manager-managed LLC will not generally 
trigger company dissolution, unless the withdrawing member also holds a managerial 
position.637 Returning to duration, withdrawing from a specific-term LLC does not trigger  
dissolution, and the withdrawing member is not entitled to a buy-out until the LLC’s 
expiration date..638 In sum, the effects of a member’s withdrawal under original ULLCA 
                                                 
630 See UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT§§ 601-602, 6B U.L.A. 607 (1996). Section § 701(a)(1). 
631 See Carter G. Bishop, Treatment of Members upon Their Death and Withdrawal from a Limited Liability 
Company: The Case for a Uniform Paradigm, 25 Stetson L. Rev. 255, 310 (1995) 
632 Id, at 269. 
633 See UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT§§ 601 (a), 602, 603, 6B U.L.A. 607 (1996). Section § 802(a) and 
Section § 806(b). Section 806 (b) of ULLCA states the following: “Each member is entitled to a 
distribution upon the winding up of the limited liability company's business, consisting of a return of all 
contributions which have not previously been returned and a distribution of any remainder in equal shares.” 
634 Id, § 701(a)(1). 
635 Id, § 701(b) 
636 Id, § 801(4)(iv). 
637 See Carter G. Bishop, supra note 629, at. 268. 
638 Id. 
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depend on whether the LLC is at-will or for a specified term, and whether it is member-
managed or manager-managed.   
The U.S. National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
(NCCUSL) subsequently amended the section concerning the effect of an individual 
member's withdrawal.639 As amended, ULLCA holds that withdrawal from an LLC will no 
longer cause its dissolution, regardless of the company’s management structure.640 The 
LLC’s duration designation will still affect the timing of when the LLC is obligated to 
purchase the withdrawing member's interest.641 A member’s premature withdrawal from a 
term company will not generally lead to dissolution or require a vote on continuation, as 
the withdrawal itself is considered wrongful.642 The withdrawing member will be liable to 
both the company and the remaining members for any resulting damages.643 ULLCA 
Section 701(f) states the following: 
 
Damages for wrongful dissociation under Section 602(b), and all other 
amounts owing, whether or not currently due, from the dissociated member 
to a limited liability company, must be offset against the purchase price.644 
 
 
Besides the potential liability and loss of purchase value that the withdrawing 
member may incur, wrongful withdrawal will also not trigger a buy-out of the dissociated 
member’s interest prior to the LLC expiration date in effect at the time of withdrawal.645 
                                                 
639 National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) adopted first amendment to 
the ULLCA in 1996. 
640 UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 603. 
641 Id. § 602. 
642 Id, § 601 and § 602(b). 
643 Id, § 602(c).  
644 Id, § 701(f). 
645 Id, § 701(a)(2). This section state that “A limited liability company shall purchase a distributional 
interest of a member of a term company for its fair value determined as of the date of the expiration of the 
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By contrast, a member lawfully withdrawing from an at-will company triggers a right to a 
timely buy out. Additionally, the wrongfully dissociated member of a term company is 
treated as a transferee of a member, with no further right to participate in LLC management, 
due to no longer owing a fiduciary duty to the company and other members.646 The 
withdrawn member will, however, be entitled to receive distributions from the LLC to the 
same extent as any other transferee prior to LLC dissolution.647  
Under the Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act648 (RULLCA) the 
default rule is that an LLC member has the right to withdraw from the LLC rightfully or 
wrongfully, and if wrongfully, the disassociated member will be liable to the company and 
the other members for the damages caused thereby.649 The withdrawing member is required 
only to submit to the company a notice of his or her intent to withdraw.650 RULLCA does 
not require written notice of the member’s intent to withdraw in order for the withdrawal 
to be valid.651 As a result, it is possible disputes may arise over whether or not a 
withdrawing member has provided  the required notice of express will to withdraw.652 A 
member’s withdrawal would be considered wrongful if: (1) The withdrawal is in violation 
of an express provision of the LLC's operating agreement; (2) The withdrawal occurs 
before the termination of the company and the member either withdraws by express will, 
                                                 
specified term that existed on the date of the member's dissociation if the expiration of the specified term 
does not result in a dissolution and winding up of the company's business”. 
646Id, § 603(b).  
647Id, § 503(e)(1).  
648 The new Uniform LLC Act which the US National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws (NCCUSL) promulgated in 2006. 
649  RULLCA § 601(a). 
650  Id, 602(1). 
651See Pablo Tagre, Withdrawal from a Limited Liability Company LLC Under the Revised Uniform 
Limited Liability Company Act (RULLCA)(2013). Available at http://www.tagrelaw.com/news/withdrawal-
from-a-limited-liability-company-llc-under-rullca/. 
652 Id. 
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is expelled by judicial order, becomes a debtor in bankruptcy, or is dissolved or 
terminated.653 If the LLC and the other members incur damages as a result of the member’s 
wrongful withdrawal, the withdrawing member will be liable for such damages.654 
However, it should be noted that under RULLCA, a member's withdrawal does not entitle 
the member to receive distributions from the LLC and does not, by itself, trigger a buy-
out.655 This contrasts with ULLCA, which granted the withdrawing member the right to 
receive fair value for his or her interest upon withdrawal.656 Under RULLCA, there are 
generally two special effects of the member's withdrawal. First, the member no longer has 
the right to participate in the management and the operation of the company.657 Second, in 
a member-managed LLC, the member’s fiduciary duty to the company and other members 
terminates upon the member's withdrawal.658 The withdrawing member is treated as a 
transferee of a member and retains the right to receive distributions from the LLC to which 
the transferor would otherwise be entitled.659 RULLCA Section 603(a)(3) states the 
following: 
 
Any transferable interest owned by the person immediately before 
dissociation in the person’s capacity as a member is owned by the person 
solely as a transferee.660  
 
                                                 
653 UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 601(b). 
654 Id, 601(c).  
655 Id, 404(b). 
656 Id, § 603. 
657 RULLCA § 603(a)(1). 
658 Id, § 603(a)(2). 
659 Id, § 502(b). 
660 Id, § 603(a)(3). 
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The dissociation rules under RULLCA are not mandatory provisions, and LLCs 
can modify or exclude them in the LLC operating agreement.661 Thus, an operating 
agreement has the power to provide for a buy-out of a member's transferable interest in 
connection with the member's withdrawal.662 
Under the Delaware Limited Liability Company Act (DLLCA), a member has the 
right to withdraw prior to dissolution only if the LLC Agreement expressly provides for 
such a right.663 Absent the operating agreement affirmatively asserting the member’s right 
to withdraw, withdrawal rights will be governed by the default rules of DLLCA, meaning 
a member is not allowed to withdraw prior to dissolution.664 Where withdrawal takes place 
with the permission of the LLC operating agreement, the member is entitled by DLLCA 
default rules to receive a distribution equal to the fair value of the member’s interest as of 
the date of withdrawal, unless another valuation method is provided for in the LLC 
agreement.665 DLLCA, therefore, grants LLC members the contractual flexibility to draft 
withdrawal provisions in the LLC Agreement that will satisfy member objectives.666 
Payment for a withdrawing member's interest must be delivered within a reasonable time 
period following withdrawal.667  
 The three U.S. LLC statutes discussed reflect three different approaches with regard 
to a member’s right to withdraw and resign from the LLC prior to dissolution, as well as 
the member’s right to receive a distribution for the value of his or her interest upon 
                                                 
661 See Darren T. Freedman, et al., Drafting Considerations Under RULLCA, 17 at 
https://www.troygould.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Pub-119.pdf. 
662 Id. 
663 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 18-603. 18-603. 
 664 LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, ET AL., UNINCORPORATED BUSINESS ENTITIES, 516 (Lexisnexis Fifth Ed. 2013). 
665 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-604. 
666 See Tarik J. Haskins, Exit Stage Left: Getting out of Your Limited Liability Company, at 
https://www.americanbar.org/publications/blt/2013/07/01_haskins.html. 
667 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § § 18-604. 
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withdrawal. Under the ULLCA approach, a member’s withdrawal is permissible upon 
notice from the member, and the member receives a fair value distribution upon 
withdrawal. The RULLCA (or transferee) approach treats a withdrawing member as a 
transferee of a member, with no distribution right upon the member’s withdrawal. Finally, 
the Delaware approach gives a member no right to withdraw, unless permitted by the LLC 
agreement. 
 
B. The Fair Value, Fair Market value, and Minority Discounts  
A “minority discount” is the term for the difference in share value between minority 
and majority shares in a privately held company.668 Given this reality, should the buyout 
price of an LLC minority member's interest be lower than that of an equivalent-sized 
majority interest? ULLCA and Delaware LLC Act both state that the withdrawing member 
shall receive the “fair value” of the member’s interest upon withdrawal. U.S. courts provide 
different definitions for “fair value” and “fair market value.”669 The courts define “fair 
market value” as the price which a purchaser would be willing to pay to a willing seller in 
light of all market-related factors.670 The “fair value,” on the other hand, is viewed as the 
member’s pro-rata share at the time of withdrawal.671 As a result, a distribution 
corresponding to the "fair market value" of a minority member's interest will generally be 
                                                 
668 See Sandra K. Miller, Discounts and Buyouts in Minority Investor LLC Valuation Disputes Involving 
Oppression or Divorce, 13 U. Pa. J. Bus. L. 607, 684 (2011). Available at 
https://www.law.upenn.edu/journals/jbl/articles/volume13/issue3/Miller13U.Pa.J.Bus.L.607(2011).pdf. 
669 Id, at. 611. 
670 Id. 
671 See Albert O. IV Saulsbury, Catch You on the Flip Side: A Comparative Analysis of the Default Rules 
on Withdrawal from a Louisiana Limited Liability Company, 71 La. L. Rev. 675 (2011). Available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1906428 
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lower than a distribution equal to its "fair value.”672 The Pennsylvania Committee 
Comments to Section § 8933673 of the Pennsylvania LLC Act specifically addresses this 
potential discrepancy with regard to a withdrawing member’s distribution674, as follows: 
 
The "fair value" of the interest of the member is to be fixed generally with 
reference to the right of the member to share in distributions from the 
company. As such, it should not include discounts for lack of marketability 
or minority interest and thus is different from "fair market value," which 
term has been specifically avoided.675 
 
 
 Accordingly, an LLC member under ULLCA and DLLCA generally will not be 
subject to the “minority discount,” since the withdrawing member is entitled to “fair value” 
regardless of what a buyer would be willing to pay in the market.676 Instead, an LLC 
minority member will receive upon withdrawal an amount equal to his ownership interest 
in the overall value of the company.677 The “fair value” standard under ULLCA and 
DLLCA accordingly provides minority members with greater protection in the event they 
withdraw.   
 
 
                                                 
672  Id, at. 689. 
673  Section § 8933 of Pennsylvania LLC Act provides the following: “Upon the occurrence of an event of 
dissociation which does not result in the dissolution of the limited liability company, a dissociating member 
is entitled to receive any distribution to which the member is entitled under the operating agreement on the 
terms provided in the operating agreement and, within a reasonable time after dissociation, the fair value of 
the interest of the member in the company as of the date of dissociation based upon the right of the member 
to share in distributions from the company.” 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8933 (1995). 
674 See Albert O. IV Saulsbury, supra note 672, at. 689. 
675 Id. 
676 Id. 
677  See Sandra K. Miller supra note 669, at. 612. 
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C. Member’s Death  
Under ULLCA, an LLC member’s death is considered a form of dissociation.678 Unless 
the death leads to the LLC’s dissolution, the company is required to purchase the interest 
of the deceased member.679 The decedent’s heirs in an at-will company are entitled to 
receive the distributions of the decedent member’s interests immediately.680 In an LLC 
formed for a specific term, the company must purchase the decedent’s interest only at the 
end of the specified term.681 The heirs of a fixed-term LLC member may therefore be 
compelled to wait for years before receiving any distribution from a buy-out.682 The heirs 
or estate of the dead member will be deemed transferees, and unless they are accepted as 
LLC members, they generally lack any management rights.683 As transferees of the 
member’s interest, though, heirs retain the right to petition a court for judicial dissolution 
if the managers or other members in control act in a manner deemed illegal, oppressive, 
fraudulent, or unfairly prejudicial to them.684  
RULLCA also deems a member’s death to be a dissociating event.685 Unlike  under 
ULLCA, such a death does not entitle the heirs or estate to a buy-out or any special 
distribution of the deceased member's interest.686 The heir will be treated as transferees of 
the member's interest,687 and accordingly will retain the right to receive any interim 
                                                 
678 See UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 601(8)(i). 
679 See Susan Kalinka, Dissociation of a Member from a Louisiana Limited Liability Company: The Need 
for Reform, 66 La. L. Rev. 365 (2006). Available at 
https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=6127&context=lalrev 
680 Id, at 386. 
681 Id. 
682See Carter G. Bishop, supra note 629, at 80. 
683  
684  See UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 801(4)(v). 
685 See REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 602(6)(A). 
686 Id, § 603 cmt. 
687 Id, § 102(22). 
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distributions from the LLC that the deceased member would have received.688 An LLC 
operating agreement has the power to opt-out of this default rule and provide for the buy-
out of a member’s transferable interest in the event of the member's death.689 Unless 
admitted as members of the LLC, under RULLCA the heirs will have no right to participate 
in LLC management, conduct any of the company’s activities,690 or retain any fiduciary 
duties with regard to matters arising after the member’s death .691 The member's death also 
not absolve the heirs or estate of any debt, obligation or other liability to the LLC incurred 
by the member.692 As transferees, the heirs have no right to inspect the company's records 
or to receive any information from the LLC concerning the company’s activities or its 
financial condition.693 The heirs and estate may, though, have access to any information to 
which the decedent member was entitled while a member, if the information pertains to the 
period during which the member was alive.694 
Under DLLCA, a member’s death terminates membership and does not of itself lead 
to the LLC’s dissolution, unless the operating agreement provides otherwise.695 The 
personal representative of a deceased member may exercise all of the member's rights for 
the purpose of settling the member's estate or administering the member's property, 
including any power under a LLC agreement for an assignee to become a member.696 The 
DLLCA defines a "personal representative''  as the executor, administrator, guardian, 
                                                 
688 Id, § 502(b). 
689 See REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 603 cmt. 
690 Id, 603(a)(1). 
691 Id, 603(a)(2). 
692 Id, 603(b). 
693 Id, 410(a). This section of clearly determines that the Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act 
retains such right exclusively from the LLC existing members.  
694 Id, 410(c). 
695 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 18-801(b). 
696 Id, § 18-705. 
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conservator, or other legal representative of a natural person, and the legal representative 
or the successor to a person other than a natural person.697 The decedent member's executor, 
administrator, or other legal representative is therefore treated as an assignee of the 
decedent's interest in the LLC, and is not entitled to exercise the rights or powers of a 
member.698 As an assignee, the personal representative is entitled only to receive 
distributions as authorized by the operating agreement, to share in LLC profits and losses, 
and to receive allocations of LLC income, gain, loss, deduction, and credit.699 The deceased 
member’s estate will remain liable for any promised capital contribution to the LLC, 
regardless of whether the promised capital contribution is in the form of cash, property, or 
services.700 The personal representative, as an assignee, may also not become a member or 
exercise any of the rights or powers of a member, unless the LLC's operating agreement 
provides otherwise.701 Therefore, the legal representative of a decedent, unless admitted as 
a member, will lack any right to participate in the management of the LLC or to inspect 
any of its records702, as DLLCA grants such rights exclusively to members.703704 Under 
DLLCA, the personal representative may not be able to appropriately safeguard the estate’s 
interest in the LLC due to the lack of management and inspection rights. 
 
                                                 
697 Id, § 18-101(13). 
698 Id, §18-702(b)(1). 
699 Id, §18-702(b)(2). 
700 Id, § 18-502(a). 
701 Id, §18-702(b)(1). 
702  Section §18-702(a) of DLLCA  provides that: “The assignee of a member's limited liability company 
interest shall have no right to participate in the management of the business and affairs of a limited liability 
company except as provided in a limited liability company agreement or, unless otherwise provided in the 
limited liability company agreement, upon the vote or consent of all of the members of the limited liability 
company.” 
703 Section §18-305 of the DLLCA expressly provides for inspection rights to each LLC member. 
704 Section §18-101(11) of DLLCA defines “Member” as a person admitted to an LLC as a member. 
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D. Valuation of Member’s Interest Under the LLC Agreement 
If LLC members elect to require the purchase of a dissociating member’s interest upon 
his or her withdrawal, U.S. operating agreements incorporate various models for 
determining the purchase price of the interest. Sometimes these valuation methods are 
incorporated into a separate agreement referred to as a “Buy-Sell agreement.” The 
following are some of the most commonly used valuation methods: 
 
(a) Formula Approach (Book Value)  
Many LLC agreements use an accounting-based book value for determining the purchase 
price of the withdrawing interest.705 This method is popular due to its simplicity and 
economy.706 The book value is measured as the total assets reflected on the balance sheet 
of the company minus the total liabilities.707 The disadvantage of this method is that the 
book value often bears little resemblance to the market value, with the market value often 
significantly greater than what shows in the company’s balance sheet.708 For example, a 
company may have intangible assets not reflected on a balance sheet.709 Additionally, a 
company's balance sheet is prepared in accordance with Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (GAAP), which typically are recorded on an original cost basis.710 The original 
cost basis is frequently not reflective of present value.711 Thus, while relatively 
                                                 
705 Berson Bryan L., Buy-sell agreements: be prepared for the day your co-owner leaves, Quality, 
Vol.51(3), p.18(1) (2012) 
706 Id. 
707 JEFFREY M. RISIUS, BUSINESS VALUATION: A PRIMER FOR THE LEGAL PROFESSION, 23 (AMERICAN BAR 
ASSOCIATION. 2007). 
708 Id, at. 24. 
709 Id. 
710 See Scott R. Miller & Robert F. Reilly, The Asset-Based Approach: The AdjustedNet Asset Value 
Method at http://www.willamette.com/insights_journal/18/winter_2018_3.pdf. 
711 Id, at. 29. 
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straightforward and inexpensive, using book value may lead to a significant deviation from 
fair market value. 
 
(b) Formula Approach (Multiple of Earnings) 
Agreements also frequently include a formula for determining purchase price, such as 
a multiple of a certain profit measure. The formula approach is a popular and frequently 
used one in the U.S., as the parties view it as simple and easy to apply.712 A multiple of 
earnings formula focuses the valuation inquiry on company income, rather than its balance 
sheet.713 Because newly established companies have no profit history, LLCs typically do 
not employ this method until they develop an earning record.714 Despite its apparent 
simplicity, though, the formula approach can lead to valuation controversies unless its 
formula inputs are both specific and precise.715 Additionally, because the formula does not 
automatically account for company and market condition changes over time, it runs the 
risk of becoming irrelevant.716 Consequently, a formula that provides a reasonable 
valuation at the time of the LLC agreement will not necessarily do so if a triggering event 
occurs years in the future.717  
 
                                                 
712 STEPHEN R. AKERS & MYRON E. SILDON, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO BUY-SELL AGREEMENTS, 120 
(illustrated, 2002). 
713 Id, at 121. 
714 MICHAEL A. YUHAS & ERIC A. MANTERFIELD, DISCOUNTING AND VALUING FAMILY LIMITED 
PARTNERSHIP INTERESTS, AND BUY-SELL AGREEMENTS, 26, 27 (First edition, 2009) 
715 JAMES JURINSKI, GARY A. ZWICK, TRANSFERRING INTERESTS IN THE CLOSELY HELD FAMILY BUSINESS, 
144, 145 (ALI-ABA, 2002) 
716 Stephen R. Akers, supra note 713, at 120. 
717 Id. 
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(c) Fixed Price Approach 
Other LLC agreements provide for a fixed price to determine the value of the dissociated 
member's interests in the company, with such stipulated price to be updated periodically.718 
A fixed-price agreement typically involves little expenditure and is considered simple to 
negotiate.719 The issue that may arise from using this method is that company owners often 
neglect to update the price, as required by the agreement,720 and thereby over time the price 
become unrealistic and unfair to apply.721 If LLC owners elect the fixed-price approach, 
they must be conscientiousness about updating the price regularly, and at least once a 
year.722 An additional downside to the fixed-price method is that it may leave minority 
shareholders vulnerable to abuse if the price is determined by majority vote.   
   
(d) Appraisal Approach  
The previous chapter discussed use of the appraisal method under ROFR provisions, 
which the parties could employ in case of any disagreement as to the interest’s fair value. 
The appraisal method is also used in cases of withdrawal-triggered buyouts, as many LLC 
agreements specify that an independent appraiser shall determine a share’s value.723 Such 
agreements often provide that the company and the dissociated member each shall elect 
                                                 
718 Anne Warren, Buy-Sell Agreements: A Key Element of Business Succession and Preservation at 
https://www.bbh.com/resource/blob/22292/a1152fd3a3d88fbde566d8f6f1c6de16/q2-2017-buy-sell-
agreements--a-key-element-of-business-succession-and-preservation-pdf-data.pdf. 
719 Donald R. Parker, Buy/Sell Agreements: A Business Valuation Perspective at 
https://images.template.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/07053722/Sample-Business-Buy-Sell-Agreement-
Template.pdf. 
720 Id. 
721 Morton A. Harris, Buy-Sell Agreements For Closely Held Family Businesses: Tax and Practical 
Considerations, 7 at https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/taxation/taxiq-fall11-harris-
buysell.authcheckdam.pdf. 
722 Anne Warren, supra note 719. 
723  Id, at. 4. 
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one appraiser, and the two appraisers then choose a third appraiser.724 The fair market value 
of the member’s interest is then determined by majority vote among the appraisers, and 
that valuation is deemed final and binding among the parties.725 One downside to this 
approach is the considerable time and money often required for an appraisal.726 In addition, 
if the agreement does not specify a time period within which each party must designate 
their chosen appraiser, the selection process itself may become a means of disrupting the 
buy-out process.727 Well-written agreements provide a clear time period of time for 
appointing appraisers, and any party failing to meet the deadline risks having the company 
appoint the party’s appraiser itself.728 
 
(e) The Menu of Valuation Methods Under Template Buy-Sell Agreements 
Some of the template buy-sell agreements used in the U.S. list more than one sample 
valuation method, typically three to five methods, requiring company owners to then 
choose one for inclusion in the agreement.729 For example, the template buy-sell agreement 
may list as options Agreed Value (the Fixed Price), Book Value, Multiple of Book Value, 
and Appraised Value.730 The template indicates that the chosen method shall be used for 
determining the price of individual ownership interests under the agreement.731 Having a 
                                                 
724 See LARRY E. RIBSTEIN & ROBERT R. KEATING, RIBSTEIN AND KEATINGE ON LIMITED LIABILITY 
COMPANIES, APP. B-3-25 § 2 (Thomson Reuters. 2017). 
725 Id. 
726 STEPHEN R. AKERS & MYRON E. SILICON, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO BUY-SELL AGREEMENTS, 123,124 
(American Law Institute-American Bar Association.). 
727 Id. 
728 Id. 
729 See the Sample Buy-Sell Agreement, at 
https://usagym.org/PDFs/Member%20Services/bestpractices/2015/1_1legalplanning.pdf 
730 Id. 
731 Id. 
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list of suggested options works as a guide to assist the company's owners in making their 
choice.   
 
E. Limitations on Distribution and Creditors Protection  
Even though U.S. LLC statutes provide a default limited liability rule for managers and 
members, the statutes frequently contain provisions that also protect creditors to a certain 
degree.732 ULLCA, RULLCA, and DLLCA all provide that an LLC member may be liable 
to a creditor for any unpaid contribution to the company, even if such contribution 
obligation has been waived by the other members.733 In addition, statutes typically include 
provisions imposing liability on those who consent to any improper distribution, as well as 
on anyone receiving such distributions.734 Under ULLCA, a distribution is deemed illegal 
if, after making such a distribution, the LLC would be unable to pay its debts as they 
become due in the ordinary course of business, or its total assets would be less than the 
sum of its total liabilities.735 Members or managers who vote for or otherwise consent to 
an unlawful distribution will, if also in violation of the standards of conduct,736 be held 
personally liable for any portion of the distribution exceeding the maximum lawful 
distribution.737 Members knowingly receiving an unlawful distribution are also personally 
liable to the extent that the received distribution exceeds the amount that could have been 
                                                 
732  RICHARD D. FREER & DOUGLAS K. MOLL, PRINCIPLES OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS, 613, 614 (West 
Academic Publishing 2nd Ed. 2018). 
733 Id.  See ULLCA § 402(b); RULLCA § 403; DLLCA § 18–502(b). 
734 Id. 
735 See ULLCA § 406(a). 
736 LLC members and managers owe to the company and to the other members and managers the fiduciary 
duties of loyalty and care, and the obligation of good faith and fair dealing. See ULLCA § 409. 
737 ULLCA § 407 cmt. 
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properly paid to such members.738 RULLCA contains similar language with regard to the 
limitations on distributions and the liability of LLC members and managers for illegal 
distributions.739  
DLLCA prohibits an LLC from making member distributions that cause the 
company’s liabilities to exceed the fair value of the company’s assets.740 LLC members 
may therefore receive distributions only to the extent that the fair value of the company’s 
assets will be at least equal to its liabilities.741 The Delaware Court of Chancery has stated 
that “this section prohibits the stripping of limited liability company assets so as to render 
an LLC insolvent.”742 However, DLLCA has no provision making managers personally 
liable for authorizing improper distributions.743 Only a member who knows at the time of 
receiving a distribution that it is unlawful will be personally liable to the LLC for the 
amount of the distribution.744 Actions for unlawful distributions under the DLLCA must 
be brought within three years of the unlawful distribution date, or such an action will be 
barred.745 
 
                                                 
738 Id. 
739  See RULLCA § 405; RULLCA § 406. 
740 DLLCA § 18-607(a). 
741 ROBERT L. SYMONDS & MATTHEW J. O'TOOLE JR., SYMONDS AND O'TOOLE ON DELAWARE LIMITED 
LIABILITY COMPANIES, 7-3, 7-4 (Aspen Publishers. 2006). 
742Id. See the Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company of Salisbury, Maryland v. Handy, C.A. No. 1973-5, slip op. at 
11 (Del. Ch. Mar. 15, 2000). 
743 NCBA Business Law Section, A Comparative Study of the Corporate and LLC Laws of North Crolina 
and Delaware at https://www.ncbar.org/media/82216/Corporate-And-LLC-Laws-of-NC-and-Delaware.pdf. 
744 DLLCA § 18-607(b). 
745  Id, § 18-607(c). 
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5.6. Summary and Analysis 
In the U.S., LLC state laws vary regarding a member's ability to withdraw, and 
generally fall into one of three approaches. The first approach gives the member the right 
to withdraw and requires purchase of the member's interest at a fair value (ULLCA). The 
second (transferee) approach, provides for a member’s right to withdraw, but does not grant 
an accompanying right to a buy-out (RULLCA). The third approach grants no right of 
withdrawal unless permitted by the operating agreement (DLLCA). The KSA LLC law is 
similar to the third, or Delaware, approach in that it bars voluntary unilateral withdrawal. 
Unlike in Delaware, however, withdrawal either through the consent of the other 
shareholders or by the terms of the company agreement is not practical, due to the strict 
prohibition on reducing capital. The KSA approach, similar to Delaware, requires a 
member seeking unilateral withdrawal to wait until the expiration of the LLC term, or the 
satisfaction of other conditions stipulated in the LLC agreement.746 The consequence of 
this approach is that minority shareholders do not enjoy the same flexibility as members in 
an ULLCA state have.747 To what extant this may be problematic depends on the 
availability of alternative exit options for an individual. Even though the SCR no longer 
requires unanimous shareholder consent in order to transfer shares, the rule is often still 
interpreted to allow stricter restrictions on transfers, including an absolute ban on transfer 
without obtaining the consent of the other shareholders.748 We have seen examples where 
LLC owners in the KSA place restrictions in LLC agreements requiring the unanimous 
                                                 
746  Albert O. IV Saulsbury, Catch You on the Flip Side: A Comparative Analysis of the Default Rules on 
Withdrawal from a Louisiana Limited Liability Company, 71 La. L. Rev. 699 (2011). 
747 Id. 
748 Gorman, supra note 612, at. 290.  
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consent of the other shareholders for permitting a transfer.749 By permitting the inclusion 
of such restrictions, Saudi LLC law makes shareholder withdrawal incredibly challenging, 
given that unilateral withdrawal is not permitted. Although the ULLCA approach works 
better for the withdrawing member, there is a disadvantage to this approach.750 The LLC 
becomes vulnerable to a potentially fatal depletion of its capital, especially where the 
withdrawing member indeed owns a high percentage of the LLC’s interest.751 Still, the 
ULLCA approach does the best job of protecting minority shareholders.  The RULLCA 
(transferee) approach, while permitting withdrawal, does not entitle the withdrawing 
member to receive an immediate distribution. The result is that the withdrawing member 
loses all membership rights, including voting and inspection rights752    
Regarding a member’s death, under both DLLCA and RULLCA, the heirs and the 
estate of the decedent member will be in the weakest position. The death does not entitle 
the heirs or estate of the member to a buyout, to receive any special distribution of the 
deceased member's interest, to participate in the management of the LLC, to inspect any of 
its records, or to receive any information concerning the company’s activities or financial 
condition. The estate, heirs, or the legal representative will likely be unable to protect the 
                                                 
749 See the example of published Article of Association of Abdulghani Erth Jewelery L.L.C, Um Al-Qura 
Newspaper, 1437/11/13, No. 4737, p 47. Article 7 of this agreement state that “Transfer of shares is 
allowed between shareholders. No shareholder may transfer any shares to third parties, with or without 
consideration, unless the consent of the other shareholders has been obtained. The remaining shareholders 
may recover the share or shares that one of the shareholders wished to assign to others in accordance with 
Article 161 of the Saudi Companies Regulation” Also, see the example of published Article of Association 
of Schindler Olayan Elevator Company L.L.C, Um Al-Qura Newspaper, 1439/3/6 No. 4699. Article 8 of 
this agreement states that “The Transfer of shares is allowed between shareholders. No shareholder may 
transfer any of its shares to third parties, with or without consideration, unless the prior written consent of 
the other shareholders has been obtained. The remaining shareholders may recover the share or shares that 
one of the shareholders wished to assign to others in accordance with Article 161 of the Saudi Companies 
Regulation.”  
750 See Saulsbury, supra note 747, at. 690. 
751 Id, 691. 
752 Id, 694. 
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interests of the decedent member’s share.   In addition, as their interests in the LLC may 
be held for a period of years, they will be vulnerable to the risk of market devaluation, as 
the purchase price will be determined at the end of the specified duration.753 ULLCA, by 
requiring the immediate purchase of the deceased member's interest in at-will company, 
protects heirs far better. The Saudi LLC law, however, gives the heirs the most protection 
of all, granting a default right to take all the power of an LLC shareholder, including 
management and voting rights. Here there is a great contradiction in how the SCR treats 
ordinary share transfers and how it treats shares transferring through death. Any third-party 
transfer of shares is subject to mandatory ROFR, while shares transferring through death 
carry the full    rights of an LLC shareholder. This is despite the fact that the risk LLC 
shareholders may face from third parties is no greater than that they may face from the 
decedent’s heirs.  From my prospective, it seems irrational to allow third parties (heirs) to 
enter the company without the consent of other shareholders simply because the shares 
transferred through death. The ULLCA approach is thus most preferable, as it provides 
heirs and the beneficiaries of the decedent shareholder with a buyout right while at the 
same time protecting the LLC and its remaining shareholders.  
 In determining which withdrawal rules function best, it is important to remember that 
a Saudi LLC’s ability to return shareholder capital via share repurchases is limited by the 
legal capital rule, as explained earlier.754 The United States, on the other hand, has revoked 
the legal capital rule, deeming it no longer necessary for creditor protection.755 U.S. 
                                                 
753 Carter G. Bishop, The Uniform Limited Liability Company Act: Summary & (and) Analysis, 51 Bus. 
Law. 80 (1995). 
754 See Supra note 591.  
755 John Armour, Legal Capital: An Outdated Concept? Centre for Business Research, 
University of Cambridge. (2006) available at https://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/fileadmin/user_upload/centre-for-
business-research/downloads/working-papers/wp320.pdf  
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creditors must therefore contract for safeguards against actions that may threaten the 
security for their loans.756 In closely held companies such as LLCs, creditors may also 
obtain a personal guarantee from the LLC owners.757 As we have seen, U.S. LLC statutes 
create additional creditor protection through liability rules, such as piercing the corporate 
veil.758  Personal liability against LLC managers and members who improperly reduce 
company assets, along with the other measures just mentioned, provide security for 
creditors without necessitating the rigidity of the legal capital rule.759   
Given the U.S. position, one must question whether the legal capital doctrine is still 
necessary in the KSA. Scholars offer several reasons for abandoning the legal capital 
rule.760 One view is that contractual obligations would provide sufficient alternative 
protection for creditors.761 The argument is that contractual covenants are more adaptable 
and resilient for particular needs, avoiding the excessively rigid company financial 
structures under the legal capital rule.762 However, the covenant method itself can lead to 
limitations somewhat at odds with the overall U.S. approach of favoring a self-regulating 
and efficient-market as a major source of creditor protection.763 Covenants can limit a 
company’s freedom to make new investments or distribute assets in ways unforeseen at 
                                                 
756 Det Juridiske Fakultet, Protecting Creditors and Investors - Capital Maintenance in the European 
Private Company, University of Osloensis. (2009) Available at: 
https://www.duo.uio.no/bitstream/handle/10852/22314/97185.pdf?sequence=1  
757 Luca Enriques, supra note 596, at. 1188. 
758 Id, at 1185. 
759  Under most U.S. LLC statutes, distributions to members are legal only if the company would still be 
able to pay its debts as they became due in the ordinary course of business, and the company’s total assets 
remain less than its total liabilities. See ULLCA § 406; RULLCA § 405; DLLCA § 18-607(a). 
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their formation, which may lead to unanticipated and unintended losses.764 However, 
contractual covenants can generally be more comprehensive and sophisticated in avoiding 
such consequences than the legal capital rule would be.765 A second objection to 
contractual covenants as an alternative to legal capital rules is that only sophisticated and 
powerful creditors can in fact protect their rights through contract. Other creditors in a 
weaker position, such as company employees, or involuntary creditors such as tort victims 
are generally unable to protect themselves by contract.766 The legal capital rule is therefore 
superior from the point of view of such creditors.767  
 It is therefore debatable whether contractual protections alone are sufficient to 
protect creditor interests.768 However, the United States, as noted, has created additional 
statutory creditor protections without needing to rely on the legal capital rule.769 In addition 
to liability rules like piercing the corporate veil, most U.S. jurisdictions impose fiduciary 
duties upon directors and LLC managers toward their creditors' interests.770 The U.S. also 
has high levels of protection for secured creditors who hold claims on company assets via 
contract, making contractual remedies themselves especially strong.771 The Uniform 
Fraudulent Transfer Act and insolvency procedures such as company reorganization under 
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765 Luca Enriques, supra note 761 at.1172 
766 LOUISE GULLIFER & JENNIFER PAYNE, CORPORATE FINANCE LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICY, 551 
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chapter 11 of the U.S. bankruptcy code provide still further creditor protection.772 In sum, 
U.S. creditor protection combines contractual and statutory rights to form a comprehensive 
regime. By contrast, the Saudi regime relies primarily on the legal capital rule to protect 
the interests of the company's creditors. Therefore, arguing that the KSA should abandon 
the legal capital rule in favor of rules based on U.S. LLC statutes fails to take into account 
the full scope of U.S. creditor protections that exist in addition to LLC law. Replacing the 
legal capital rule without fully accounting for these differences would leave company 
creditors with inadequate protection.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
772 Id. 
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Chapter 6: Judicial Dissolution 
 
6.1.Introduction  
 
Judicial remedies constitute a significant source of protection for LLC owners 
facing management deadlocks, majority oppression, or other shareholder disputes that may 
affect the company's affairs.773 Potential judicial remedies an LLC owner might seek 
include a court-ordered dissolution of the company, as well as less severe remedies such 
as the buy-out of an individual’s shares.774 As explained earlier, an LLC minority 
shareholder seeking to sell in the KSA may experience great difficulty finding a willing 
buyer at a fair price, due to the statutory restriction of the ROFR and the lack of market for 
his or her shares.775 The lack of a shareholder buy- out right and restrictions on the LLC’s 
ability to repurchase its shares often leaves the majority LLC shareholders as the only 
available buyer. The price the majority owners are willing to pay in such a situation is often 
far below the share’s fair value. Given the lack of alternative options, however, the minority 
shareholder seeking to exit will often have to accept the below-market price offered. Such 
a situation illustrates why judicial intervention is an essential protection for minority 
shareholders and therefore necessary for resolving certain shareholder disputes. This 
chapter will discuss the grounds available for LLC shareholders seeking the judicial 
                                                 
773 Sandra K. Miller, What Remedies Should be Made Available to the Dissatisfied Participant in a Limited 
Liability Company, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 465 (1994). 
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dissolution of the company and other judicial remedies that the court may award to 
dissatisfied LLC owners.    
 
6.2 Judicial Dissolution in Saudi Arabia   
 
The SCR states that a company shall be dissolved, and its activities concluded, in the 
event that any of the following occur: 
(1) The company achieves the purpose for which it was established, or achieving that 
purpose becomes impossible.   
(2) The affirmative vote or consent of all shareholders to dissolve the company before 
the expiry of its term; 
(3) Reaching the date specified for dissolution in the LLC Agreement; 
(4) Entry of a judicial decree of dissolution upon the request of a shareholder.776  
When an LLC shareholder fails to reach agreement with the other shareholders on an 
avenue for exiting the company, and he or she no longer wishes to remain a member of the 
company, SCR Article 16 permits that shareholder to seek a court order dissolving the 
company. However, judicial dissolution in Saudi Arabia is a discretionary, rather than 
mandatory, remedy. The SCR permits company owners to petition for judicial dissolution 
of the business when “serious reasons” justify the request, and it is up to the court to 
determine whether the “serious reasons” are sufficient  enough to order dissolution.777 A 
judicial order dissolving a company on the "serious reasons" ground is based on the idea 
                                                 
776 Saudi Companies Regulation, Art 16. 
777  Id. 
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that the objective of establishing a company is for it to function normally.778 Dissolution is 
therefore appropriate when this objective is no longer feasible.779 The right to a judicial 
dissolution is a mandatory, non-waivable right required in all LLC owner agreements, and 
each individual shareholder has the ability to bring a judicial action for dissolution if there 
are legitimate reasons justifying the request.780 However, the "serious reasons" requirement 
for seeking dissolution is subject to criticism as an excessively vague and imprecise 
standard for guiding both shareholders and courts during dissolution proceedings. The SCR 
neither defines the term "serious reasons" nor enumerates any examples of what might 
constitute sufficient grounds for a court to dissolve a company.781 Some defend the "serious 
reasons" term as necessarily general in order to cover all circumstances which might justify 
dissolution, as the reasons a company might require termination are too numerous and 
unpredictable to be listed in a statute.782 Others, however, argue that the lack of statutory 
guidance gives courts too much discretion to decide when dissolution is appropriate, 
leading to widely varying and unpredictable outcomes in dissolution proceedings.783 The 
term’s vagueness has also been criticized on the ground that it provides too much incentive 
for shareholders to sue for dissolution without any reasonable justification, leading to 
lengthy and unnecessary litigation.784 The opposite problem can also occur, where owners 
                                                 
778 NABIL SALEH, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF SAUDI ARABIAN AND OMANI COMPANY LAWS: STATUTES 
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who have legitimate reasons for seeking dissolution are prevented from doing so.785 Even 
the recent updates to the SCR did not include any further guidance on what might constitute 
the "serious reasons" justifying a decree for judicial dissolution. In the majority of cases 
decided by courts, the “serious reasons” ground for dissolution was rejected whenever the 
company showed strong profits, notwithstanding the presence of other factors which might 
justify dissolution.786 The court has absolute discretion in determining whether the existing 
circumstances justify dissolving the company, and it therefore may reject the request for 
termination or order other, alternative remedies even where strong reasons support 
dissolution.787 In spite of this broad discretion, though, there are a number of situations 
where courts are likely to find sufficient grounds for dissolution, and order the company’s 
termination upon request. The circumstances widely seen to justify termination include:  
(a) A shareholder who has failed to supply his required capital contribution to the 
company. 
(b) The disability of a shareholder who promised capital contribution to the company 
in the form of services or labor.  
(c) Acute conflicts between the shareholders where cooperation between them has 
become practically impossible. 
(d) A company has suffered a financial crisis or circumstance that impedes its ability 
to perform its commercial activities.788 
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786 Nabil Sale, supra note 779, at.140. 
787 Board of Grievances, Case No. 227/4/T. Appeal Division Decision No. 24/T/3, 2001 (1421.H). 
788 Nabil Sale, supra note 779, at. 139, 140. 
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A. Majority Oppression and Judicial Dissolution 
The SCR does not specifically authorize a minority shareholder to seek dissolution on 
the ground of shareholder oppression. Minority shareholders do, however, have the right 
to seek judicial dissolution if the reason for the request is deemed sufficient under Article 
16 of the SCR. The Court's sufficiency analysis primarily depends on the amount and type 
of damages suffered by the minority and the absence of suitable alternative solutions or 
remedies to dissolution, as well as the totality of the circumstances regarding the company's 
activity.789 The majority shareholders’ exercise of power derives from a contractual 
obligation that is matched by the minority's commitment to accept majority rule.790 
Majority rule, as a principle, entails substantial power being placed in the hands of the 
shareholders who control more than half of the voting power at a given shareholder 
meeting.791 Minority shareholders must therefore accept majority shareholder decisions, 
and also acknowledge that this majority power is legally enjoyed by those holding more 
shares.792 On the other hand, when the majority uses its power to pursue personal interests 
as opposed to those of the company, or in a way which harms minority interests, the 
majority breaches its obligations under the law.793 In such a situation, the court holds 
discretionary authority to dissolve the company in response to a minority shareholder 
petitioning for dissolution.794 In practice, however, it is quite rare for a court to order 
dissolution on the basis that the majority shareholders have abused the minority.795 In most 
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cases, the court rules that any damages caused to minority shareholders can be remedied 
by rescinding or invalidating the particular action in dispute, by compensating the minority 
shareholder, or allowing minority shareholders to sell their shares to third parties and 
thereby exit the company.796 This last alternative remedy is particularly unhelpful to an 
oppressed minority shareholder, as restrictions on transfer and the lack of a liquid market 
make it difficult to sell at fair value. Many commentators argue that Saudi courts generally 
play a weak role in protecting minority shareholders from majority abuse.797 The 
insufficient judicial response typically results from either perceived deficiencies in the 
minority shareholder case or the lack of clear legal authority for resolving such cases.798 
As a result, judges in KSA often end up exercising their discretion in vastly differently 
ways, depending on the views of the particular judge and the individual circumstances of 
the case.799 Dissolution is only ordered when the majority behavior at issue has caused the 
company’s failure to the point that future operations are impracticable.800 Judicial 
dissolution is thus an extraordinary remedy infrequently awarded to minority shareholders 
alleging majority shareholder oppression.801 
 
B. Case Studies: An Analysis  
Since the Saudi legislature does not provide a definition for ‘serious reasons’ and the 
courts have considerable discretion in determining, on a case-by-case basis, when 
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termination is justified, examining specific case results is necessary in order to understand 
the legal standard. Because the SCR does not include a specific statutory remedy for LLC 
owners in the event of management deadlocks or minority oppression, a particularly 
important question is whether either of these situations constitute "serious reasons" 
sufficient to permit judicial dissolution. A related question is whether the court may order 
alternative remedies, such as a forced buy-out of the allegedly oppressed minority owner, 
under the “serious reasons” ground instead of ordering dissolution. At least nine published 
cases interpret "serious reasons" in the context of a plaintiff seeking judicial dissolution, 
providing some answers to these questions.  The four presented here were selected because 
they each involve slightly different issues. However, the cases not discussed are consistent 
with these four in that the financial position of the company is always the dominant factor 
courts consider in deciding whether to order dissolution. 
 
1. Judicial Dissolution Case Study I: Acute Conflicts as “Serious Reasons” For the 
LLC’s Dissolution 
 
In this case (No.261/1/G.1418.H), the Board of Grievances, which was formerly the 
competent court under the SCR, granted a shareholder petition for LLC dissolution on the 
basis that shareholder conflicts were acute enough to render achievement of company 
objectives unfeasible.802 
 
Background  
 
                                                 
802 Board of Grievances, Case No. 261/1/G. Appeal Division Decision No. 126/T/3, 2001 (1421.H). 
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The dispute underlying the dissolution petition arose when the defendant took 
actions which the plaintiff felt were detrimental to both his interests and those of the LLC. 
The parties’ business relationship then deteriorated to the point of mutual hostility and 
mistrust, undermining company operations. The LLC in question began in 1985 as a 
company producing advertising billboards, in particular as related to the advertising needs 
of foreign companies. The LLC Article of Association provided that the defendant would 
hold the position of LLC Chief Executive Manager. The position empowered him to 
supervise the company’s operations in exchange for compensation amounting to five 
percent of the company’s net profit, after setting aside the LLC statutory reserve. In July 
1997, the plaintiff, the defendant’s co-owner, initiated an action alleging that the defendant 
was taking company actions without informing the plaintiff or obtaining the consent of the 
LLC general assembly, as required by the Article of Association. The plaintiff further 
alleged that the defendant had obtained a license to set up a rival company in the same line 
of business, and that the defendant had used the existing LLC’s headquarters and address 
to obtain the license. The defendant had then rented his own office, where he began to 
operate the rival company, causing severe damage to the original company and the 
plaintiff's interests. The defendant also attempted to poach the existing LLC’s clients by 
asking them to transfer their business to his new company. Finally, the plaintiff claimed 
the defendant attempted to convince the LLC’s employees to leave their positions and 
transfer to the rival company. The plaintiff’s action sought: (1) judicial dissolution of the 
LLC, (2) compensation for the damages caused by the defendant’s acts, pursuant to SCR 
Article 32, which states: "The manager shall compensate any damage caused to the 
company, shareholders or third parties that stems either from violating the terms of the 
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company's agreement or any negligent errors committed during performance of his 
work".803 
The defendant responded by rejecting the petitioner's claims and alleging various 
counterclaims. Specifically, the defendant alleged that the plaintiff was responsible for the 
company’s decline in profits since mid-1996 by preventing the defendant from carrying 
out his duties, converting company assets to the plaintiff’s own account, and assigning 
company employees to spy on the defendant. The defendant also argued that he informed 
the plaintiff about his desire to withdraw from the business, but that the plaintiff frustrated 
his withdrawal by attempting to dictate unreasonable separation terms. While the defendant 
acknowledged that he had established another company operating in the same field, he 
defended that decision as necessary in light of the plaintiff’s hostile acts. He further argued 
that his professional expertise was in billboard advertising, and that he set up the rival 
company as the only means of continuing his career.   
 
Court’s Ruling 
 
The court ordered dissolution of the company, finding "serious reasons" justified 
its decision and requesting that a receiver be appointed to wind down the LLC’s business. 
 In reaching its decision that judicial dissolution of the company was warranted, the 
court focused extensively on the company's financial position and business operations. It 
held that the shareholder disputes had led to a complete collapse in business operations, 
affecting the LLC’s relationships with both clients and its employees, and that dissolution 
was therefore inevitable.  The court articulated its reasoning as follows:  
                                                 
803 Saudi Companies Regulation, Art. 32. 
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“The basis of any company’s existence is mutual trust and cooperation 
between its participants. The case at bar illustrated this point, as the 
shareholders here suffer from the absence of the required trust and mutual 
cooperation, which has led to the company’s financial deterioration. The 
dispute between LLC owners has reached the point where it is impossible 
for the company to continue its business operations. Further operations will 
only serve to expand the circle of controversy and lead to a further erosion 
of LLC assets. Accordingly, the court exercises its discretion to find that 
sufficiently serious reasons justify dissolution as provided for under 
Article 16 of the Saudi Companies Regulation. The court orders the 
company to dissolve, and wind down its business as appropriate in order 
to mitigate damages and reduce losses.” 
 
Analysis 
 
This case illustrates that the court will examine the following circumstances in 
deciding whether to order dissolution: (1) whether shareholders conflicts are acute; (2) 
whether the conflicts have negatively affected the entity, its financial position, and the 
operation of its businesses; (3) whether carrying on operations is financially feasible. In 
light of the court’s decision, shareholders petitioning for dissolution should focus their 
arguments on those three considerations.    
As the plaintiff did not raise the issue, the court did not address whether a manager 
establishing a rival business could constitute a breach of fiduciary duty. The case 
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nonetheless appears to involve a clear breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty, as the 
defendant directly bolstered a competitor of the company where he served as manager. 
Despite this apparent breach, the court did not order compensation to the plaintiff for any 
resulting damages. The court also denied the plaintiff’s request for compensation pursuant 
to SCR Article 32, which permits damages for violations of the LLC agreement, as well as 
for any managerial negligence.    
 
 
2. Judicial Dissolution Case Study II: Suspicion and Distrust as “Serious Reasons” 
For the LLC’s Dissolution - Deadlock between two LLC owners arising from 
alleged violations of the LLC agreement. 
 
 
The court in this case (No.2906/2/G.1424. H.) denied the plaintiff's request to dissolve 
the LLC, concluding that distrust, suspicion, or disagreement among shareholders, standing 
alone, are insufficiently “serious reasons” to warrant judicial dissolution of an entity. 804 
 
Background  
 
 The case involved an LLC formed in August 2001 by its two owners, the eventual 
parties to the lawsuit, to operate a tourism, hospitality, and hotel management business 
wherein each held a fifty percent ownership share. Soon after the LLC’s formation, and 
prior to processing of its application for Commercial Registration, the two owners had a 
falling out. The plaintiff subsequently brought an action alleging that his co-owner has 
violated several provisions of the Articles of Association and ignored all written and verbal 
requests to correct the offending behavior. The plaintiff also contended that he asked the 
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defendant not to move forward with the company’s registration procedures, as the 
defendant's violations and other non-cooperation made the company’s continuation 
impossible. Finally, the plaintiff argued that the defendant had acted in bad faith by not 
only failing to halt registration procedures as requested, but in fact attempting to accelerate 
issuance of the company's commercial register as well as then pursuing a business license. 
The petition contained claims for: (1) the dissolution and liquidation of the company on 
the grounds that cooperation between the owners was no longer possible and (2) recovery 
of the plaintiff’s share of LLC capital contributions in the amount of two hundred and fifty 
thousand S.R. 
 The defendant moved to dismiss the proceeding for judicial dissolution of the LLC, 
arguing, in part, that all letters he received from the plaintiff had been written after the issue 
date of the LLC’s Commercial Register. He also claimed that the plaintiff had implicitly 
approved continuing the company's business operations by attending an owners’ meeting 
in early October 2003, more than two months after issuance of the company's Commercial 
Register. The defendant maintained that, during the meeting, the parties discussed and 
agreed upon a plan for future business operations. As for the alleged Articles of Association 
violations, the defendant denied them, responding that the plaintiff was incorrectly 
confusing their hotels operations agreement with the LLC Article of Association. The 
defendant’s final contention was that the LLC agreement specified all circumstances that 
would trigger dissolution, and that non-compliance with the hotel operations agreement 
was not one of the agreed upon circumstances.  
 
Court’s Ruling 
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The court denied the petition for dissolving the company, finding that the 
petitioner’s claims were insufficient to satisfy the “serious reasons” ground for dissolution. 
In reaching its decision, the court made a number of factual findings. First, the court 
found that the parties signed the LLC Article of Association and that those articles were 
then legally approved by the governing authority. Second, the LLC agreement provided 
the LLC’s duration and expiration date and articulated the circumstances which would 
trigger dissolution.   The court further held that the plaintiff’s stated reasons for seeking 
dissolution were operational and management disputes which did not harm the company’s 
finances or involve violations of the LLC agreement. The court ultimately ruled that "loss 
of confidence, distrust, and disputes alone are not serious reasons warranting judicial 
dissolution. Only managerial disputes so acute that they affect the company’s financial 
position are sufficient for dissolution.” 
 
 
Analysis 
 
The court's decision confirmed that mistrust, loss of confidence, suspicion, and non-
cooperation among shareholders will not warrant dissolution unless those issues affect the 
company’s profitability. The decision is therefore consistent with the first case examined, 
where the court ordered dissolution due to the LLC becoming economically unviable. The 
two decisions make clear that shareholders seeking dissolution must argue that the 
company’s internal discord is affecting company finances, and constitutes an existential 
threat to the LLC’s future operations and profitability.    
 
 174
 
3. Judicial Dissolution Case Study III: Minority Oppression as “Serious Reasons” 
For the LLC’s Dissolution 
 
 
The third case (No.167/2/G.1420.H.) involved an LLC minority shareholder seeking 
dissolution under the “serious reasons” ground where the majority shareholders failed to 
perform certain obligations as required by the LLC agreement. The court ruled that non-
fulfillment of a shareholder’s obligations under the LLC agreement is a matter that can 
only be raised by a company’s management body, and that the petition did not therefore 
prove “Serious Reasons” requiring dissolution.805 
 
Background  
 
 In 1976, the petitioner formed an LLC with two co-owners to construct and operate 
a medical center, each of them holding a one-third ownership share. The petitioner agreed 
to act as the general contractor for the project and be responsible for all construction. The 
other two owners, who became the defendants in the case, agreed to provide the land for 
the medical center as well to provide continuing capital contributions over the course of 
the construction. After several years of delay in the construction work, the plaintiff filed 
an action demanding dissolution on the grounds that the co-owners had failed to provide 
the agreed upon land as well as their required capital contributions. The plaintiff 
additionally claimed that the defendants refused to accept his calls requesting a meeting 
that would decide whether they would meet their obligations or agree to dissolve the 
company. Finally, the petition contended that the defendants had attempted to force the 
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plaintiff to sell them his share at an unreasonably low price. The plaintiff sought: (1) 
judicial dissolution and liquidation of the company under the “serious reasons” ground and 
(2) compensation for losses the plaintiff suffered as a result of the defendants’ refusal to 
honor their LLC agreement obligations. The petition cited for support SCR Article 7, which 
states that: “Each shareholder shall be liable to the company for the capital contributions 
that he has undertaken to provide, and if such capital is not delivered within the specified 
period, a shareholder shall be liable to the other shareholders for the damage caused by 
such delay.”806  
 The defendants moved to dismiss the claim on the ground that the LLC Article of 
Association states that any dissolution resolution requires unanimous consent, that the 
defendants object to the proposed dissolution, and that the required unanimity was 
therefore not present. 
 
Court’s Ruling 
 
The court rejected the petition for dissolving the company, holding that the 
petitioner's claims did not constitute serious reasons for dissolution as required by SCR 
Article 16.   
The court reasoned that the petitioner’s alleged grounds for dissolution, including 
the failure of his co-owners to comply with the LLC agreement, should all have been raised 
through the company’s management body. The court also noted that, since most of the 
company's projects have been completed, dissolution would cause financial damage to the 
LLC. The court further held that the LLC Agreement clearly stated that any resolution for 
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dissolving the company required the unanimous consent of shareholders, and that the 
required unanimity was not shown. The court specifically noted that "whoever is 
committed to something, is obliged to do so," referring to the plaintiff’s agreement in the 
LLC articles that all dissolution petitions must be unanimous.    
 
Analysis 
 
 
Although the petitioning minority shareholder successfully proved that the majority 
owners committed misconduct against him, he failed to secure the requested dissolution. 
The ruling makes clear that the SCR’s text, as interpreted by the courts, provides no legal 
remedy against majority oppression. By leaving it to the company management to decide 
whether to bring an action for shareholder violations, the court is only encouraging an 
increase in majority misconduct. This case therefore represents a significant threat to 
minority shareholder interests.   
 
4. Judicial Dissolution Case Study IV: Financial Infeasibility as “Serious Reasons” 
For the LLC’s Dissolution 
 
Saudi Courts have consistently held LLC financial difficulties to be the most acceptable 
ground for dissolving the company pursuant to SCR Article 16. Case (381/2/G.1410 H) 
was one such example, as the court ordered the LLC’s dissolution and requested 
appointment of a liquidating trustee when LLC losses reached three-quarters of its paid-up 
capital.807 
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Background  
 
 The petitioner brought an action seeking dissolution based on several 
circumstances. First, plaintiff alleged that the company was incapable of continuing 
operations due to the sale of its only factory. The plaintiff additionally alleged that one of 
the shareholders, a foreign national, had abandoned the company and left the country. Since 
this shareholder was primarily responsible for company operations and management, his 
departure caused significant losses reaching three-quarters of the LLC’s paid-up capital. 
Petitioner contended that the circumstances he alleged should be sufficient to establish 
serious reasons justifying dissolution under Article 16.   
 The defendants moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that the LLC agreement 
expressly stipulated the LLC term and date of expiry, and reaching that expiration date, 
along with a shareholder then desiring to end the business, was the only legal way to 
dissolve the company.   
 
Court’s Ruling 
 
The court granted the petition for dissolution and requested the parties appoint a trustee 
to liquidate the business.  The court reasoned that there were sufficient signs of the LLC’s 
financial distress to warrant dissolution. Specifically, the court found that closing the 
company’s only factory, which supplied most of its goods for sale, combined with financial 
losses totaling three-quarters of the company’s capital constituted serious reasons for 
dissolution.  
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Analysis 
 
 
 The holding is again consistent with those previously discussed, with the 
company’s financial viability serving as the key factor courts use in deciding whether to 
order dissolution. Courts may consider other factors in determining whether company 
operations should continue, but financial condition plays the most vital role. There are 
certainly reasons to question the courts’ narrow focus on company finances in any 
dissolution decision. Financial status is clearly a relevant and important factor in 
contemplating dissolution.808 However, it seems misguided to focus on that one factor, to 
the seeming exclusion of all other considerations. A court should not reject any appropriate 
form of relief solely on the ground that the company is profitable.809 
 
6.3 Managers’ Fiduciary Duties and Available Remedies  
 
Fiduciary duty law presents a potential alternative source of remedies in shareholder 
oppression cases. The SCR itself offers few details regarding the fiduciary duties owed by 
LLC managers.810 Saudi courts, however, do not necessarily interpret the SCR’s lack of 
specificity to mean LLC managers owe no such duties.811 Rather, KSA judges at times 
draw on fiduciary rules applying to other sorts of companies, as well as Shari’a law, to 
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define an LLC manager’s  duties.812 SCR Article 165 is one of the few legal provisions 
addressing LLC manager responsibilities. It states stating that such managers shall be 
individually and jointly liable to the LLC and its shareholders for damages caused by 
negligence, violations of the SCR or the LLC Articles of Association, or any other 
wrongful action committed while performing their duties.813 As a result, some argue that 
Article 165 create implicit fiduciary duties requiring that LLC managers act with due care, 
within the scope of their powers, and in good faith while carrying out their duties.814  
The SCR also specifies fiduciary duties owed by managers in other types of companies, 
such as JSC directors, which might be interpreted as applying to LLC managers as well. 
These duties include avoiding conflicts of interests815, refraining from participating in 
competing businesses816, and maintaining confidentiality.817 Moreover, while the SCR 
does not explicitly provide that JSC directors owe a general duty of loyalty, the duties it 
does expressly create have been interpreted to create an implicit loyalty duty owed to the 
company and other shareholders. The SCR never addresses one way or another whether 
the provisions defining a JSC director’s duties also apply to LLC managers. The SCR’s 
silence on this subject has therefore led to some uncertainty over whether any or all of a 
JSC director’s fiduciary duties should also apply to such managers.   
As mentioned, Saudi courts also consider relevant Shari’a law rules in determining the 
scope of duties an LLC manager owes to the LLC and its shareholders. Shari’a law is 
invoked through the mechanism of agency theory (agent-principal), which separates 
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shareholders not involved in the company’s management from those who are.818 Shari'a 
law imposes on LLC managers, and all other management bodies for any type of company, 
the additional duty to conform with principles of accountability, trust, fairness, and 
transparency.819 820 Shari'a law also imposes a general duty of care upon those persons in 
positions of responsibility or authority.821 Islamic law further prohibits self-dealing when 
a conflict of interest arises, as well as an agent’s self-interested use of information.822 The 
SCR explicitly prohibits, under any circumstance, the elimination or modification 
(contracting out) of LLC manager obligations and responsibilities. Any provisions in the 
LLC agreement to the contrary will be considered void.823 LLC managers are jointly liable 
for any damages suffered by the LLC and its shareholders resulting from a breach of the 
LLC agreement, the SCR or any other fiduciary duty.824 The SCR also provides for 
significant criminal penalties in cases where an LLC manager or JSC director breaches a 
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fiduciary duty, including imprisonment of up to five years, and a fine of up to five million 
Saudi Riyals.825   
Both LLC manager negligence and misconduct can create a cause of action for an 
individual shareholder to bring a suit for damages. Article 165 of the SCR provides for two 
types of actions against LLC managers. The first is a shareholder suing on an individual 
basis for any personal harm suffered as a result of the manager’s actions, and the second is 
a derivative action brought by a shareholder on behalf of the company.826 Due to the 
inability of managers to avoid or waive their fiduciary duties, an agreement among 
shareholders to discharge managers from any liability will not bar a subsequent suit for 
damages.827 A general meeting resolution to discharge managers from liability will not, 
therefore, have any binding legal effect.828 Further, while a shareholder is compelled to 
inform the general meeting of shareholders of any individual action he or she intends to 
bring, the approval of the general meeting is not required.829 However, in accordance with 
LLC law, damages are typically the sole remedy a court will provide minority shareholders 
when they allege majority shareholder breaches. Injunctive relief and specific performance 
are rarely ordered as judicial or adjudicative remedies under Saudi law.830 For example, a 
minority shareholder proving he was unjustly removed from a management position will 
not receive judicially-ordered reinstatement, but rather be limited to monetary 
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compensation, as expressly provided in the SCR.831 Additionally, in most cases the court 
did not examine or discuss whether or not a legitimate business reason existed for removing 
a minority owner from management, so long as the procedures used by the majority did 
not violate the SCR or the LLC agreement. In the case (No. 5475/1/G. 1434H), petitioner, 
a minority LLC shareholder, sought a preliminary injunction preventing majority 
shareholders from terminating his managerial position, as well as punitive damages, by 
arguing that the decision violated the majority vote requirement in the LLC agreement.832 
Specifically, petitioner alleged that his removal required the assent of a supermajority of 
LLC shareholders, constituting at least 75% of the outstanding company shares. As he 
himself owned 30% of the shares, such a supermajority did not exist.833 The court 
disagreed, finding that petitioner had previously sold 5% of his stake to other shareholders, 
and that the required supermajority had been achieved.834 Since this majority shareholder 
decision did not violate the LLC agreement, the court held the petitioner was not entitled 
to any relief.835  
In an additional case (No. 8684/1/G. 1435H), the petitioning minority shareholder-
employee   filed suit against the majority shareholder seeking cancellation of his allegedly 
wrongful termination as an LLC employee.836 The minority shareholder alleged his 
termination violated the LLC agreement, which required supermajority approval for 
removing managers and expressly held that the supermajority must consist of more than 
one shareholder, even if that one shareholder held sufficient shares on his own.837 The court 
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found for the petitioner, holding that his termination resolution received support from only 
one shareholder, in violation of the LLC agreement. The court further ordered injunctive 
relief, invalidating the termination resolution and directing that the minority shareholder 
be reinstated as manager.838 Interestingly, in both of the above-mentioned cases, the court 
did not discuss whether the terminations were for legitimate business reasons or whether 
the controlling shareholders breached any fiduciary duty. Instead, the courts focused on 
whether internal LLC procedures were properly followed. The failure to examine potential 
breaches of fiduciary duties owed by the majority to the minority is significant, as 
oftentimes minorities do not participate significantly in company management, lack access 
to company information and may not receive financial returns. When majority shareholders 
then attempt to buy out minority shareholders, this power and information imbalance 
enables them to do so at unreasonably low prices.839 The lack of established market for 
minority shares may then leave the minority shareholder locked in, forced to either endure 
majority abuse or sell at an unfairly low price.840 
 
6.4. Judicial Dissolution in The United States  
 
 In the U.S., statutory and judicial remedies exist for resolving disputes among LLC 
members and protecting minority owners from unlawful, abusive, and oppressive majority 
owner actions.841 The available remedies include judicial dissolution of the company, as 
                                                 
838 Id. 
839 Jeffrey M. Leavitt, Burned Angels: The Coming Wave of Minority Shareholder Oppression Claims in 
Venture Capital Start-up Companies, 6 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 229, 230 (2005). Available at 
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840 Id. 
841 Sandra K. Miller, Minority Shareholder Oppression in the Private Company in the European 
Community: A Comparative Analysis of the German, United Kingdom, and French Close Corporation 
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well as less severe alternative actions a court can order.842 Virtually all the state-level U.S. 
LLC statutes provide particular grounds upon which LLC members may pursuing judicial 
dissolution.843 The most common ground for dissolution under state LLC statutes is a 
finding that it is no longer reasonably practicable for the LLC to carry on operations in 
conformity with its constitutional documents.844 ULLCA, RULLCA, and the Delaware 
LLC Act each contain the "not reasonably practicable" standard for when a court may 
decree dissolution of the company.845 None of the statutes, however, have elaborated on 
how a court should apply or interpret the “not reasonably practical” standard when ruling 
on a petition for dissolution.846 Case law, however, has analyzed the standard and provided 
guidance concerning what type of events should warrant dissolution under the   
standard.847’848 The LLC statutes differ regarding an LLC’s ability to modify the “not 
reasonably practical” standard in its operating agreement. ULLCA and RULLCA both 
explicitly forbid an LLC’s operating agreement from waiving or eliminating member or 
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company agreement.” 
846 John D. Cromie & Noel D. Humphreys, Popular Approaches to Judicial Dissolution of an LLC Under 
RULLCA "Not Reasonably Practicable" Standard, US LAW, https://web.uslaw.org/wp-
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the “not reasonably practicable” ground triggered.  
 185
manager rights to seek judicial dissolution.849 By contrast, the Delaware Court of Chancery 
has heled that the state’s LLC Act permits LLC agreements to waive the right of a member 
or a manager to apply for judicial dissolution under §18-802.850 The court noted that 
Delaware LLC Act §18-1101(b) clearly states that the Act’s policy is to gives parties the 
maximum freedom of contract in the making and enforcing of LLC agreements, unless 
explicitly forbidden by statute.851  
A second common statutory ground for seeking judicial dissolution is unlawful, 
fraudulent, illegal, or oppressive actions by managers or controlling members.852 This 
ground implies that managers and members in control have an affirmative duty to avoid 
acting in an oppressive manner toward the other members.853 The Delaware LLC Act does 
not state a specific remedy for the LLC minority member claiming oppression.854 The 
statute does, however, explicitly enforce fiduciary obligations which managers and 
controlling members of an LLC owe to the other members, unless the LLC agreement itself 
alters those obligations.855’856 Although the right to seek judicial dissolution is generally 
confined to the LLC’s members, ULLCA also allows disassociated members to seek 
dissolution in certain circumstances, such as when the disassociated member’s interest was 
not immediately required to be purchased, as in a term company.857 A member seeking 
                                                 
849 See UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT §801 cmt; REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 701 cmt. 
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dissolution generally has the burden to prove the circumstances warranting dissolving the 
company.858 Even when that burden of proof is satisfied, some LLC statutes give courts 
the discretion to order alternative remedies, including ordering the purchase of the 
distributional (economic) interest of the petitioner or another LLC member.859 What 
follows are selected cases which illustrate the circumstances that, in practice, trigger the 
"not reasonably practicable" ground as well as the "unlawful, fraudulent, illegal, or 
oppressive action" ground for seeking judicial dissolution in the United States. 
 
A.  “Not Reasonably Practicable” As a Ground for Seeking the LLC’s Dissolution 
 
Uniform acts, as well as most state LLC statutes, provide for dissolving the LLC on the 
ground that it is not reasonably practical for the LLC to carry on operations in conformity 
with its formation documents. While the statutes themselves do not typically outline what 
factors or situations courts must consider in deciding whether it is “not reasonably 
practicable” for an LLC to continue operations, case law provides further interpretation of 
the term. Courts typically view dissolution as an extreme remedy requiring a strong 
showing that further operations are no longer feasible.860 In Re: Arrow Investment 
Advisors, LLC, involved a petition for dissolution filed under Delaware LLCA § 18-802.861 
The petitioner alleged that the LLC’s managers failed to satisfy the initial business plan 
and objectives outlined in the LLC Agreement.862 The Delaware Court of Chancery 
dismissed the petition, holding that, for purposes of evaluating a dissolution request on 
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grounds that operations are no longer reasonably practical, the court should look to the 
broad purposes outlined in the LLC agreement. That is, rather than focusing on specific 
business plans that any rational shareholder would understand might evolve over time, the 
court should confine itself to asking whether the LLC was behaving consistently with the 
general purpose articulated in the LLC agreement.863 The court noted that judicial 
dissolution is an extreme remedy, to be granted only in exceptional situations, and 
dissolving the LLC in question was not warranted simply because the LLC has not attained 
immediate profitability or that events have not turned out precisely as the LLC's owners 
initially intended.864 The court further found that a hair-trigger dissolution measure would 
disregard market realities and frustrate the expectations of reasonable investors that entities 
will not be judicially dissolved merely because of unexpected market disturbance.865 
In Haley v. Talcott, however, a Delaware court held that DLLCA § 18-802 should 
provide relief in the event that an LLC genuinely cannot perform and operate consistently 
with its chartering agreement.866 The petitioner in Haley was one of two LLC members, 
each of whom held a 50 percent interest in the company. The petitioner claimed that 
DLLCA § 18-802 required termination because it was no longer reasonably practicable for 
the LLC to continue operations in conformity with the LLC founding documents.867 The 
court agreed, finding that a deadlock between two 50 percent LLC owners hindered the 
company from operating as provided for in its funding agreement, and that sufficient 
grounds for dissolution under the statute therefore existed868 Defendant Talcott, Haley's 
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co-owner, had argued that Haley should be limited to the contractually-provided exit 
mechanism specified in the LLC agreement, which called for buying out the petitioner and 
therefore allowing the LLC to continue to exist.869 The court ultimately rejected this 
argument, but did note that “[i]f an equitable alternative to continued deadlock had been 
specified in the LLC Agreement, arguably judicial dissolution under § 18-802 might not 
be warranted.” The buyout remedy in this case was inadequate, the court held, because it 
provided no means of relieving the petitioner of  his burden as a personal guarantor for the 
company's mortgage, as he would remain liable for the mortgage debt even after exiting.870 
Accordingly, with no adequate exit mechanism available to the petitioner, judicial 
dissolution became the only practical deadlock-breaking remedy available.871 In reaching 
this decision, the court applied, by analogy, the corporate law principals under Del. Code 
Ann. tit. 8, § 273, which set forth three pre-requisites for a judicial order of dissolution: (1) 
two 50 percent owners (2) engaged in a joint venture (3) who are unable to agree on a 
business direction, each of which the court found present in Haley.872 
 In Fisk Ventures, LLC, the court identified three factors to be considered when 
deciding whether a court shall order judicial dissolution under DLLCA § 18-802. The three 
factors are: (1) whether the members’ vote is deadlocked at the Board level; (2) whether 
the LLC agreement provides for means other than dissolution to resolve the deadlock; and 
(3) whether the company’s financial condition permits continued operations.873 In 
evaluating the "not reasonably practicable" standard, the court emphasized that no one 
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factor is dispositive, and all three do not necessarily need to be present for a court to find 
the standard for dissolution satisfied.874 Instead, the factors function merely as guides for 
evaluating whether it is reasonably practicable for the business to continue in conformity 
with its specified purpose.875 The court further noted that a petitioner need not prove that 
the LLC’s purpose has been wholly frustrated in order to meet the standard for 
dissolution.876 Ultimately, the court concluded that because the LLC had no office, no 
employees, no operating profits, no prospects of equity or debt infusion, and a board with 
a long history of deadlock, more than sufficient reason existed to warrant judicial. 
dissolution.877 The respondent argued that the petitioner had a "put right" under the LLC 
agreement, under which a shareholder may force the company to purchase their interest at 
any time, and at the shareholder’s sole discretion.878 Therefore, respondent contended, the 
LLC agreement contained a viable alternative exit mechanism to judicial dissolution, and 
the LLC should continue its operations after buying out petitioner.879 The court rejected 
this argument, finding that "it would be inequitable to force a party to exercise its option 
when that party deems it in its best interests not to do so, and that the court is not permitted 
to second-guess a party's business decision in choosing whether or not to exercise its 
previously negotiated option rights."880 
 An entity’s financial prosperity does not preclude dissolution when other 
circumstances warranting the dissolution exist.  In Meyer Natural Foods LLC, the 
petitioner argued for judicial dissolution under DLLCA § 18-802 by alleging the LLC’s 
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inability to continue its business in conformity with its original agreement.881 The Court 
granted the petitioner partial summary judgment, holding that it was no longer reasonably 
practicable for the company to continue operating in conformity with the LLC agreement's 
specified purpose.882 While noting that there was no deadlock between the LLC owners 
and the company was financially viable, the court nonetheless concluded that "financial 
viability does not preclude dissolution of a limited liability company".883  
 In Matter of 1545 Ocean Ave., LLC, the court held that, for dissolution of an LLC 
pursuant to Limited Liability Company Law § 702, the petitioning owner must establish, 
by referencing the terms of the operating agreement, that (1) company management is 
unwilling or unable to reasonably pursue the entity’s stated purpose, or (2) that continuing 
business operations is financially unfeasible.884 The court further affirmed that the test for 
dissolving a company is whether it is “reasonably practicable” for the business to continue 
operating, and not whether it is impossible.885 The test therefore does not require a showing 
that the company’s purpose, as stated in the operating agreement, be entirely frustrated.  
Instead, the “reasonably practicable” standard implies that the company remain capable of 
pursuing the purpose specified in its operating agreement.886 
 In a few jurisdictions, a court that finds it "unreasonably practicable" for a company 
to continue operating may order alternative remedies to dissolution, such as a buyout. In 
Mizrahi v. Cohen, the New York Supreme Court found sufficient grounds existed to order 
an LLC’s dissolution.887 The court nonetheless rejected dissolution as the remedy, instead 
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ordering one member to buy-out the other member. Underscoring a judicial reluctance to 
order dissolution, the court reasoned, after conferring with the parties, that a buyout option 
was preferable despite finding that it was no longer reasonably practicable for the LLC to 
continue operations.888 
 
 
B. “Oppressive and Unfairly Prejudicial Action” As a Ground for Seeking LLC 
Dissolution 
 
 
LLC judicial dissolution on the grounds of oppressive action by managers or members 
in control of the company is permitted by LLC statute in twenty-four U.S. states.889 The 
oppression doctrine initially developed in the context of closely held corporations, to 
safeguard the interests of minority owners.890 A common form of minority oppression is 
the freeze-out, where majority owners deny minority shareholders certain participatory or 
financial rights.891 Examples of such practices include removing a minority owner from 
company management, denying them distributions, or refusing them access to company 
records.892 When LLC minority owners lack exit rights, they are particularly vulnerable to 
such practices, and judicial oversight is necessary to prevent abuse.893 Historically, 
minority oppression first arose in closely held corporations, as minority shareholders, for 
practical reasons, lacked the ability to sell, demand a buyout, or trigger dissolution.894 In 
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response, U.S. state legislatures and courts over time devised certain avenues of relief for 
oppressed shareholders in closely held companies.895 For example, a number of states 
revised their corporate dissolution statutes to make oppression by controlling shareholders 
a ground for triggering involuntary dissolution.896 Because minority members in LLCs are 
often similarly situated to those in closely held companies, particularly in terms of lacking 
exit rights, many states’ LLC statutes, especially those modelled after ULLCA and 
RULLCA, now provide similar remedies for minority oppression.897 ULLCA authorizes 
judicial dissolution of an LLC when the managers or members in control act in an illegal, 
fraudulent, oppressive, or unfairly prejudicial manner toward the petitioning member.898 
RULLCA, using similar language, provides for judicial dissolution when managers or 
members in control (1) have acted or are acting in a manner that is illegal or fraudulent, or 
(2) have acted or are acting in a manner that is oppressive and was, is, or will be directly 
detrimental to the petitioner.899 Under these uniform acts, as well as other, similar U.S. 
LLC statutes, minority members therefore have a remedy against majority oppression.900 
RULLCA also prohibits LLC  owners from agreeing to eliminate this judicial power to 
order dissolution.901 Accordingly, even if an LLC agreement stipulates that certain acts are 
authorized and therefore not illegal, a court under RULLCA could still order dissolution if 
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it finds the acts served to oppress minority members.902 An LLC agreement can, however, 
agree to restrict or eliminate remedies for minority oppression other than dissolution.903  
In the absence of uniform legislative guidance, U.S. states have adopted various 
standards for defining oppression or determining when oppressive acts have occurred. New 
York, for instance, uses a "reasonable expectations" test for identifying and measuring 
minority oppression. This test, first articulated by the case in re Kemp & Beatley, defines 
oppression as majority conduct which “substantially frustrates expectations that, 
objectively viewed, were both reasonable under the circumstances and were fundamental 
to the petitioner's decision to join the venture.”904 A minority shareholder must therefore 
demonstrate how his or her reasonable expectations were undermined by majority 
shareholder or manager actions.905 Such a standard thus does not require a minority owner 
to prove fraudulent or unlawful conduct in order to trigger judicial remedies.906 Other 
jurisdictions define oppression as burdensome, harsh, wrongful, and dishonest conduct, or 
an apparent departure from the standards of fair-dealing and contravention of the 
conditions of fair play.907 U.S. LLC statutes generally do not specifically define the term 
"unfairly prejudicial."  Historically, though, "unfairly prejudicial" has been adopted as a 
replacement for "oppressive," with many U.S. states making the change due to concern that 
courts were interpreting “oppressive” too narrowly. In particular, courts viewed 
“oppressive” as requiring some indication of bad faith.908 In Roemmich v. Eagle Eye Dev., 
LLC, the court addressed the legislative intent behind the change, stating that "it is clear 
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that the term "unfairly prejudicial" is to be construed liberally to cover virtually any form 
of unreasonable conduct that has an unfair impact, even though the conduct may not have 
been fraudulent or illegal and regardless of whether there has been bad faith."909 Unfairly 
prejudicial conduct has therefore been deemed to include a broad variety of circumstances, 
such as conduct amounting to a minority freeze-out, extreme cases of mismanagement, and 
majority conduct which unfairly deprives minority members of their "reasonable 
expectations”."910 
While most U.S. states have created dissolution remedies for oppressed minority 
shareholders in closely held corporations, far fewer have done so with regard to LLCs. For 
a possible explanation of why this is the case, Professor Douglas Moll offers the following:   
 
“In the corporation setting, directors and officers traditionally owe 
fiduciary duties to the corporation itself, but not to individual shareholders. 
By contrast, in the LLC setting, many jurisdictions indicate (either by 
statute or judicial decision) that a manager owes a fiduciary duty to an 
individual member as well as to the LLC itself.  See, e.g., RULLCA § 409 
(2006).  A member’s ability to bring a breach of fiduciary duty claim on his 
own behalf lessens the need for an oppression action, as the oppression 
action is also designed to allow a minority owner to assert, on his own 
behalf, that he has been unfairly treated.”911 
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As a result, LLC statutes which provide that managers owe a fiduciary duty to 
individual members, as well as the LLC, provide an alternative vehicle (the fiduciary duty 
action) for protecting minority owner from oppression.912 New York, for example, is a state 
which grants statutory dissolution protections to oppressed minority shareholders in close 
corporations, but not to LLC members.913 New York LLC Law § 409(a), on the other hand, 
states that managers of a manager-managed LLC and members of a member-managed LLC 
owe fiduciary duties of loyalty and care to individual members, and not just to the LLC.914 
This raises the important question of the remedies available to an individual LLC member 
suing for breach of fiduciary duty where the LLC statute does not provide a dissolution-
for-oppression remedy. In Matter of Felzen v PEI Mussel Kitchen, LLC, petitioner, a 
minority LLC member, brought an action for dissolution, claiming breach of fiduciary 
duty, looting, and oppression by the majority LLC member, all of which are available 
grounds for dissolution under the New York Business Corporation Law.915 Petitioner 
argued that dissolution should be a proper remedy where an LLC has operated exclusively 
for the defendant member’s benefit.916 Petitioner further contended that the defendant's 
dishonest conduct and self-dealing rendered the company incapable of carrying on 
operations in conformity with the LLC operating agreement.917 The court rejected the 
petitioner’s claim seeking dissolution.918 The court held that the “not reasonably 
practicable” ground for LLC dissolution remains the standard, requiring a showing that (1) 
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the company’s management is unable or unwilling to reasonably authorize or promote the 
specified purpose of the business to be realized or achieved, or (2) continuing the entity’s 
business is financially unfeasible.919 The petitioner’s inability to make either of these two 
showings caused the court to dismiss the dissolution action for failure to state a claim upon 
which relief could be granted.920 This decision made clear that oppressive LLC majority 
conduct which breaches a fiduciary duty, but nonetheless fails to meet the general standard 
for dissolution, will not trigger dissolution. This is the case even if the same conduct would 
warrant dissolution if brought by a minority shareholder in a close corporation.921 It also 
remains true that the numerous U.S. LLC statutes which hold that managers or controlling 
members owe a fiduciary duty to individual members lack a uniform standard for the 
remedies available once those duties are breached.922 The most commonly awarded 
remedies for breach of the fiduciary duty owed to individual LLC members are damages 
or equitable relief as to that member.923 A small number of jurisdictions, however, also 
provide for forced buy-outs of minority members as a remedy for fiduciary violations.924 
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6.5.Court Discretion to Order Alternative Remedies for Oppression Claims  
 
As noted, certain U.S. jurisdictions provide for judicial dissolution of an LLC when the 
managers or members in control act in an oppressive manner toward other LLC 
members.925 Dissolution, however, is not the only available remedy for an oppressed LLC 
member. Several states have provided, through either statute or case law, for less severe 
remedies as an alternative to dissolution.926 RULLCA, for example, lists the specific 
equitable remedies available to an oppressed LLC member.927 One such remedy is court 
appointment of one or more provisional managers, if such an appointment would be in the 
best interest of both the members and the LLC itself.928 Another important remedy is a 
court-ordered buyout of the victimized member.929 The court has the discretion to decree 
the sale of a member's interests, who is a party to the lawsuit, if such an order would be 
fair and equitable to all parties under the totality of the circumstances.930 One issue with 
buyouts is that most LLC statutes authorizing them as an alternative remedy to dissolution 
fail to include meaningful valuation guidelines for a court to employ.931 U.S. courts 
typically respond to this lack of guidance by referring to statutes and cases dealing with 
oppressed minority shareholders in the corporate  context.932 RULLCA also states that 
court authority to order a remedy other than dissolution is a default rule which can be 
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overridden by a contrary provision in an LLC agreement.933 Members may therefore agree 
to eliminate or otherwise restrict a court’s authority to craft a lesser remedy, even if that 
has the effect of limiting the court to the  ‘all-or-nothing’ remedy of dissolution.934  This 
choice is consistent with RULLCA’s underlying purpose of promoting LLC members 
autonomy to structure their relationship, rights, and obligations as they see fit, thereby 
maximizing freedom of contract.935 The main limit on this freedom is RULLCA’s provision 
preventing an LLC agreement from eliminating a court’s authority to order dissolution 
upon application by an oppressed member.936 
 
6.6.Member’s Judicial Expulsion  
 
In the U.S., judicial removal of an LLC member from the company can be an effective 
means of avoiding dissolution, when that member is responsible for the specific harm 
alleged by the plaintiff. Such involuntary disassociation of a member is permitted under 
such certain circumstances, such as the member in question breaching his or her fiduciary 
duty or engaging in other wrongful conduct toward the LLC or an individual member. Both 
the complaining member and the LLC itself can petition for such a remedy.937 RULLCA 
specifically authorizes expulsion as a remedy in certain situations.938 The revised act states 
that a court may remove any member whose misconduct adversely and materially affects 
                                                 
933 REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT §701 cmt. 
934 Id. 
935 Joan MacLeod Heminway, The Ties at Bind: LLC Operating Agreements as Binding Commitments, 68 
SMU L. REV. 811 (2015). Available at: http://scholar.smu.edu/smulr/vol68/iss3/20 
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937 Dennis A. Nowak; Caitlin M. Trowbridge, Involuntary Expulsion of Troublesome Members under 
Florida's Revised LLC Act, 91 FLA. B.J. 9, 14 (2017).  Available at: 
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LLC operations, or who willfully or persistently commits material breaches of member 
duties or the LLC operating agreement.939 Expulsion is also permitted when the member’s 
conduct makes it no longer reasonably practicable for the company to carry on operations 
with that person as a member.940 Involuntary judicial removal thus serves as a significant 
and useful alternative to the more intrusive remedy of dissolution.941 In many cases, 
removal of the offending member allows the company to move forward while protecting 
the interests of the remaining members.942 Some jurisdictions, however, such as New York 
and Delaware, do not permit judicial expulsion, with dissolution that only available remedy 
for a company whose operational ability has become  compromised.943 For states which do 
permit judicial expulsion, the most common permissible grounds are as follows: 
 
A. Wrongful Conduct as a Ground for Expulsion  
Under RULLCA, judicial expulsion is permitted when the individual LLC member’s 
wrongful conduct materially and adversely affects the company’s business activities or 
operations.944 Interestingly, the limited number of cases which have addressed judicial 
expulsion have not offered a clear interpretation of “wrongful conduct” under the relevant 
LLC statute.945 Some argue that removal for wrongful conduct is unlikely to generate much 
controversy because the concept is well-developed under tort law.946 “Wrongful conduct” 
                                                 
939 Id. 
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941 Joan MacLeod Heminway, supra note 936. 
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can include misappropriation of  company assets, taking business opportunities that belong 
to the company, competition with the company, or, most commonly, breach of the member 
or manager's fiduciary duties.947 In IE Test, LLC v. Carroll, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
held that expulsion for “wrongful conduct” under section 24(b)(3)(a) of New Jersey’s LLC 
law requires a finding that the conduct has materially and adversely affected the company's 
business.948 The court further found that the “wrongful conduct” must have already created 
definitive damage to LLC operations in order to justify expulsion.949 Once that standard is 
met, the LLC and its other members will have a cause of action for judicial expulsion.    
 
B. Material Breach of LLC Agreement as a Ground for Expulsion 
 
Limited liability companies are mainly creatures of contract.950 When analyzing and 
examining an LLC agreement, courts employ the same principles used when interpreting 
and construing other contracts.951 A material breach is a breach which excuses the 
performance of a contract.952 A mere disagreement between LLC members over the terms 
of an operating agreement does not necessarily justify expulsion of the dissenting 
member.953 Whether any particular contract breach will be deemed 'material' is typically a 
fact-intensive inquiry.954 A breach is considered material only if it pertains to a matter of 
vital significance, undermining the essence of the contract or frustrating the purpose of the 
                                                 
947 DANIEL S. KLEINBERGER, AGENCY, PARTNERSHIPS, AND LLCS: EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS, 559 
(Aspen Publishers. 2008). 
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950 Godden v. Franco, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 283 (Del. Ch. Aug. 21, 2018). 
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952  Eureka VIII, LLC v. Niagara Falls Holdings, LLC, 899 A2d 95 (Del Ch 2006). 
953 IE Test, LLC v. Carroll, 140 A.3d 1268 (N.J. 2016). 
954  Kriesch v. Vilsack, 931 F. Supp. 2d 238 (U.S. Dist. 2013). (Headfirst Baseball LLC v. Elwood, 239 F. 
Supp. 3d 7, 16, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30211, *19. 
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non-breaching party.955 Among the factors courts frequently consider in determining the 
materiality of a breach include: whether the plaintiff is deprived of a benefit reasonably 
anticipated from the contract, the extent to which the injured party can be compensated for 
the lost benefit, the possible forfeiture of the defendant, the defendant’s ability to cure the 
breach, such as with reasonable assurances, and the extent to which the defendant complied 
with the requirements for good faith and fair dealing.956 In Headfirst Baseball LLC v. 
Elwood, the court held that an LLC member's expulsion was justified by his willful and 
material breach of the LLC agreement in converting LLC funds to his own benefit, which 
included a breach of the agreement’s requirements for good faith and fair dealing.957 
Material breach of the LLC agreement as a basis for judicial expulsion thus constitutes an 
important additional protection for LLC members who wish to avoid terminating a 
successful company based on a particular member’s misconduct.   
 
C. Not Reasonably Practicable as a Ground for Expulsion 
 
RULLCA provides that an LLC member may be judicially expelled for conduct which 
makes it no longer reasonably practicable for the company to continue operations with the 
member in question.958 The statute indicates this is an independent ground for expulsion, 
separate from the “wrongful conduct” ground discussed previously.959 The separate 
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grounds likely reflect the legislature’s intent to provide a “no-fault” basis for expulsion.960 
The statutory language therefore suggests expulsion can be justified merely on a showing 
of inadequate performance, harm to customer relationships, or any other conduct making 
it not reasonably practicable for the business to continue with the particular member.961 In 
IE Test, LLC v. Carroll, the court confirmed that RULLCA distinguishes between the 
showing required for a “wrongful conduct” expulsion and one on “not reasonably 
practicable” grounds.962 A “wrongful conduct” expulsion requires the court to find that the 
member's wrongful conduct has materially affected the business and caused definitive past 
harm.963 A "not reasonably practicable" expulsion requires no finding of material harm to 
the business, and evaluates the member’s continued presence on a prospective basis, as it 
relates to the company’s future prospects.964 The court also held that only member conduct 
relating to the LLC’s business is relevant, as the Legislature did not intend for disputes 
between members with no bearing on company operations to become a basis for 
expulsion.965 
 
6.7. Summary and Analysis  
 
Analysis of current trends in Saudi Arabia concerning corporate dissolution reveals that 
Saudi legislators and courts prioritize a company’s long-term existence and interests, the 
societal interest in the company’s continuing operations, and the protection of creditors.  
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The interests of minority shareholders, on the other hand, are given relatively little 
protection.  As discussed previously, individual shareholders seeking a court-ordered 
dissolution must show that future company operations are financially infeasible. Any lesser 
showing is virtually certain to result in the court dismissing the petition. While the SCR 
permits court-ordered LLC dissolution upon a finding that “serious reasons” justify that 
step, it fails to address situations where majority shareholders’ abusive conduct harms 
minority shareholders, but the business still remains profitable and able to carry on. 
Because the SCR does not explicitly provide for a dissolution-for-oppression remedy, 
courts tend to reject such claims. It is not clear whether abuse of minority shareholders 
could ever be deemed “serious reasons,” as the cases analyzed show courts rejecting 
dissolution whenever the company shows substantial profits. The KSA needs explicit 
remedies for shareholder oppression in order to offset the absence of withdrawal and buy-
out rights, and the difficulty of selling minority shares in closely held businesses on the 
open market.966 Stronger exit rights could compensate for the lack of oppression-specific 
rights, as minority shareholders could protect themselves by withdrawing and receiving a 
fair-value buyout,967 which they cannot do under current capital rules.968 Some argue that 
LLC managers and controlling shareholders owe fiduciary duties to individual shareholder, 
as well as the LLC, and may this be liable for any breaches. However, the remedies for 
such a breach are limited to damages, or on occasion the court invalidating the oppressive 
action by the majority, as other mechanisms such as forced-buyouts are not available.  
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U.S. LLC statutes, on the other hand, provide more protection for minority owners, 
enabling them to pursue judicial dissolution or other remedies on a much more widespread 
basis. For example, many LLC statutes provide a dissolution-for-oppression remedy, in 
addition to “not reasonably practicable” grounds for dissolution. Nevertheless, the absence 
of withdrawal and/or buyout rights in many U.S. jurisdictions still leaves minority 
potentially locked-in to a business, and these states should consider adopting dissolution-
for-oppression provisions. The “not reasonably practicable” standard for dissolution is not 
necessarily applicable in many oppression cases, which leaves minority members 
potentially vulnerable.969  For example, freeze-out cases where a minority member is 
removed from a managing position, or denied distributions, will not necessarily create an 
obstacle to further LLC operations, and thus not meet the requisite legal standard.970 Partly 
in response to such situations, the number of U.S. states with current oppression-related 
dissolution provisions in their LLC statutes has increased from eight to twenty four.971 
These statutory oppression provisions remain an important check on managers or majority 
members who might otherwise harm the interests of minority owners.972  
                                                 
969 Thomas F. Knab, Oppressive conduct insufficient to support LLC dissolution, THE DAILY REC. (Sept. 
16, 2013), 
https://underbergkessler.com/sites/default/files/article_docs/Oppressive%20Conduct%20Insufficient%20to
%20Support%20LLC%20Dissolution.pdf. 
 Id. In Matter of Nunziata, a decision from the New York Supreme Court, a member requesting to 
dissolve an LLC claimed that the two managing members had: failed to allow him to vote and participate in 
business meetings; excluded him from all aspects and control of the business and engaged in oppressive 
conduct toward him.  The court held that the plaintiff’s allegations of being excluded from the LLC's 
operations and affairs were insufficient to establish that it was no longer “reasonably practicable” for the 
company to carry on its business. The court reasoned that plaintiff failed to show that the company 
management was unable or unwilling to reasonably permit or promote the stated purpose of the company, 
or that continuing the business was financially unfeasible. 
970 Id. 
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In KSA the financial prosperity of a company generally precludes judicial dissolution, 
regardless of other circumstances. The U.S., on the other hand, permits court-ordered 
dissolution in various situations, even with profitable companies.973 Allowing even a 
profitable entity to continue operations is not always in the best interest of the LLC and its 
members, especially when majority abuse is taking place. However, dissolution is a major 
step, and it makes sense that courts would consider it only when alternative remedies are 
inadequate.974 
A final important provision in U.S. LLC statutes is the ability of courts to order a 
member’s expulsion in cases of wrongful conduct, LLC agreement breaches, or other 
actions making it not reasonably practicable for the company to continue operating with 
the specific member.975 Judicial expulsion is important for cases where the company could 
continue operating successfully once the problematic member is removed, making 
dissolution unwarranted.  
The key difference between U.S. and Saudi law concerning remedies for oppressed 
shareholders is the different emphasis the two place on protection of creditor interests. The 
critical inquiry is thus whether or not ordering dissolution will hurt creditors more than 
would a buy-out. In most cases it seems reasonable to assume that allowing share 
repurchases, whatever the motivation, will prejudice creditor interests, and especially the 
interests of unsecured creditors, whose only protection is the company's paid-up capital.976 
By contrast, a dissolution and liquidation of company assets gives creditors a preferential 
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right to those assets, before any distribution to shareholders or shareholders’ personal 
creditors.977 Dissolution therefore offers greater protection to creditor interests than does a 
buy-out. In sum, the dissolution-for-oppression remedy does not undermine creditor 
protection, as company liquidation rules in the KSA provide creditors the ability to seek 
repayment in full prior to distributions to any other party. 
American corporate law in general and LLC law in particular are decidedly libertarian, 
preferring default over mandatory rules in almost every area. This emphasis on freedom of 
contract provides great flexibility in structuring nearly every aspect of an LLC’s internal 
governance. One notable exception to the general preference for default rules is the judicial 
resolution remedy, which numerous U.S. states and certain uniform LLC acts make 
mandatory. One must therefore ask whether there is something about judicial resolution 
that makes a mandatory rule more preferable, even in generally default jurisdictions. Some 
argue that the history of majority oppression in closed companies justifies this mandatory 
protection for minority LLC shareholders.978 Another theory is that such minimum 
mandatory rules are essential to fill the gaps in the parties’ agreement, restricting the 
potential for abuse when unexpected situations arise.979 This theory posits that LLCs are 
long-term relational contracts whose viability often depends on unstated assumptions; the 
impracticality of devising an agreement which addresses all potential contingencies 
therefore justifies courts applying mandatory rules to protect these unstated assumptions.980 
Under this view, an optimal LLC statute is one which provides contractual freedom in 
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general, but retains a core of mandatory provisions to avoid majority abuses which the 
parties may prove unable to contractually protect against.981 Such a perspective is also 
mindful that many small-business investors are not particularly sophisticated or 
experienced, and often invest at the behest of friends or family without considering all 
possible risks. Mandatory shareholder protections are thus important to guard against 
potential future oppression.982  
One common argument against the mandatory law approach among Western scholars 
is that existing non-legal remedies for minority shareholders lessen the need for explicit 
legal protections.983 This argument is made most commonly in the context of family-run 
businesses. Researchers have documented that company ownership, even in prosperous 
markets, is most often controlled by a founder or his or her descendants.984 A family-owned 
company is also the world’s most prevalent form of business, and the argument is that 
family businesses provide adequate shareholder protection regardless of the legal rights 
present in a particular jurisdiction.985 That is, family-run companies adapt to fluctuating 
legal protections, and in particular create certain informal safeguards that make up for the 
lack of public regulations in developing countries.986 987 The explanation is that family 
relationships are often, although not always, defined by confidence, trust, open-ended 
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mutuality, and an appreciation for fairness and impartiality.988 Family businesses also 
frequently involve concentrated long-term ownership that promotes managerial motivation 
and oversight.989 Such firms also facilitate collaboration among shareholders, and between 
shareholders and their managerial agents, as family members regularly perform both 
functions.990 Further, the likelihood of repeat transactions induces mutual altruism, 
decreasing the need for legal contract protections.991   
In Saudi Arabia, family businesses dominate the market, and are especially well-
represented among LLCs, the typical first choice entity for family-run companies.  An 
argument can therefore be made that the KSA’s lack of LLC shareholder protection is due 
to the non-legal safeguards which family businesses effectively provide. There are several 
reasons, however, to question the conclusion that legal protections are not needed.  First, 
long-term firms increase the possibility that minority shares may be ultimately inherited by 
new owners less known or trusted than the previous owners.992 The initial company 
agreement, moreover, may have been specially tailored to those individuals who originally 
established the business.993 Shareholders who inherit their shares or otherwise join the 
company years after its formation may lack the foresight or power to renegotiate the 
underlying agreement.994 Second, Saudi LLCs are increasingly the favorite vehicle for non-
family businesses, particularly those involving foreign investors, and non-legal protections 
may therefore prove irrelevant or inadequate to a growing percentage of LLCs. Ultimately, 
then, the presence of many family-owned LLCs in KSA does not diminish the importance 
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of establishing adequate legal protections for minority owners. Minority LLC shareholders 
truly require legal remedies, such as the oppression remedy used in the U.S., to guard 
against majority abuses.   
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
 
7.1. Summary  
A comparative study of LLC structures, as well as the available remedies for 
shareholder disputes and minority oppression, shows significant differences between the 
U.S. and the KSA. However, LLC exit rights in both jurisdictions involve certain 
similarities, with both the U.S. and KSA restricting a member’s right to sell shares and 
limiting withdrawal and/or buyout rights.  
The analysis from chapter 4 shows that the Saudi legislature, for example, 
maintains a mandatory ROFR, limiting the ability of minority investors, in particular, to 
freely sell their shares. Most U.S. LLC statutes permit the free transferability of a member’s 
economic rights, but require member consent for transfers of management rights.995 One 
of the most prominent attempts in the new SCR to address majority abuses is its abolition 
of the requirement that shareholders must approve sales to a third party. Despite this 
reform, however, minority shareholders still struggle to obtain fair value when selling to a 
third party, with such a task often proving impossible in practice.     
There are several reasons minority shareholders encounter problems trying to sell 
to third parties. First, there is the issue of determining a fair share price in the absence of a 
liquid market. Then, even when such a price can be reasonably determined, an outside 
buyer willing to become a new minority owner can be difficult to find. Potential investors 
fully understand the risks inherent to minority investments, captured in the expression: 
“Only a fool would purchase a minority interest in a closed company.”996 Given that reality, 
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the existing majority shareholders often prove the only potential buyer for a minority 
shareholder seeking to liquidate. The U.S. addresses this problem by permitting the LLC 
itself to repurchase shares, pursuant to shareholder buy-out rights. SCR Article 177, 
however, forbids such LLC repurchases.997 The end result is that Saudi majority owners 
are frequently the only potential buyers for minority shares, leaving the minority owner 
with little chance of receiving anything close to fair value. The KSA further restricts LLC 
share sales with the mandatory ROFR, adding an additional barrier to owners hoping to 
sell their share to an outside buyer.      
Chapter 5 illustrated a major difference between the two countries regarding an 
LLC investor’s ability to withdraw at will, with the difference attributable to contrasting 
approaches to the legal capital rule. The Saudi legal capital rule limits an LLC’s ability to 
return shareholder capital. LLCs may reduce capital in order to make distributions to an 
individual shareholder seeking to withdraw, but numerous procedural hurdles, including a 
creditor veto power, increase the transaction costs. The restrictions will at times preclude 
a company from acquiring a dissenting shareholder’s stake, increasing the chances of 
shareholder deadlock which might affect company operations. The restriction on share 
buy-backs also makes investments in KSA LLCs less liquid, reducing their attractiveness 
to external investors. On the other hand, the legal capital rule serves to protect company 
creditors, and may be viewed as a necessary price to pay for the benefits of limited liability 
protection. Such a view assumes that LLCs with large debts will otherwise be incentivized 
to behave opportunistically at the expense of company creditors.998 Saudi LLC 
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shareholders lack the protections enjoyed by KSA partnership members, where any partner 
can voluntarily withdraw and force the partnership’s dissolution. The LLC shareholder also 
lacks the liquidity advantages of joint stock company shareholders. Both the partnership 
and joint stock company thus provide investors with remedies for majority oppression not 
enjoyed by LLC members. A partner’s ability to exit and force dissolution provides 
leverage to keep other partners honest. A joint stock company owner’s access to public 
markets provides a ready ability to sell if the company ceases to be a desirable investment. 
The lack of LLC shareholder exit rights, combined with the doctrine of majority rule, fails 
to offer LLC minority shareholders equivalent protection.  
There are reasons for this difference in treatment. LLC owners are not given the 
right to exit at will by voluntarily withdrawing, and thus triggering a buy-out right, because 
such an ability is viewed as prejudicial to LLC creditors.999 The right of partners to 
voluntarily withdraw from a partnership does not present an equivalent concern because 
partners are personally liable for partnership debts, giving creditors an alternative remedy. 
Even accounting for this creditor concern, however, the KSA should enact specific 
statutory guidelines articulating when minority shareholders are entitled to judicial relief. 
The discussion from chapter 6 shows that the U.S., in general, provides greater 
protection for minority shareholders than does the KSA. It is true that U.S. LLC members 
lack free transferability in management rights and certain limits on withdrawal and/or buy-
out rights. Other statutory protections, however, provide U.S. minority owners with 
stronger rights than their Saudi counterparts. For example, ULLCA and RULLCA both 
permit LLC members to seek dissolution in the event of specified majority misconduct and 
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oppression.1000 U.S. LLC statutes also enable courts to order remedies less severe than 
dissolution, providing greater flexibility in addressing minority shareholder concerns. 
RULLCA lists specific equitable remedies available to an oppressed LLC member,1001 
including court appointment of a provisional manager when it would be in the best interests 
of both the members and the LLC.1002 Another important remedial tool is a court-ordered 
buyout of the victimized member.1003 Moreover, although some U.S. jurisdictions do not 
specifically provide a remedy for majority oppression, they do enforce fiduciary duties or 
standards of care to guide LLC members' conduct, including a duty of loyalty owed to both 
the LLC and other members.  
In contrast to the relatively strong protections for minority shareholders in the U.S., 
the KSA’s new SCR, despite its many amendments to LLC rules, fails to sufficiently 
address the needs of minority shareholders. This is true despite the widespread problems 
encountered by minority shareholders under the previous SCR. This paper has shown the 
obstacles minority shareholders currently face when seeking court-ordered remedies for 
majority misconduct. As discussed in this research, individual shareholders seeking a 
court-ordered dissolution must show that future company operations are financially 
impracticable. Any lesser showing is virtually certain to result in the court dismissing the 
petition.  
The overall analysis in chapters 4 through 6 demonstrates the insufficiency of 
current protections for KSA LLC minority shareholders. Chapter 4 revealed the difficulty 
facing an LLC investor seeking to sell to a third party. Chapter 5 demonstrated the legal 
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capital rule’s role in preventing shareholders from withdrawing at will. Chapter 6 explained 
the difficulty in obtaining judicial dissolution for any reason other than financial 
deterioration.    
 
7.2. Recommendations  
The first proposal for addressing inadequate minority shareholder protection in the 
KSA is a statute specifying the situations where judicial dissolution is mandatory. The 
current approach, giving courts wide discretion in deciding when to dissolve a company, 
has failed to sufficiently protect minority interests. The SCR should also be amended to 
broaden the remedies a court can order short of dissolution. This expansion is necessary to 
prevent judges from having to decide between ordering no remedy at all and ordering the 
harsh remedy of dissolution. In cases involving illegal, oppressive, or fraudulent conduct, 
a KSA court should have the authority to approve a shareholder’s withdrawal, combined 
with an order that the LLC or remaining shareholders purchase the withdrawing shares at 
a court-determined price. If the company’s capital would be reduced in the event the buyer 
is the LLC itself, the court would need to ensure that all creditor interests are protected. 
The ability to order purchases of minority shares at fair market-value prices, combined with 
mandatory dissolution in cases of extreme majority misconduct, would enable courts to 
protect minority shareholders far better than they do today. Adopting such reforms in the 
KSA is especially important due to the illiquidity of minority LLC shares, as well as the 
uncertainty regarding what duties of loyalty and care LLC managers and shareholders 
presently owe.  
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The second proposal is making the ROFR an optional default rule. The mandatory 
ROFR, as has been discussed, excessively burdens the marketability of LLC shares. It 
dissuades outsiders from investing the time and money needed for due diligence on shares 
when they know the ROFR might ultimately block their purchase. The involved parties 
should be the ones able to decide if they need a ROFR provision, as there is no reason to 
limit their contractual freedom when no risk to third parties is present.  However, making 
the ROFR an optional default rule would not entirely solve the problems faced by minority 
shareholders seeking to sell.    
A third reform proposal is revising the standard Articles of Association template to 
provide a menu of options suitable for different objectives and business purposes. Such 
options are especially critical with regard to valuing shares in the event of an owner 
withdrawal, either when the LLC’s duration period comes to an end, or due to an 
involuntary withdrawal, such as shareholder death, when there is no third-party offer. As 
demonstrated in this paper, the typical small Saudi investor virtually always relies on the 
template form provided by the MoCI. This is true because the KSA lacks an adequate 
supply of attorneys sophisticated enough to draft specialized Articles of Association. The 
result is much greater reliance on the standard form than is the case in countries like the 
United States, where even less sophisticated investors typically have access to capable 
counsel. A more flexible template, providing a menu of options similar to template LLC 
agreements available in the U.S., would therefore be especially beneficial in the KSA. The 
template’s valuation provisions are particularly important. The menu options should 
include choices such as Agreed Value (the Fixed Price), Book Value, Multiple of Book 
Value, or Appraised Value. By giving the parties the ability to select a valuation method 
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before any shareholder disputes arise, many future problems could be avoided. Another 
menu option that should also be included in the standard template is a choice to opt out of 
the ROFR, allowing the parties to understand their ability to select this approach.   
 
7.3. Implications for Future Research 
This research paper has focused on one particular comparative law approach, 
examining and contrasting the legal protections for minority shareholders in the KSA and 
U.S. The overall purpose was developing suggested reforms that might make Saudi 
Arabia’s business environment more attractive for domestic and foreign investors. It is 
important to note that other comparative law approaches exist within the Western literature, 
such as the LLSV. The LLSV articles, however, follow a broader approach when 
comparing legal protections between jurisdictions, beyond merely examining the specific 
laws themselves.1004 This literature looks to the roots of the legal system in each country, 
and in particular the differences between common-law countries, which derive their system 
from English law, and civil-law countries, which are inspired by French law.10051006 In 
adopting such a framework, the LLSV maintain that common-law countries are better able 
to protect shareholder and creditor rights than are civil-law jurisdictions.1007 One study 
remarks on the consistently encouraging results for investors in common-law countries.1008 
The paper argues that the weak investor protection in French civil-law countries stems from 
the remarkably concentrated ownership in large public companies, leaving small investors 
                                                 
1004 Porta, Rafael La, et al. “Law and Finance.” Journal of Political Economy, vol. 106, no. 6, (1998). 
Available at http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.615.3690&rep=rep1&type=pdf. 
1005 Id. 
1006 Id. 
1007 Id. 
1008 Id. 
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less likely to be important.1009 In such countries, close to half of the ownership in public 
companies is controlled by the three largest shareholders. The paper contends that this 
heightened concentration is the result of weaker minority protections, and that strong 
minority shareholder protections correspond to less concentrated ownership.1010 Because 
data shows that French civil-law countries provide weaker protection for minority 
shareholders than do common law countries, LLSV argues that the two systems are 
completely distinct legal environments.1011 LLSV analysis ultimately concludes that strong 
legal protection for shareholders is a substantial predictor of financial growth. 
In future research it will be important to study how Saudi Arabia’s need for stronger 
minority protections relates to the broader relationship between different types of legal 
systems and financial development. Further study should address at least two specific 
issues. First, the Saudi legal system and commercial statutes have civil-law origins, but 
Islamic Law and the principles of Shari'a influence and govern all laws in the Kingdom.1012 
The question would be whether the Saudi system can be fairly classified along with other 
civil-law countries, or are there major differences in investor and creditor protections that 
differentiate it? Second, most literature focuses on publicly traded companies. Since this 
study examined shareholder protections in closely-held businesses, what, if any, impact 
should that have for LLSV findings?  
 
 
                                                 
1009 Id. 
1010 Id. 
1011 Id. 
1012 Maren Hanson, The Influence of French Law on the Legal Development of Saudi Arabia, 2 ARAB L.Q. 
272, 291 (1987). 
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